Opinion
111,605.
07-31-2015
Dustin J. MERRYFIELD, Appellant v. Shawn SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, Appellee.
Dustin J. Merryfield, appellant pro se. Michele Kraak, litigation counsel, and Kimberly M.J. Lynch, senior litigation counsel, of Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, for appellee.
Dustin J. Merryfield, appellant pro se.
Michele Kraak, litigation counsel, and Kimberly M.J. Lynch, senior litigation counsel, of Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., BRUNS, J., and HEBERT, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Dustin J. Merryfield appeals from the district court's order finding he was not entitled to recover certain funds withheld or withdrawn from his account while involuntarily committed in the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) at Lamed State Hospital (Lamed). First, he argues that the State has no statutory or regulatory authority to deduct funds from his paycheck or his account. Next, he argues that he signed several contracts under duress or that they were otherwise invalid. These contracts permitted the State to take funds from his paychecks and his account. Finally, he argues that he was entitled to free transcripts or, in the alternative, that he was entitled to pay for his transcripts on a payment plan. Finding no error in the district court's decision, we affirm.
Facts
In December 2000, Merryfield was involuntarily committed in the SPTP at Lamed. For most of his time as a patient in the SPTP, Merryfield has been employed by the State of Kansas through a program called the Vocational Training Program (VTP). In order to take part in the VTP, Merryfield was required to sign agreements that, in relevant part, permitted the State to withdraw money from his patient trust fund in accordance with certain guidelines. The most recent agreement permitted Merryfield to keep a total of $127 per month and then one-half of any remaining amount earned through the VTP. The agreement stated that the other one-half of the remaining amount would be applied towards his maintenance, care, and treatment for the duration of his employment.
On September, 21, 2011, Merryfield filed a petition for replevin in Pawnee County District Court. In it, Merryfield alleged that the State unlawfully had taken money from his paychecks and his patient account. More specifically, Merryfield alleged that he had signed the VTP agreement and other contracts under duress, which led to the unlawful taking of $4,559.54 by the State at the time the petition was filed. He further alleged that no statute or regulation authorized the State to collect funds from his paycheck.
The case proceeded to a bench trial in January 2014. After hearing evidence from both parties, the district court took the matter under advisement. The court later issued a written memorandum decision and order denying Merryfield's petition for replevin. After trial, Merryfield filed a notice of appeal. He also filed a request to have the costs of his transcripts put on a payment plan. In it, he asserted he was not able to pay the costs of his transcripts up front. The district court denied the request, citing the fact that this was a replevin action for damages in ruling that it was not appropriate for a county to advance the costs of the transcripts.
Analysis
Merryfield raises several claims of error on appeal. To avoid confusion, the relevant facts related to each claim are presented with greater specificity below in conjunction with the corresponding analysis.
1. No authority to deduct funds
Where a district court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court must determine whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the findings are sufficient to support the conclusions of law. Substantial evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. U.S.D. No. 233 v. Kansas Ass'n of American Educators, 275 Kan. 313, 318, 64 P.3d 372 (2003). The district court's conclusions of law are subject to unlimited review. Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1182, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014).
The elements required to sustain a replevin action are: (1) the plaintiff owned the property alleged in the petition; (2) the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property; and (3) the defendant unlawfully detained the property. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 60–1005 ; Herl v. State Bank of Parsons, 195 Kan. 35, 39, 403 P.2d 110 (1965). The parties agree that the disputed funds were earned by Merryfield through his participation in the VTP. The district court, however, found that Merryfield failed to bear his burden to establish that the State unlawfully detained the funds.
a. Legal disability
In his first claim of error, Merryfield argues the State is not authorized to collect any money from him because he is under a legal disability. He does not challenge the validity of any particular statute but rather claims that the State did not abide by the law. His arguments require this court to interpret several statutes and regulations. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to unlimited review by this court. State v. Kendall, 300 Kan. 515, 520, 331 P.3d 763 (2014).
