Opinion
2014-10-15
Robert MESSINA, et al., respondents, v. STATEN ISLAND UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, appellant.
Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Christopher Simone and Lauren J. Daniels of counsel), for appellant. The Ashley Law Firm PLLC (Arnold E. DiJoseph, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Arnold E. DiJoseph III], of counsel), for respondents.
Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Christopher Simone and Lauren J. Daniels of counsel), for appellant. The Ashley Law Firm PLLC (Arnold E. DiJoseph, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Arnold E. DiJoseph III], of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, SANDRA L. SGROI, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Maltese, J.), dated May 24, 2012, as denied that branch of its motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of liability finding it 75% at fault for the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict on the issue of liability as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial or, in the alternative, to set aside, as excessive, the damages awards in the sums of $1,000,000 for past pain and suffering and $1,992,000 for future pain and suffering.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
“A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR ... 4404 may be granted only when the trial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusion reached by the jury upon the evidence presented at trial, and no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party” (Tapia v. Dattco, Inc., 32 A.D.3d 842, 844, 821 N.Y.S.2d 124; see Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346; Flynn v. Elrac, Inc., 98 A.D.3d 938, 939, 950 N.Y.S.2d 582). “In considering such a motion, ‘the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant’ ” (Hand v. Field, 15 A.D.3d 542, 543, 790 N.Y.S.2d 681, quoting Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d at 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346; see Leonard v. New York City Tr. Auth., 90 A.D.3d 858, 859, 934 N.Y.S.2d 721). Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, there was a rational process by which the jury could have found that the defendant departed from accepted nursing practice in failing to provide appropriate care for the plaintiff Robert Messina's skin ulcers, and that such departure was a proximate cause of his injuries ( see Burnett v. Jeffers, 90 A.D.3d 799, 800, 935 N.Y.S.2d 601; Semel v. Guzman, 84 A.D.3d 1054, 1056, 924 N.Y.S.2d 414).
Furthermore, “[a] jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence” (DeSalvo v. Kreynin, 95 A.D.3d 819, 819, 942 N.Y.S.2d 890; see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163; Flynn v. Elrac, Inc., 98 A.D.3d at 939, 950 N.Y.S.2d 582; Young Hee Lee v. Inspa World, 90 A.D.3d 915, 934 N.Y.S.2d 817). “ ‘Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors' ” (Vasquez v. County of Nassau, 91 A.D.3d 855, 857, 938 N.Y.S.2d 109, quoting Fekry v. New York City Tr. Auth., 75 A.D.3d 616, 617, 906 N.Y.S.2d 297; see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 498–499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145). We accord deference to the credibility determinations of the jury as factfinder, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses ( see Vasquez v. County of Nassau, 91 A.D.3d at 857, 938 N.Y.S.2d 109; Exarhouleas v. Green 317 Madison, LLC, 46 A.D.3d 854, 855, 847 N.Y.S.2d 866). Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the jury's determination that the defendant departed from good and accepted nursing practice and that such departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff Robert Messina's injuries was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Young Hee Lee v. Inspa World, 90 A.D.3d at 916, 934 N.Y.S.2d 817).
The awards for past and future pain and suffering do not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation ( seeCPLR 5501 [c] ).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit ( see Tarlowe v. Metropolitan Ski Slopes, 28 N.Y.2d 410, 413, 322 N.Y.S.2d 665, 271 N.E.2d 515; Mular v. Fredericks, 305 A.D.2d 648, 759 N.Y.S.2d 893).