No. 05-04-01215-CR
Opinion Filed November 9, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-00854-SW. Affirm.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG-MIERS and MAZZANT.
Opinion By Justice LANG-MIERS.
Appellant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and a Dallas County jury convicted him of murder. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The jury made a deadly weapon finding and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In three points of error, appellant argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's implicit rejection of his insanity defense and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to exercise peremptory strikes against jurors 20 and 25 in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We affirm.
FACTS
On June 23, 2003, appellant strangled his 15-year-old pregnant girlfriend Teshibra Bell, attempted to dismember her leg, and then burned her body. The night before her death, appellant's cousin Marlon Van Coleman arrived at appellant's home around 10:30 p.m. to stay the night. Appellant and Coleman bought a six-pack of beer and cocaine and stayed up drinking and talking until 3:30 a.m. The next morning, Coleman awoke to hear appellant and the victim arguing in the bedroom. Coleman yelled to appellant that he was going to buy cigarettes, and appellant came out of the bedroom and asked Coleman to buy him a cigar. Appellant did not appear angry. Although Coleman asked appellant to leave the door unlocked, he heard appellant lock the door after he left. When Coleman returned fifteen to twenty minutes later, the door was still locked, but he could see appellant in the backyard. Appellant was wearing orange shorts with an extension cord hanging from his neck, was dripping in sweat, and did not have any visible injuries. Appellant opened the door, and Coleman asked him what he was doing. Appellant replied that he was getting ready to barbecue. When Coleman asked appellant where the victim was, appellant said, "[R]ight there" and pointed outside the door to a king-sized multicolored comforter with something sticking out of it. Coleman asked appellant if he had killed her, and appellant replied that he "had to." Appellant asked Coleman to help him, but Coleman said no and left, later calling the police. After receiving a call that a person was unconscious at appellant's address, Lieutenant August Galli and fellow firefighters rushed to appellant's house around 11:00 a.m. When Galli arrived, appellant told him that no one was unconscious or injured. He claimed that he was burning a blanket and leaves to ward off mosquitoes. Galli followed appellant to an area behind the house in front of a garage apartment and saw only scorched ground, burned leaves, and the burned remnants of a blanket. Appellant seemed anxious and jittery. Galli tried to enter the garage apartment after another firefighter told Galli he believed he had seen a body there. Appellant initially blocked the entrance but eventually stepped aside. Galli then saw a large mass wrapped in a blanket. The blanket contained the naked burned body of a black female. Dallas Police Officer Mark Woody, who also viewed the body at the scene, testified that it appeared to have been cut up or quartered. Officer Rodney Allen testified that, at the scene of the murder, appellant complained that the victim harassed him and had a screwdriver or knife. While in the car awaiting transport to the homicide division, appellant told Officer Woody that "he had been trying to get [the victim] to leave, that she would not leave, that she had been destroying his property, and that she had attacked him." Appellant later confessed in a written statement at the police station: I first met [the victim] in August 2002. She told me she [was] 19 years old. We begin to see each other and I later found out she was not of age. I cut her off and terminated our relationship. She continued to come by my house and after a period of time she became a stalker. She would harrass [sic] me[,] destroy my property on a consistent basis. I have made complaints to the police department but nothing seemed to get resolved. I have had criminal trespass cards issued to her by the police department. This did not get resolved and she continued to threaten me and destroy my property. She continuously came to my house and was loud and caused disturbances to my neighbors. She came by on 6-22-03 and paid me for my tires that she had destroyed. I ask[ed] her to leave my house and she began to disagree with that and I let her spend the night. I got tired of her arguing and her beligrent [sic] attitude and that is why I let her spend the night. Sometime in the middle of the night I began physically trying to put her out of my house. She began getting loud and started destroying my property and refusing to leave. I got tired of this same repetitive behavior and grabbed her to put her out of the house. She started hitting me and that is when I lost control. I choked her with my hands till she passed out. I thought she [was] still alive and I began to panic. I pulled her out on the patio and lit the blanket she was on. She began to smoke a lot and I pour[ed] water on her to put the flame out.