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–29al2(a) provides:
“(a) For state budgetary purposes, the secretary shall be responsible for all cost relating to the evaluation and treatment of persons committed to the secretary's custody under any provision of [the Sexually Violent Predator Act]. Payment for the maintenance, care and treatment of any such committed person shall be paid by the person, by the conservator of such person's estate or by any person bound by law to support such person. Reimbursement may be obtained by the secretary for the cost of care and treatment, including placement in transitional release, of persons committed to the secretary's custody pursuant to K.S.A. 59–2006, and amendments thereto.” (Emphasis added.)
In turn, K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006(a) states:
“(a) A person's spouse and the parents of a person who is a minor shall be bound by law to support the person if the person is committed to, admitted to, transferred to or received as a patient at a state institution. Payment for the maintenance, care and treatment of any patient in a state institution irrespective of the manner of such patient's admission shall be paid by the patient, by the conservator of such patient's estate or by any person bound by law to support such patient. The secretary for aging and disability services may recover the basic maximum charge established as provided for in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 59–2006b, and amendments thereto, or the actual per patient costs established as provided in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 59–2006b, and amendments thereto, as compensation for the maintenance, care and treatment of a patient from such patient when no legal disability exists, or from the estate of such patient or from any person bound by law to support such patient.” (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006(a) clearly prohibits the State from collecting money from a patient for his or her maintenance, care, and treatment while the person is under a legal disability. Merryfield points out in his brief that K.S.A.2014 Supp. 77–201 states that “ ‘[u]nder legal disability’ includes persons who are within the period of minority, or who are incapacitated, incompetent or imprisoned.” K.S.A.2014 Supp. 77–201. He asserts that he is imprisoned and therefore exempt from compensating the State for his care under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006(a).
Although involuntary, Merryfield's commitment proceedings were civil in nature rather than criminal. See K.S.A. 59–29a01. To that end, the United States Supreme Court specifically has held that confinement under Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act is not tantamount to punishment. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). The Hendricks Court also held that civil commitment does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if it follows a prison term. 521 U.S. at 369. Based on the statutory scheme under which Merryfield has been placed at Lamed, as well as the United States Supreme Court's decision interpreting that statutory scheme, we conclude as a matter of law that his placement as a patient in the SPTP does not qualify as imprisonment.
b. Notice
Merryfield claims that the State's failure to serve him with a written demand providing notice of the amount of money owed to the State violated K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006(b). K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006(b) states:
“(b) The secretary for aging and disability services shall periodically and not less than once during each fiscal year make written demand upon the patient or person liable for the amount claimed by the secretary to have accrued since the last demand was made, and no action shall be commenced by the secretary against such patient or such patient's responsible relatives for the recovery thereof unless such action is commenced within three years after the date of such written demand. When any part of the amount claimed to be due has been paid or any acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same has been made by the obligor, an action may be brought in such case within three years after such payment, acknowledgment or promise, but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing signed by the party to be charged thereby. If there are two or more joint debtors, no one of whom is entitled to act as the agent of the others, no such joint debtor shall lose the benefit of the statute of limitations so as to be chargeable by reason of any acknowledgment, promise or payment made by any other or others of them, unless done with the knowledge and consent of, or ratified by, the joint debtor sought to be charged. The secretary may accept voluntary payments from patients or relatives or from any source, even though the payments are in excess of required amounts and shall deposit the same as provided by law.” (Emphasis added.)
At trial, Merryfield testified that he had never received a written demand notifying him of what he owed. Tammy Binder, a public service administrator who oversaw the reimbursement department at Lamed, admitted that the State did not serve patients with formal notice of, and demand for, the full accrued cost of a patient's care in the SPTP. However, she did state that Merryfield was provided with sufficient notice of the costs due and owing in deposit slips provided to him each month. These deposit slips were entered into evidence. They show how much Merryfield earned during a specified period, how much was deducted for room and board, and the total amount available to Merryfield. They also show the amount of any applicable carryover amount to the next month. Binder testified that the deductions noted in these slips were the only amounts Merryfield would ever have to pay toward his maintenance, care, and treatment in the SPTP. The district court found that the deposit slips constituted adequate notice under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006(b).
