The only interpretation that can be given if there is not a merger before April 16, 1981, is that the tax would not expire April 15, 1982. "Michigan case law makes it absolutely clear that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary. * * * Acme Messenger Service Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 306 Mich. 704 [ 11 N.W.2d 296] (1943)." Read literally, and as construed by SEMTA, the 1980 amendment produces the following result:
This language is not ambiguous. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary. People v Carey, 382 Mich. 285, 292; 170 N.W.2d 145 (1969), Acme Messenger Service Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 306 Mich. 704, 709; 11 N.W.2d 296 (1943). The Legislature clearly intended to create an offense separate and distinct from the underlying felony and to impose a separate punishment upon a person guilty of this offense.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary. People v Carey, 382 Mich. 285, 292; 170 N.W.2d 145 (1969), Acme Messenger Service Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 306 Mich. 704, 709; 11 N.W.2d 296 (1943). I would, therefore, order defendant's conviction on the felony-firearm charge vacated and the sentence for this offense set aside.
The law is well established that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no interpretation need or can be made. Jones v Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich. 1; 84 N.W.2d 327 (1957), Acme Messenger Service Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 306 Mich. 704, 709; 11 N.W.2d 296 (1943), Murray v Ferris, 74 Mich. App. 91, 94; 253 N.W.2d 365 (1977); Schigur v Secretary of State, 73 Mich. App. 239, 243; 251 N.W.2d 567 (1977), Gregory Boat Co v Detroit, 37 Mich. App. 673, 676; 195 N.W.2d 290 (1972); Collins v Motorists Mutual Ins Co, 36 Mich. App. 424, 430; 194 N.W.2d 148 (1971). An extension of that rule was promulgated by the Supreme Court in MacQueen v City Comm of Port Huron, 194 Mich. 328, 342; 160 N.W. 627 (1916).
It is therefore necessary to analyze the two statutes under consideration which, on the surface, appear to be inconsistent insofar as the present facts are concerned. The Supreme Court in Acme Messenger Service Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 306 Mich. 704, 709; 11 N.W.2d 296 (1943), stated: "The function of the court is to apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction and thereby seek to determine the legislative intent.
The legislative designation of a "peace officer" in section 2 of the safety act is plain and unambiguous and no interpretation or construction of this particular section is necessary. Acme Messenger Service Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission (1943), 306 Mich. 704; In re Chamberlain's Estate (1941), 298 Mich. 278; Geraldine v. Miller (1948), 322 Mich. 85; Knapp v. Palmer (1949), 324 Mich. 694; Van Antwerp v. State (1952), 334 Mich. 593; Mercy Hospital v. Crippled Children Commission (1954), 340 Mich. 404; Bartkowiak v. Wayne County (1954), 341 Mich. 333; Big Bear Markets of Michigan, Inc., v. Liquor Control Commission (1956), 345 Mich. 569. The Court can only give full effect to the plain meaning of the term as used in the statute and cannot read into the law a requirement that the lawmaking body has seen fit to omit.
Nordman v. Calhoun (1952), 332 Mich. 460, provides the test. In Nordman this Court, citing as authority Acme Messenger Service Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission (1943), 306 Mich. 704, said at page 466: "In our opinion the statutory definition of `employment' as provided in section 42(1) of the act is clear and unambiguous. It means service performed for remuneration or under an oral or written contract for hire."
In summary, plaintiff corporations are not entitled to have their experience records combined with that of the preceding partnership for the purpose of determining their contribution rate for 1942. The trial judge, in affirming the decision of the appeal board, correctly determined that the contribution for each of plaintiff corporations for 1942 should be computed at the 3% rate as provided in section 19 of the act. "The materially-different factual situations and questions presented in American Screw Products Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 311 Mich. 440 (159 ALR 1195), and other cases cited by plaintiffs, distinguish them from the present case. For other authorities bearing upon the questions involved in the case before us, see Auten v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 310 Mich. 453; Acme Messenger Service Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 306 Mich. 704; Iron Street Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 305 Mich. 643; Wayne Apartments, Inc., v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 305 Mich. 714; Godsol v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 302 Mich. 652 (142 ALR 910)." The case cited involved the liability of the plaintiff corporations for contributions during the calendar year 1942. Counsel for appellants in the case at bar direct attention to the fact that the legislature by PA 1943, No 246, amended section 22 by substituting in certain instances the word "employer" for the term "employing unit."
Sustaining this contention appellant calls attention to the following cases involving the workmen's compensation law as to whether the injured party was an independent contractor or employee: Tuttle v. Embury-Martin Lumber Co., 192 Mich. 385 (Ann Cas 1918 C, 664); Van Simaeys v. George R. Cook Co., 201 Mich. 540; Conrad v. Cummer-Diggins Co., 224 Mich. 414; Dennis v. Sinclair Lumber Fuel Co., 242 Mich. 89. In Nordman v. Calhoun, 332 Mich. 460, 465, this Court quoted with approval Acme Messenger Service Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 306 Mich. 704, wherein we said (p 709): "`Neither the common-law rules as to the relation of master and servant, nor the "independent contractor" rules as applied to the workmen's compensation law or the licensing of carriers of passengers or goods for hire, will be considered to provide the controlling test as to whether one is "in the employment of" another, under the unemployment compensation act.
In its brief plaintiff says, as borne out by the record, that there was such lack of personal relationship between them and it that plaintiff did not necessarily know who actually had done the typing, payment being made solely for delivered results without regard for the identity of the persons producing them. Plaintiff bases its claimed right to recover upon its contention that the typists were not its employees and, in that connection, stresses its lack of control or right of control over them in the production of the typed materials, citing Bert Baker, Inc., v. Ryce, 301 Mich. 84; Acme Messenger Service Co. v. UnemploymentCompensation Commission, 306 Mich. 704; O'Brian v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 309 Mich. 18; Palmer v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 310 Mich. 702 (158 ALR 909); Graystone Ballroom, Inc., v. Baggott, 319 Mich. 87. It is to be noted that the periods involved in those cases antedated PA 1943, No 246, which amended the 1936 act and omitted therefrom the provision found in section 42, subsection 4(a), (made section 42, subsection 6[a] by PA 1937, No 347) that one of the tests of "employment" under the act should be whether the person performing services was free from control or direction over his performance thereof. In Nordman v. Calhoun, 332 Mich. 460, stressed by defendant and relied upon by the lower court, which involved a period after the 1943 amendment, we said: