Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3958-14T1
10-04-2016
DORA E. MESSICK, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and RTA PEDIATRIC CARE, INC., Respondents.
Dora E. Messick, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent RTA Pediatric Care, Inc., has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Fasciale and Higbee. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 00026953. Dora E. Messick, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent RTA Pediatric Care, Inc., has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Claimant Dora E. Messick was employed as an accounts payable clerk for a little over a year by RTA Pediatric Care d/b/a Family Medical Equipment. She left her employment on June 23, 2014, and advised her supervisor she was resigning. She asserts she had good cause to leave her employment, because she was harassed by her supervisors who required her to perform tasks outside of the scope of her job title; she was refused medical benefits because of her age; and she was disparaged because of her age. She was seventy-three years old at the time.
She appeals from the final decision of respondent Board of Review (Board) disqualifying her from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Board determined that claimant left her job without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.
At the hearing before an appeals examiner, claimant testified that she resigned her position because of the reasons stated above, and stated she left when she did because she needed time during the day to seek alternative employment and go on job interviews, which her employment schedule did not accommodate.
The appeals examiner concluded that claimant had not shown her working conditions were severe enough to leave her employment, especially since she waited months after the alleged incidents of discrimination to quit. The appeals examiner, also found that she had not carried her burden of proof that she was denied health benefits because of her age. Further, it was determined that claimant's decision to leave work to have more time to seek another job was a personal reason and not good cause for joining the unemployed. The appeals examiner, therefore, concluded claimant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her work. The Board affirmed the decision holding claimant was disqualified for benefits.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but . . . whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). We also give "due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility." Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obligated to accept them.'" Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210 (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "Unless . . . the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210.
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), a provision of the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law, states that a claimant is disqualified for benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed[.]" Moreover, "[c]laimants bear the burden of proof to establish their right to unemployment benefits." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218 (citing Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1964); DiMicele v. General Motors Corp., 51 N.J. Super. 167, 171 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd, 29 N.J. 427 (1959)).
An employee who leaves work voluntarily bears the burden to prove she did so "with good cause attributable to the work." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218. Although the statute does not define "good cause," our court has long construed the statute to mean "cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)). N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "good cause" as "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment."
The issue is not whether claimant's decision to leave work to make it easier for her to look for another job was reasonable. Instead it is whether she had no choice, but to leave her job. She was appropriately found to have left work voluntarily without good cause pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
We conclude claimant does not fall under the category of an unemployed worker that the Act is designed to protect. The Board's determination that claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and was supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION