¶ 5 If the deed is unambiguous it is not subject to interpretation. Messner v. Moorehead, 1990 OK 17, ¶ 9, 787 P.2d 1270. The clear and unambiguous deed will be governed by the laws in force at the time of the deed's execution. Id. However, deeds that are ambiguous or uncertain must be construed.
"[T]he court's first priority is to ascertain the true intent of the parties, particularly that of the grantor, as gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself, considering each part and viewed in light of the circumstances attending and leading up to its execution. . . ." Messner v. Moorehead, 1990 OK 17, ¶ 8, 787 P.2d 1270, 1272. "If the language and terms of a conveyance are clear and unambiguous, then the written deed, and the laws in force at the time of the deed's execution will govern the rights and obligations of the grantor and grantee." Id., ¶ 9, 787 P.2d at 1273.
Determining whether a conveyance is ambiguous is a matter of law. Messner v. Moorehead, 787 P.2d 1270, 1273 (Okla. 1990). When the court determines that a deed is ambiguous, the court has a duty to resolve the ambiguity by considering parol and extrinsic evidence, including the parties' admissions and construction, and other circumstances.
. . ." Messner v. Moorehead, 1990 OK 17, ¶ 8, 787 P.2d 1270, 1272. "If the language and terms of a conveyance are clear and unambiguous, then the written deed, and the laws in force at the time of the deed's execution will govern the rights and obligations of the grantor and grantee." Id., ¶ 9, 787 P.2d at 1273. If, however, the four corners of a conveyance demonstrate "an intrinsic uncertainty" the instrument is ambiguous.
"[T]he court's first priority is to ascertain the true intent of the parties, particularly that of the grantor, as gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself, considering each part and viewed in light of the circumstances attending and leading up to its execution. ..." Messner v. Moorehead , 1990 OK 17, ¶ 8, 787 P.2d 1270, 1272. "If the language and terms of a conveyance are clear and unambiguous, then the written deed, and the laws in force at the time of the deed's execution will govern the rights and obligations of the grantor and grantee."
In construing a conveyance, or alleged uncertainties in a deed, the Court's first priority is to ascertain the true intent of the parties, particularly that of the grantor, as gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself, considering each part and viewed in light of the circumstances attending and leading up to its execution, including the subject-matter and situation of the parties as to the time of the deed's execution.Messner v. Moorehead, 1990 OK 17, ¶8, 787 P.2d 1270. ¶7 Here, the trial court found that due to the limiting words "which may be owned by Circle F Ranch, Inc."
In construing a conveyance, or alleged uncertainties in a deed, the Court's first priority is to ascertain the true intent of the parties, particularly that of the grantor, as gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself, considering each part and viewed in light of the circumstances attending and leading up to its execution, including the subject-matter and situation of the parties as to the time of the deed's execution.Messner v. Moorehead, 1990 OK 17, ¶ 8, 787 P.2d 1270. ¶ 7 Here, the trial court found that due to the limiting words “which may be owned by Circle F Ranch, Inc.” in the granting clause of the deed, Grantor unambiguously expressed its intent to reserve in itself an undivided one-fourth (¼) mineral interest in Section 24.
Osprey L.L.C. v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co., Inc., 1999 OK 50, ¶ 14, 984 P.2d 194, 199. Johnson v. Butler, 1952 OK 207, ¶ 6, 245 P.2d 720, 722 (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Wear, 1939 OK 254, ¶ 0, 91 P.2d 91, 91; citing Vanzant v. State Ins. Fund, 1950 OK 237, 223 P.2d 111; Terrill v. Laney, 1948 OK 109, 193 P.2d 296; Bayouth v. Howard, 1948 OK 34, 190 P.2d 783; Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 1937 OK 228, 66 P.2d 1069); see also Logan Cty. Conservation Dist. v. Pleasant Oaks Homeowners Ass'n, 2016 OK 65, ¶ 15, 374 P.3d 755, 762; Beattie v. State ex rel. Grand River Dam Auth., 2002 OK 3, ¶ 12, 41 P.3d 377, 382 (citing Messner v. Moorehead, 1990 OK 17, 787 P.2d 1270). Logan Cty. Conservation Dist., 2016 OK 65, ¶ 15, 374 P.3d at 762 (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas v. Bishop, 1998 OK 16, ¶ 11, 956 P.2d 871, 874); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 160 (2001) ("The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning, unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed.").
Moreover, if the contract is not ambiguous, the parties' intent must be determined "from the four corners of the instrument itself," ascertaining the parties' intention solely from the language used in the conveyance. Messner v. Moorehead, 787 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Okla. 1990). If, however, the contract is deemed to be ambiguous, the court may order the parties to present extrinsic, parol evidence concerning the meaning of the terms used by the parties, "including their admissions and construction and other circumstances."
Resort to extrinsic evidence to determine whether an ambiguity exists is not permitted; the Court must make this finding based on the language of the insurance contract and the applicable rules of construction. See id. at 376-77; see also Messner v. Moorehead, 787 P.2d 1270, 1273 (Okla. 1990); Mercury Investment Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 (Okla. 1985).