On appeal, Merryfield again argues he never received the formal written demand required and, without such a demand, the State is prohibited from collecting any money from him. The State continues to assert that the deposit slips fulfill its notice requirement. Because the deposit slips do, indeed, show the amount withheld from a given deposit, substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that the deposit slips constituted adequate notice under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006(b).
c. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–29al2/K.A.R. 30–26–3
K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–29al2(d) provides: “The secretary shall adopt rules and regulations to implement this section.” The regulation cited by the State as authority to collect funds from Merryfield's paycheck is K.A.R. 30–26–3, which states in part: “Payment for the maintenance, care and treatment of persons admitted to a state hospital, state hospital and training center or the Kansas neurological institute, shall be made in accordance with K.S.A.1973 Supp. 59–2006 and K.S.A. 59–2006a or any other Kansas statute particularly pertaining to said hospitals or institutions.” This regulation also provides that “[t]he state hospitals or institutions shall make collections for maintenance, care and treatment, but the final determination as to a compromise on any claim due shall be by the legal division of the state department of social and rehabilitation services.” K.A.R. 30–26–3.
Merryfield claims on appeal that the State cannot properly collect any money from him because the State did not comply with the Rules and Regulations Filing Act. More specifically, Merryfield argues that because K.A.R. 30–26–3 (a regulation authorizing collection of funds for maintenance, care, and treatment from persons at a state hospital) was last amended in 1974 and K.S.A. 59–29al2 (a statute permitting the secretary to adopt rules and regulations for the sexual predator treatment program at Lamed) was not passed until 1994, then K.A.R. 30–26–3 cannot form the basis for the State's authority to withhold money from his paycheck. In essence, he argues that an old regulation cannot be applied to implement the provision of a more recent law because those affected by the new law—in this case sexually violent predators—could not have possibly had the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking procedures under the Rules and Regulations Filing Act.
Merryfield admits that he could not find any caselaw to support his argument that a regulation passed before a statute requiring such a regulation cannot lawfully be used to implement the purpose of the new statute. Weighing against Merryfield's argument is the principle that administrative regulations generally operate prospectively unless a contrary intent is clearly indicated. State v. Ernesti, 291 Kan. 54, 70, 239 P.3d 40 (2010). And every rule or regulation promulgated under the Rules and Regulations Filing Act has the force and effect of law on and after the date it takes effect until the regulation is amended or revoked. K.S.A. 77–425. Therefore, K.A.R. 30–26–3 has the force and effect of law, despite the fact that no new regulation was adopted after K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–29al2 took effect.
Moreover, we find it significant that K.A.R. 30–26–3 applies to “persons admitted to a state hospital.” Merryfield argues that the SPTP is separate and distinct from Lamed and therefore K.A.R. 30–26–3 does not apply to patients in the SPTP. This argument is without merit, as the SPTP is housed at Lamed, which indisputably is a state hospital. While Merryfleld may be in a different treatment program than other patients living at Lamed, he was admitted to—and still resides in—Larned. As a result, K.A.R. 30–26–3 does apply to Merryfleld, and the State may collect funds pursuant to K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006.
d. Commissioner Letter 930 and the KEESM
Next, Merryfleld challenges how the State collects money from his paycheck and account. As mentioned above, the VTP contract is a contract that Merryfleld was required to sign in order to become employed as a patient. The most recent VTP contract, which was admitted into evidence at trial, states that patients are allowed to keep the first $127 of their monthly wages and then half of any amount beyond that. The contract states in full:
“I understand that according to Commissioner's Letter 930:
“ ‘Patients employed in sheltered workshops or in therapeutic institutional employment programs shall pay towards the cost of care from their income the amount which exceeds the allowable for SSI, Medicaid, etc.’
