First, we note that the cases cited by Winder predate the Act. See, e.g., City of Moultrie v. Burgess , 212 Ga. 22, 90 S.E.2d 1 (1955);Messenheimer v. Windt , 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402 (1955) ; Alford v. City of Eatonton , 174 Ga. 169, 162 S.E. 495 (1932) ; see also City of Union Point , 303 Ga. at 449, 812 S.E.2d 278 (noting the Act became effective in 1997); Ga. L. 1997, p. 1567, § 1. Importantly, the Act implicitly acknowledges a governing authority's standing to challenge water charges assessed in its jurisdiction by another governing authority, as the County does here.

In division 3, it was held, "[i]n Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ga. 753 ( 58 S.E.2d 823), it was held: `A municipal corporation may not compel any person outside its territorial limits to accept water service which it undertakes to furnish, nor may the municipal authorities be compelled to render such service. A municipal corporation may classify rates to be charged in outlying territories, and upon failure of customers to pay such charges, the municipal corporation may discontinue its service.' See, in this connection, Collier v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 575 ( 173 S.E. 853); Messenheimer v. Windt [ 211 Ga. 575 ( 87 S.E.2d 402) (1955)]. In City of Phoenix v. Kasun, 54 Ariz. 470 ( 97 P.2d 210, 127 ALR 84), which quotes at length from Collier v. Atlanta, supra, and which deals with water customers of the city residing outside of its corporate limits, it was said that the courts may determine whether or not the terms, including rates, on which one obtains service from a city are reasonable if the service is based upon a legal right, regardless of contract; but if his right to receive service is based solely on a voluntary contract with the city, that contract is subject to review by the courts only in the same manner as any other private contract, and it is not for them to determine whether its provisions are arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory.

Standard Cigar Co. v. Doyal, 175 Ga. 857 ( 166 S.E. 434). See also Wallace v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 749 ( 38 S.E.2d 596), and Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575 ( 87 S.E.2d 402), and citations. 3. The power of the City of Moultrie to extend its water system beyond its corporate limits and to serve customers outside of the city was originally granted by the legislature in 1931 (Ga. L. 1931, p. 908).

A municipality even has a right to classify rates for its public utilities services by fixing different rates for non-resident users and for resident users. Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402. Neither is the price for which the city furnishes water to its customers in any sense a tax.

Courts in this country have generally held that when a municipality provides public services beyond its corporate limits the rates charged for them may be fixed by contract, as was done here, in the absence of forbidding statute. Davisworth v. City of Lexington, 311 Ky. 606, 224 S.W.2d 649; Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402; City of Moultrie v. Burgess, 212 Ga. 22, 90 S.E.2d 1; Guth v. City of Staples, 183 Minn. 552, 237 N.W. 411; City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 299 P.2d 667; Fulghum v. Town of Selma, 238 N.C. 100, 76 S.E.2d 368; City of Montgomery v. Greene, 180 Ala. 322, 60 So. 900; City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 151 Tex. 100, 246 S.W.2d 622; Botkin v. City of Abilene, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W.2d 732. The last two cases deal with question of fixing utility rates as between residents and non-residents of the city. The concluding question is whether or not the construction of water distribution facilities within the corporate limits of the towns of Indialantic and Melbourne Beach deny due process and equal protection of the laws to the residents of the City of Melbourne in violation of Sections 1 and 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.

Most significantly, in most jurisdictions, it has been held that city authorities may fix a utility rate which generates a profit which can be transferred to the general fund. (See e.g., Mitchell v. City of Mobile (1943) 244 Ala. 442, 13 So.2d 664, 667; City of Pompano Beach v. Oltman, supra, 389 So.2d 283, 286; Messenheimer v. Windt (1955) 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402, 404-405.) (Since nonresidents are not taxpayers, they have no interest in the municipal revenues and no right to challenge a diversion of fund to retire hospital obligations.

In addition we note that the theory of adjustment of cost in favor of the taxpayer has been approved, in general, in Swank v. Village of Shiloh, 166 Ohio St. 415, and cases therein cited, where free street lighting by a municipal light plant was involved. The same theory of adjustment for actual services furnished to the municipal utility by the taxpayer has been pursued in many out-of-state cases including Delong v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287; Ashley v. Gilmer (Texas Civ. App.), 271 S.W.2d 100; Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402. This adjustment in favor of the taxpayer supporting the general fund which furnishes overhead expenses of the utility normally takes the form of rate differential between resident and non-resident rate payers.