Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 98-2013 SECTION: E/1
October 6, 2000
RULING ON MOTION
Plaintiffs CYNTHIA MESA-TONEY and JASON MESA-TONEY (hereinafter "MESA-TONEY") have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine seeking ostensibly for dismissal of the crossclaim of defendant STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter "STATE FARM") against MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a Mazda North American Operations (hereinafter "MAZDA"), and to preclude State Farm from relying on a defense of third party fault or having the jury apportion fault to Mazda. Defendant STATE FARM opposes this motion.
Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Mesa-Toney filed the instant complaint against defendants State Farm and Mazda alleging that Mazda was liable in products liability and State Farm was liable for the negligence of an uninsured driver for damages plaintiff Cynthia Mesa-Toney suffered during a traffic accident. See Complaint ¶¶ VII-XVIII; Amended Complaint ¶¶ IV-XIV. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Mesa-Toney have voluntarily dismissed all of their claims asserted against the Mazda defendants, reserving their rights to their claims against State Farm. Defendant State Farm contends that they are only liable for the amount of loss proximately caused by the tortfeasor — unidentified motorist, and that summary judgment on its crossclaim, which is now in the nature of a third-party demand, against Mazda, should be denied. State Farm also argues in effect that even if its cross-claim against Mazda is dismissed and the jury is not allowed to apportion Mazda's third party fault based on products liability, it should be allowed to argue that a proximate cause of the accident was the air bag deployment, and that it can only be held liable for that portion of the plaintiff's damages which were proximately caused by the tortfeasor-uninsured motorist.
On June 18, 1997, plaintiff Cynthia Mesa-Toney leased a new 1997 Mazda Miata from Royal Oldsmobile Mazda. She obtained automobile insurance, including uninsured motorist coverage, from defendant State Farm. About a month later, on or about July 16, 1997, while driving the insured car eastbound on Lapalco Boulevard in Jefferson Parish, she was allegedly forced off of the roadway by an unidentified, dark colored truck. As she left the roadway, her car struck the curb and the driver-side air bag deployed forcefully, pushing plaintiff's fist to strike her face. As a result, plaintiff suffered several broken facial bones and a choroidal rupture beneath the macular of the left eye, leaving her legally blind in that eye, a permanent condition. Plaintiff testified that the driver of the unidentified truck did not stop, nor did any eyewitnesses. Plaintiff did state that two unidentified men had stopped to offer assistance shortly after the accident and she told them what happened.
Two issues are at the core of the instant motion. The first is whether, under the Louisiana Products Liability Act and general negligence, fault, and joint and several liability principles, the defendant/cross-claimant State Farm may maintain its claim of products liability and/or third party fault against Mazda when it has failed to obtain expert testimony in support of the claim. The second is whether, even if the jury is not allowed to assign a percentage of fault to Mazda, whether State Farm may nonetheless argue that it is only liable for the damages which were proximately caused to the plaintiff by the negligence of the uninsured driver, and that it may not be held liable for any damages proximately caused by Mazda and/or the plaintiff.
Louisiana Civil Code 2323 provides that:
A. In any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or loss, the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and regardless of the person's insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute, including, but not limited to the provisions of [the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Statute] R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable. If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the amount of damages shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death, or loss.
B. The provisions of paragraph A shall apply to any claim for recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability.
LSA-C.C. art. 2323.
Article 2323 plainly states that, regardless whether Mazda is a party to this suit or not, its degree of fault contributing to the injury may be determined by the factfinder, here the jury, along with all other persons whose fault has contributed to the plaintiff's injury or loss. Certainly, State Farm may urge the defense of comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff, as plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to her by the trier of fact. See, LSA-CC. art. 2323.
In order to establish its cross-claim, which is now in the nature of a third-party demand, and consequently the fault, of Mazda, State Farm would have to meet its burden of proof under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA). The LPLA provides the exclusive remedy for suits against a manufacturer of a product for damages allegedly resulting from that product's use. Gallien v. Stapleton Corp., 692 So.2d 1271, 1274 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1997). If unable to prove products liability under the LPLA, the proponent "is without a civil remedy against the manufacturer."Id.
The Louisiana Products Liability Act states that a manufacturer of a product is liable "for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product." LSA-R.S. § 9:2800.54 (West 1999). Further, a product can only be "unreasonably dangerous": (1) in construction or composition; (2) in design; (3) because an adequate warning about the product was not provided; or (4) because the product does not reasonably conform to an express manufacturer's warranty. See id.; see also Pickett v. RTS Helicopter, 128 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1997). In particular, the LPLA provides that "a product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition if, at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same manufacturer." LSA-R.S. § 9:2800.55 (West 1999). Under the LPLA, "A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control: (1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant's damage; and (2) The likelihood that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product." LSA-R.S. § 9:2800.56. The burden of proving the elements of products liability is on the claimant.See LSA-R.S. § 9:2800.54(D) (West 1999).