“According to the January 2009 edition of the Kansas Economic and Employment Support Manual, # 8151 and # 8160, the following amounts are to be disregarded from earnings: The first $65.00 per month of gross (or adjusted gross) earned income, $62.00 to meet personal needs each month and one-half of the remainder of the earnings per month. The remaining earnings will be applied towards the patient's maintenance, care and treatment account for the duration of the patient's institutional employment.
(Earnings over $127.00 per month will be divided between patient and hospital.)
“I agree to have any and all monies due me from the Vocational Training Program electronically deposited in my Patient Trust Fund account. I also agree to an automatic withdrawal from my Patient Trust Fund account for amounts due Lamed State Hospital from my earnings according to SRS Guidelines.”
The contract makes clear that it is guided by Commissioner's Letter 930 (CL 930) and the Kansas Economic and Employment Support Manual (KEESM). CL 930 was published in 1995 by the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services and contains guidelines for determining a patient's ability to pay for treatment at state hospitals. As noted in the VTP contract, section 4566.2 of CL 930 states patients “employed in sheltered workshops or in therapeutic institutional employment programs shall pay towards the cost of care from their income the amount which exceeds the allowable for SSI, Medicaid, etc.” This amount is determined by referencing the KEESM.
The KEESM is a manual that describes state policies on Medicaid eligibility. Under section 8151 of the KEESM, the first $65 per month of gross (or adjusted) income is disregarded from earned income. Section 8160 of the KEESM states: “For persons receiving long term care in a Medicaid approved institution, a standard of $62/month shall be [protected] beginning either in the month the care begins or a following month as specified in [section] 8113.”
On appeal, Merryfield argues that CL 930, the KEESM, and K.A.R. 30–26–3 do not apply to him because he is not housed in a properly licensed facility. At trial, Binder testified that although the SPTP was not licensed by Medicare or Medicaid, the KEESM must be utilized to calculate the amounts withheld from an SPTP patient's paycheck based on the directive in 4566.2 of CL 930, which governs payment from therapeutic employment programs. Binder also testified it was necessary to use the KEESM for all patients at Lamed in order to maintain needed accreditation. Binder's testimony establishes that the agency decided to use the KEESM in order to treat SPTP patients like other patients at Lamed. The KEESM provides the agency's “interpretation of the applicable statutes and regulations .” Brewer v. Schalansky, 278 Kan. 734, 740, 102 P.3d 1145 (2004), cert. denied 545 U.S. 1129 (2005). “[A]ppellate courts generally defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations [and][t]he agency's interpretation will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 278 Kan. at 740.
In sum, Merryfield's arguments do not affect the application of K .A.R. 30–26–3 or CL 930. As already discussed above, K.A.R. 30–26–3 applies to patients in the SPTP, and it is not limited to those eligible for Medicare or Medicaid. And CL 930 similarly appears to apply to all patients at a state hospital. As a result, the fact that the SPTP is not properly licensed by Medicare or Medicaid has no effect on the applicability of K.A.R. 30–26–3 or CL 930.
2. Contracts
Merryfield challenges the validity of several contracts he has signed over the years. In addition to the VTP contract discussed above, he signed several year-long cable contracts in which he agreed to pay $6 per month to have cable in his individual room. He also signed agreements in which he authorized funds to be deducted from his account so that he could purchase orthopedic shoes and eyeglasses. Finally, he signed several documents agreeing to pay for making copies of various documents related to his legal claims. The district court specifically found that Merryfield voluntarily executed each of these documents authorizing the withdrawal of funds from his account and therefore failed to show that any of them were signed under duress.
“ ‘Duress is a form of coercion, physical or moral, and is said to exist where one person, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make or discharge a contract, or to perform or forego some other act affecting his [or her] rights of person or property, under circumstances which deprive him [or her] of the exercise of his [or her] free will, subject him [or her] to the will of that other, and constrain him [or her] to act contrary to his [or her] wishes and inclination.’ “ Hastain v. Greenbaum, 205 Kan. 475, 481–82, 470 P.2d 741 (1970).