At trial, the State introduced evidence of a piece of burned bloody carpet, an extension cord with blood markings, and two bloody knives, all of which tested positive for the victim's DNA. Medical Examiner Jill Urban noted that the victim's body was burned over the front and portions of the back, and her leg had been cut as if appellant had tried to dismember the body. She said there was hemorrhaging consistent with strangulation and determined that the victim died as a result of homicidal violence including strangulation. Contributing factors included thermal and sharp-forced injuries. Carbon monoxide levels in the victim's toxicology report suggested that she may have been breathing when she was burned. She was pregnant with a 33-week-old fetus. DNA evidence excluded appellant as the father, which Coleman claimed that appellant knew. During the defense's case, various witnesses stated that the victim slashed the tires on appellant's car, attempted to flood his house by inserting a garden hose into his mailbox, and refused to allow him to break off the relationship. Appellant's uncle testified that appellant and the victim had a poor relationship but admitted that appellant knew the difference between right and wrong. He also testified that appellant had more difficulty coping as he grew older, especially with school and maintaining employment. Childhood friend Shawnkeedra Houston testified that appellant had never been violent and had become more withdrawn after the deaths of his parents. Appellant's sister, Valerie Mosley, a child adolescent psychiatrist for Dallas County, testified that appellant had experienced a behavioral change in 1999, two years before his mother's death, in which he became more disrespectful. Appellant sought help at the ABC Behavioral Health Clinic where Dr. Shivani Myer treated him with medication for bipolarism and mania with some psychosis. Dr. Myer admitted that she was unsure of her diagnosis and expressed concern that appellant's symptoms may have emanated from drug abuse. Appellant himself testified about his history of drug use and the emotional effect of his parents' deaths. He testified about a specific behavioral change in 1997 that he described as a "bad mental accident" with symptoms of paranoia and a delusion of raping a neighbor girl, on which he attempted to act. He described in detail his relationship with the victim up until the point when he killed her. On cross-examination, he testified about the details of the murder, but appellant claimed that he was not in an "aware state of mind." However, appellant admitted, "Yeah, I do feel to a certain extent that I did something wrong. I mean, I know that criminally that I probably broke the law." In rebuttal, the State called psychiatrist David Self, who had interviewed appellant, listened to his testimony, and consulted various records. He stated that appellant did not meet the definition of legal insanity and did not have a severe mental disease. At most, he believed appellant suffered from a narcissistic personality disorder and paranoia. Dr. Self testified that appellant claimed to have sought mental health treatment to get a disability check and admitted that it was wrong to kill the victim. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY TO SUPPORT REJECTION OF INSANITY
In his first issue, appellant argues that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's implicit rejection of his affirmative defense of insanity. In examining the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the affirmative defense of insanity, a reviewing court considers all the evidence relevant to the issue to determine whether the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1162 (1995); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). The factfinder may not convict a defendant of a criminal offense if he is legally insane at the time of the crime. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). But the definition of medical insanity is not necessarily the same as the definition of legal insanity within the meaning of section 8.01. And evidence of a mental disease alone is not sufficient to establish legal insanity unless the accused was mentally ill to the point that he did not know his conduct was wrong. Plough v. State, 725 S.W.2d 494, 500 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.). "The purpose of the insanity defense issue is to determine whether the accused should be held responsible for the crime, or whether his mental condition will excuse holding him responsible." Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Ultimately, the determination of this issue lies within the province of the jury, not only as to the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence but also as to the limits of the defense itself. Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 952; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Because the circumstances of a crime are always important in determining the mental state of the accused at the time of the offense, Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951, the trier of fact may consider such evidence as the appellant's demeanor before and after the offense, attempts to evade police, attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, expressions of regret or fear of the consequences of his actions, other possible motives for the offense, and other explanations for his behavior. See Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.). Moreover, because the insanity issue is not strictly medical, expert witnesses, although capable of giving testimony that may aid the jury in its determination of the ultimate issue, are not capable of dictating determination of that issue. Only the jury can join the non-medical components that must also be considered in deciding the ultimate issue. That ultimate issue of criminal responsibility is beyond the province of expert witnesses. Were it otherwise, the issue would be tried in hospitals rather than in the courts. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949. Appellant admitted on the stand and to Dr. Self that his conduct was wrong, and the State offered evidence of motive — that the victim was carrying another man's child, had destroyed appellant's property, and fought with him. The State's evidence further revealed that appellant's actions leading up to and immediately following the murder indicate that he was trying to cover up the murder. Appellant seemed normal before Coleman left to go to the store but then locked the door behind Coleman although Coleman asked him to leave it open. When Coleman learned that appellant had killed the victim, appellant asked him for "help," presumably in disposing of the body. Appellant hid the body in a comforter, burned and attempted to dismember the body, and cut out and burned a square of carpet that bore the victim's blood. He continued to cover up the murder when authorities arrived at his home by first claiming that no one was unconscious or injured and then claiming that he was burning the blanket and leaves to ward off mosquitoes. Appellant physically blocked their entrance when authorities tried to find out whether there was a body in the garage apartment. Authorities who witnessed appellant's demeanor at the scene all testified that appellant looked anxious. After police discovered the body, appellant switched tactics and attempted to deflect blame onto the victim. He complained to two police officers that she had been harassing him and then confessed in a written statement to murdering her because she "began getting loud and started destroying my property and refusing to leave." See Aschbacher v. State, 61 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd) (noting that defendant's confession to eyewitness and statement to police both favor jury's rejection of insanity defense). Although the defense attempted to mitigate the State's evidence by calling two psychiatrists to testify that appellant may have suffered from a mental disorder, neither psychiatrist testified that appellant met the definition of legal insanity at the time of the offense. Appellant's attempt to cover up the murder and then blame the victim, combined with his own admissions that his acts were wrong, indicated that he understood that his conduct was wrong. We do not believe that the evidence preponderates in favor of appellant to the extent that the jury's implicit finding was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was manifestly unjust. Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878. We overrule appellant's first point of error. BATSON CHALLENGES
In his second and third points of error, appellant argues that the State violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) when it struck black jurors 20 and 25. When reviewing a Batson challenge, the appellate court examines the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and reverses only when the ruling is clearly erroneous. Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Bausley v. State, 997 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. ref'd). A ruling is clearly erroneous when, after searching the record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court has made a mistake. Bausley, 997 S.W.2d at 315. If the record, including the voir dire, the prosecutor's explanation of her peremptory challenges, appellant's rebuttal, and any impeaching evidence, supports the trial court's ruling, then the ruling is not clearly erroneous. Id. To challenge the State's use of peremptory strikes under Batson, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the State exercised peremptory strikes on an impermissible basis. Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 630; Bausley, 997 S.W.2d at 316. Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the State must provide a race or gender neutral explanation for striking the prospective juror in question. Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 630; Bausley, 997 S.W.2d at 316. This step does not demand a persuasive or even plausible explanation; rather, it requires an explanation devoid of inherent discriminatory intent. Bausley, 997 S.W.2d at 315 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). An explanation is neutral in this context if the State bases it on something other than the juror's race or gender. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent, the courts will consider the explanation race or gender neutral. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). If the State provides a race or gender neutral explanation for its strikes, the defendant may rebut the State's explanation or show that the explanation was merely a sham or pretext. Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 630; Bausley, 997 S.W.2d at 316. To meet this burden, the defendant may call witnesses and introduce evidence just as in any other evidentiary hearing. Bausley, 997 S.W.2d at 316. The defendant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to establish the truth of his allegations of purposeful discrimination. Id. At this third step, the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. In judging the trial court's decision at step three, the reviewing court applies the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 726 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). At the Batson hearing, the State proffered neutral explanations for striking both black jurors 20 and 25. The State argued that it struck juror 20 because he was starting a new job: "the State does not want a juror sitting on this jury that has other personal conflicts and scheduling problems on their mind as they deliberated." The State also noted that it struck white juror 50 who was starting a new job the following week and white juror 5 because he had out-of-town dinner plans with his wife. See Partida v. State, 133 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding youth and employment (or lack thereof) acceptable race neutral explanations for striking prospective juror). The State argued that it struck juror 25 because he failed to understand the State's legal burdens. In support of its argument, the State pointed to two specific responses as reasons to strike: (1) "in response to [the prosecutor], he asked her why the State was holding it against the defendant for not letting him testify" and (2) "because [the prosecutor] said there was several issues the State does not have to prove, he made the comment, well, that starts to create reasonable doubt in my mind with all these things you said you don't have to prove." Both responses raise race neutral reasons to strike. The first response suggests that the juror believed the State was not honoring appellant's right not to testify. The second response suggests that the juror had already formed a reasonable doubt. See Williams v. State, 939 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, no pet.) (holding that juror's confusion over the application of the reasonable doubt standard constitutes a race neutral reason to exercise a peremptory strike). The State's explanations for striking jurors 20 and 25 fail to raise an inherent discriminatory intent, and defense counsel did not offer any rebuttal other than to say that the explanations were not, in his opinion, race neutral. A party's failure to offer any real rebuttal to a proffered race neutral explanation can be fatal to his claim. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Here, appellant has failed to prove that the prosecutor's explanations were a pretext for discrimination. We overrule points of error two and three. CONCLUSION
We conclude that appellant has failed to show that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's implicit rejection of his insanity defense. Further, the State's unrebutted explanations for striking jurors 20 and 25 were devoid of inherent discriminatory intent. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Tex.R.App.P. 43.2(a).