Words expressive of a particular intent, incompatible with others expressive of a general intent, may be construed as an exception to the latter, so that all may have effect. Dwarris on Statutes and Constitutions (Potter, 1871) 273; Churchill v. Crease, 5 Bing. 177, 180; State v. Moore, 108 Md. 636, 71 A. 461, 462. It is a canon of statutory construction that, where there is an earlier special statute and a later general statute, the terms of the later being broad enough to include the matter provided for in the former, the special statute must be considered as an exception to the general statute.
Thus, where a general intention is expressed in a statute, and also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is considered in the nature of an exception. Stockett v. Bird's Adm'r, 18 Md. 484, 489; State, to Use of Mertens v. Moore, 108 Md. 636, 639, 71 A. 461. Here we consider two sections of Article 66C, title "Natural Resources," sub-title "Oysters and Clams."
The meaning and effect of the provisions must therefore be construed with due regard to the fact that they are now consolidated in one enactment. Barron v. Zimmerman, 117 Md. 296; Reese v. Starner, 106 Md. 53; Mertens v. Moore, 108 Md. 636; Overton v. Harrington, 126 Md. 32; Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 364. The scope of sections 3 and 4 would be greatly reduced if held not to include the thirty-one property uses classified in section 2. But the applicability of the later section is not affected by an interpretation that the uses which it defines are also within the purview of sections 3 and 4. While that construction would recognize the right of interested persons to appeal to the board of zoning appeals from the unfavorable action of the buildings engineer on a request for a permit to devote property to any of the uses specified in section 2, it would not affect the provision that without the approval of the mayor no such application shall be granted. It is not required by section 2 that a permit shall be issued as the inevitable effect of the mayor's approval, but it is simply provided that without such approval the request for the permit shall be refused. The veto power thus conferred is not equivalent to affirmative an