Further, “ ‘[t]o constitute duress there must be a wrongful act or wrongful threat which compels apparent assent by another to a transaction without his [or her] volition.’ “ 205 Kan at 482.
Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's findings that Merryfield did not sign the contracts under duress. Each contract is discussed in turn below.
a. VTP contract
As mentioned above, the VTP contract is a contract that Merryfield was required to sign in order to become employed while he was a patient. Cory Turner, who previously worked with the SPTP, testified that if a patient refuses to sign the VTP contract, he or she would not be allowed to work in the program.
Merryfield argues that his free will to pay or not to pay funds from his paychecks to the State was defeated when the State required him to enter into the VTP contract. He also claims on appeal that his employment with the VTP was a necessary part of his treatment. He asserts that he must complete his treatment to be released from the SPTP, so he was coerced into signing the VTP contract so that he could continue to progress in his treatment.
But Turner testified that patients in the SPTP are not required to work. Contrary to Merryfield's argument on appeal, Turner also testified that if a patient decided not to work in the VTP, it would not affect the patient's progression through the treatment program. Rather, he stated that the treatment program is based on a patient's psycho-education, therapy, and group therapy, and that the VTP is not a necessary component of treatment. In addition, Penny Reidel, supervisor of the VTP, testified that each job opening attracts 10 to 40 applicants and the application process is competitive.
The evidence at trial established that Merryfield is not required to work in the VTP. He voluntarily chose to seek out a job. The VTP contract clearly explained the terms of his employment. Notably, it described exactly how much would be withheld by the State each month to pay for his care. Because he clearly had a choice between taking a job under the terms provided or not working, he entered into the contract voluntarily. The district court correctly found that no duress was present when Merryfield signed the VTP contract.
b. Medical devices contracts
Merryfield next argues that he signed two different medical device contracts under duress. He asserts that if he had not signed the contracts, he would have been denied items that were found to be medically necessary by a doctor. The contracts challenged and entered into evidence concerned Merryfield's agreement to pay for a pair of orthopedic shoes and a pair of eyeglasses.
The two contracts contained identical language regarding payment. They both stated: “I understand that if I have funds available and do not authorize the use of the funds, the above mentioned item(s) will not be provided.” On appeal, Merryfield argues that this language “clearly states” that if those agreements were not signed, he would not receive the items. First, the plain language of the agreement does not comport with Merryfield's interpretation. The contracts merely stated that if he had the necessary funds available and he refused to sign the contracts, the items would not be provided. Binder testified that if a resident has funds and refuses to sign the agreement authorizing withdrawal of his or her funds, the item would not be provided unless a doctor ordered otherwise. Binder also testified that after an agreement is signed, the hospital determines if the patient is indigent. If so, the hospital provides the requested item.
Merryfield testified that he has the funds to pay for his own glasses but that he believes the State should pay for the glasses because the request came from a doctor's orders. But he also testified that he previously did not have the necessary funds to purchase his orthopedic shoes and the State provided them free of charge. His argument on appeal is that if he had refused to sign the contracts, he would not have received either medically necessary item.
First, as discussed above, the evidence established that a doctor could order an item with or without a patient's signature on the contract. Second, the Kansas Supreme Court long ago held: “[I]t is not duress to bring or threaten to bring an action to enforce a valid obligation—to do that which a party has a legal right to do.” Browning v. Blair, 169 Kan. 139, 148, 218 P.2d 233 (1950). Here, the State has brought no legal action against Merryfield, but K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–29a 12(a) clearly establishes that, if he is able, Merryfield is responsible for the payment of his own maintenance, care, and treatment while a patient in the SPTP. The medical devices contracts he signed merely authorized the State to debit his account for the purchase of medical items he was already statutorily obligated to pay. We therefore find that Larned's requirement that Merryfield sign the contracts was neither an unlawful nor a wrongful act, and therefore no duress was present.
c. Cable contracts
Merryfield next challenges cable contracts he signed in order to have cable in his individual room. Merryfield introduced six different contracts into evidence at trial. The contracts, all of which were signed by Merryfield between the years 2006 and 2011, obligated him to pay $6 per month “to defray the equipment and installation cost of the cable.” They also all stated that the terms of the agreements were 12 months and continued until Merryfield requested they be terminated.
Merryfield first appears to argue that the State breached those agreements by failing to determine whether he could or would ever pay the full amount owed for his cable service and by collecting money for the monthly subscription costs rather than strictly for “equipment and installation.” It is unnecessary to dwell on these issues. First, they were only peripherally raised below in testimony, and Merryfield made no mention of them in his petition or closing argument. Second, the terms of the contracts are clear. Merryfield agreed to pay $6 per month. The contracts could extend indefinitely after the initial 12–month period. Therefore, his obligation to pay the monthly fee would continue until he no longer wished to have cable in his room.
Next, he argues that the cable costs should have been included in his room and board costs that were already deducted on a monthly basis from his paycheck pursuant to the VTP contract. He asserts that the State is “double dipping” by deducting money from his paycheck for his care, maintenance, and treatment under the VTP contract and for cable under the cable contracts. But Binder testified that cable is available to patients at no extra charge in the day hall. Patients only owe the $6 fee if they wish to have cable in their rooms. Therefore, the monthly fee is an extra service not typically provided to patients and constitutes a service above and beyond that of a normal patient.
Finally, Merryfield argues that he entered into the cable contracts under duress. The only evidence of this he cites in his brief is that on one of the contracts, he made a note indicating he was signing it under duress. As already discussed, cable is available at Lamed to patients who do not want it in their rooms. Therefore, the cable contracts allowing cable in Merryfield's room were entirely optional and voluntary. Therefore, there was substantial competent evidence to support the district court's finding that he did not sign these contracts under duress.
d. Legal copies
Finally, Merryfield argues he signed, under duress, several requests to have legal copies made at Lamed. These documents were letters written by Turner memorializing Merryfield's request and contained the exact number of copies requested and the cost of those copies.
The letters contained a space for Merryfield's signature and the following acknowledgment: “I hereby acknowledge personal receipt of this letter regarding the required reimbursement by myself of [Lamed] funds utilized for my requested legal copies via both current and future indigent funds until funds have been fully repaid to [Lamed].” To that end, Merryfield argues that had he not signed the letters, he would have been denied access to the court system. But both the testimony of Turner and the language of the letters contradict this claim. The letters contain the following unequivocal language:
“5. This policy shall not deny any resident from obtaining photo copies of legal materials. No resident shall be denied copying services for legal material. If a resident does not have enough money to purchase adequate copy coupons to cover the number of copies needed, he [or she] will be given a credit on his [or her] indigent funds provided to him [or her] by the State and deposited into his [or her] patient benefit account. The cost will be deducted in the preceding months until the credit is paid.”
Turner also testified at trial that even if Merryfield had refused to sign these letters and could not afford legal copies himself, he still would have been provided the copies. Lamed would have simply deducted money from his funds in accordance with the policy language quoted above. These facts do not establish duress.
Merryfield also argues that the acknowledgment only authorized the State to take money from his indigent funds. Binder testified that indigent funds are funds that the hospital gives to patients who have no other source of income. The hospital provides $15 per month. Binder also testified that these funds are separate from wages one might earn in the VTP. Merryfield presented evidence showing that funds were deducted from his paycheck to pay for expenses he had accrued for legal copies.
We note, as a preliminary matter, that the letters written by Turner memorializing Merryfield's request for copies and associated costs do not appear to be contracts. The acknowledgment signed by Merryfield only acknowledges receipt of the letter and does not purport to bind him to an agreement. Rather, the language of the policy controls. This policy language clearly indicates that residents are required to pay for their legal copies by outlining the price of documents and by stating that credit against indigent funds is only available if a resident cannot afford adequate copy coupons.
Second, the policy states that after credit is provided against indigent funds being deposited into a patient's benefit account, “[t]he cost will be deducted in the preceding months until the credit is paid.” This language does not explicitly limit the deductions to those from indigent funds. It simply states that deductions will be taken from a patient's benefit account until the credit is paid back. Thus, substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that all copies requested by Merryfield had been funded by SPTP subject to his future obligation to pay.
e. Double dipping
Finally, Merryfield argues that the State improperly charged him for cable, medical devices, copying costs and mailing costs in violation of K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006b. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006b provides in pertinent part:
“(a) At least annually, the secretary for aging and disability services shall establish the basic maximum rate of charge for treatment of patients in each state institution, except that such rates shall not exceed projected hospital costs of the state institution, including the allocated costs of services by other state agencies, as determined by application of generally acceptable hospital accounting principles. In determining these rates, the secretary shall compute the average daily projected operating cost of treatment of all patients in each state institution and shall set a basic maximum rate of charge for each and every patient in each state institution and each such patient's responsible relatives at the average daily projected operating cost of each institution so computed. When established pursuant to this section, each such rate shall be published in the Kansas register by the secretary and thereafter, until a subsequent rate is published as provided in this section, the rates last published shall be the legal rate of charge. All courts in this state shall recognize and take judicial notice of the procedure and the rates established under this section.
“(b) In lieu of the procedure for computing the basic maximum rate of charge established under subsection (a), the secretary for aging and disability services may authorize any state institution to compute an individual patient charge on the basis of rates for services based on cost incurred by such state institution as determined by application of generally acceptable hospital accounting principles.”
Merryfield argues that the State had two choices: compute a maximum daily rate for costs at the hospital by determining the average cost for patients or compute an individual patient charge. He asserts that by charging him a daily room and board rate pursuant to the VTP contract and also charging him for cable, medical devices, and copy and mailing costs, the State is “double dipping” by combining the two computation methods.
Binder testified at trial that the costs associated with Merryfield's placement at Lamed, apparently as figured under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006b, were deducted from Merryfield's paycheck in accordance with the VTP agreement. She went on to explain that the daily rate calculated under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006b only provides for patients' basic maintenance and care. Although Binder did not know exactly what costs were taken into account when the daily rate was calculated, she did testify that medical devices, pharmaceutical costs, lab charges, and physician charges were all costs above and beyond the rate determined under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006b. She also confirmed, once again, that in-room cable was not required but rather only a choice for patients given accessibility to cable in the dayroom. Finally, the cost of copying documents is not a cost that is related to hospital treatment.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the cost of medical devices, cable, and copies of legal documents are all costs unrelated to the daily rate figured under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006b. As a result, the State did not violate K.S.A.2014 Supp. 59–2006b by charging Merryfield a daily rate as well as costs for cable, medical devices, and copying and mailing costs.
3. Transcripts
Merry field argues the district court erroneously denied his request to pay for transcripts on a payment plan. He also argues that he was entitled to free transcripts. First, he did not request that he receive transcripts free of charge below. Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 493, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014). But even if we consider his full challenge, his claim fails.
Supreme Court Rule 3.03(f) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 23) requires an appellant to pay in advance for the transcripts if the court reporter serves a demand for advance payment that includes an estimated cost to the party. The transcriptionist did serve such a demand on Merryfield in this case. There are no apparent exceptions to this rule for regular litigants. K.S.A. 22–4506 does provide a procedure for requesting free transcripts for an appeal, but it only applies to those “in custody under a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction of a felony.” See K.S.A. 22–4506(a). Further, it only applies in the context of habeas corpus actions or motions attacking a sentence under K.S.A. 60–1507. K.S.A. 22–4506(a).
Merryfield argues that the law established for prisoners should be applied to him as well. However, even if he were imprisoned, he would not be entitled to benefit from K.S.A. 22–4506 because he filed this proceeding as a replevin action, not as an action under K .S.A.2014 Supp. 60–1501 or K.S.A. 60–1507. Therefore, the district court did not err by requiring Merryfield to pay for the cost of his transcripts in full.
Affirmed.