corporation itself regarding the essential facts of a claim'" (Matter of Leiblein v. Clark, 207 A.D.2d 348, 350, quoting Caselli v. City of New York, 105 A.D.2d 251, 255; see, O'Dell v. Town of Greenport, 97 A.D.2d 887, 888). While members of the local fire department and rescue squad were also present, the affidavit of John Haskell, respondent's Supervisor, confirmed that each of the aforementioned services are provided by contract with entities separate and distinct from respondent. In any event, because the police accident report failed to even mention a change in roadway conditions, design defects or other possible causes of the accident which could have connected the accident with any negligence on the part of the municipality or otherwise reveal the nature of this claim, no knowledge can be imputed to respondent (see, Matter of Leiblein v. Clark, supra, at 350; see also, Matter of Wilson v. City of Binghamton, 248 A.D.2d 780; Caselli v. City of New York, supra, at 257-258; cf., Mestel v. Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 90 A.D.2d 809). With no basis supporting any claim that the delay was related to the child's infancy (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e;Matter of Reiter v. City of Oneida, 244 A.D.2d 629, 630; Ford v. Guilderland, 85 A.D.2d 868, 868-869), since other claims were timely filed, Supreme Court's denial of petitioner's application was entirely proper when further considering the significant prejudice which would have enured to respondent due to its later resurfacing of the roadway (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e; Matter of Wilson v. City of Binghamton, supra, at 780; see also, Matter of Leiblein v. Clark,supra, at 350; O'Dell v. Town of Greenport, supra, at 888; compare,Matter of Welch v. Board of Educ. of Saratoga Cent. School Dist., 287 A.D.2d 761, 731 N.Y.S.2d 94; Matter of Hayes v. Peru Cent. School Dist., 281 A.D.2d 794, supra; Matter of Lacey v. Village of Lake Placid, 280 A.D.2d 863, supra;Matter of Reiter v. City of Oneida, 244 A.D.2d 629, supra).

At the time of the accident the defendant's chief operator of the sewage treatment plant was present on the site and directed traffic so that the injured claimant could be taken to the hospital. This afforded defendant actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim (see, e.g., Mestel v. Board of Educ., 90 A.D.2d 809; Matter of Ziecker v. Town of Orchard Park, 70 A.D.2d 422, affd 51 N.Y.2d 957). As defendant had actual knowledge of the claim and has not suffered substantial prejudice by the delay, claimants' motion to serve a late notice of claim is granted (see, Matter of Beary v. City of Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 412-413).

The village clerk is a person designated by law to accept service of a notice of claim on the village (see General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd 3, par [a]; CPLR 311, subd 6). Consequently, the village clerk's knowledge may be imputed to the village (see Mestel v. Board of Educ., 90 A.D.2d 809; Matter of Cooper v. City of Rochester, 84 A.D.2d 947). ¶ Furthermore, the village conducted an investigation of the facts surrounding petitioner James Hayden's arrest and resignation within three months after the statutorily prescribed period for serving a notice of claim expired, when the union commenced, on Mr. Hayden's behalf, an article 78 proceeding seeking, inter alia, Mr. Hayden's reinstatement to his job with the Department of Recreation and Parks.