In response to this summary judgment motion, State Farm has not produced sufficient evidence to establish a claim of products liability due to a design or a manufacturing defect, and there is no evidence in the record concerning warnings. The one expert consulted by the plaintiff, who is purportedly an expert in the fields of general engineering and air bag technology and is familiar with the facts and circumstances of the incident, was unable to determine the exact cause of the malfunction because the investigation was terminated prematurely.See Moakes Deposition at 54-57. Unable to clearly characterize the injury as resulting from a characteristic of the air bag that renders the product unreasonably dangerous because of any of the four expressed deviations, defendant can not substantiate a claim of products liability. Without evidence upon which a finding of liability under the LPLA could be sustained, State Farm's cross-claim against Mazda must fail, since it can only be based upon the LPLA.
The issue is then whether, regardless of State Farm's ability to establish a claim under the LPLA against Mazda, it can present the defense of third-party fault. The term fault in Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 is derived from article 2315, the seminal tort code article, which provides that "[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Fault is a term of art which includes the breach of a duty owed by one party to another. The facts and circumstances of the case, and the relationship of the parties dictates whether or not a legal duty is owed by one party to another. White v. State of Louisiana, Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 569 So.2d 1001, 1003 (La.App. 1stCir. 1990). "Fault . . . encompasses more than negligence. It is the breach of a duty owed by one party to another under particular facts and circumstances of a given case. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. State, Through Department of Highways, 339 So.2d 780 (La. 1976). 'Fault' is a broad concept embracing all conduct falling below a proper standard. Kahoe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 349 So.2d 1345 (La.App. 1stCir. 1977), writ denied, 350 So.2d 1212 (1977)." Williams v. Louisiana Machinery Company. Inc., 387 So.2d 8, 11 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1980).
Because Louisiana law limits Mazda's legal duty under these circumstances to those delineated in the LPLA, and hence its fault can only be that prescribed by the law, the requirement that the finder of fact apportion th degree of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury does not allow for Mazda's fault to be reduced to a number. State Farm failed to adduce sufficient evidence to present a claim against Mazda under the LPLA, and under the law, Mazda's only legal fault is under that statute.
In reaching this decision, the Court recognizes that implicit in Civil Code article 2323 is the concept that there may be parties who are immune from suit whose fault is specifically required to be apportioned by the fact finder. This particularly includes a plaintiff's employer who is immune from tort liability by the Worker's Compensation Statute. Article 2323 dictates that the fault, i.e., the negligence or breach of duty, of the employer be fixed in weighing the various parties' respective fault in causing the accident. If State Farm had adduced sufficient evidence to present a products liability claim against Mazda, then its fault, albeit under the LPLA, would be apportioned by the factfinder. It has failed to do so, and thus, the factfinder cannot apportion fault to Mazda.
The inquiry does not end here. In order for a defendant to be liable in negligence for injury or damage, its fault must cause the injury or damage. There are many conditions or actions, unrelated to fault, which cause injury or damage. Examples include pre-existing medical conditions, pre-existing physical or birth defects, causing physical injury, and Acts of God, such as flooding or wind storms, causing physical injury or property damage. Under article 2315, which is the basis for plaintiff's claim against the uninsured motorist, and hence State Farm, cause, often referred to as proximate cause, encompasses two notions, both cause-in-fact and legal cause. "The cause-in-fact test requires that 'but for' the defendant's conduct, the injuries would not have been sustained. The legal causation test requires that there be a 'substantial relationship' between the conduct complained of and the harm incurred." Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 653 So.2d 232, 241 (La.App. 2ndCir. 1995).
While State Farm may not have Mazda's percentage of fault assessed numerically, it may certainly argue that the negligence of the truck was not the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and that State Farm may be held liable only for the damages plaintiff sustained which were caused by the truck driver's fault or negligence. In the same manner as a defendant may not be held liable for injuries caused by a pre-existing medical condition, State Farm cannot be held liable for any damages not legally or proximately caused by its negligence. State Farm may present and argue this causation defense to the finder of fact, here the jury.
Accordingly for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of plaintiffs Cynthia and Jason Mesa-Toney for summary judgment on the cross-claim of State Farm against Mazda, and on Mazda's defense of third-party fault, is hereby GRANTED. State Farm may argue that the fault of the uninsured truck driver was not the cause-in-fact, or legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion in limine of plaintiffs to prevent defendant State Farm from arguing the defense of third party fault be and is hereby GRANTED IN PART in that fault will not be apportioned to Mazda by the jury, but DENIED IN PART in that State Farm may argue that it was not the negligence of the truck driver, but the activation of the air bag, irrespective of fault, that was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries.