Opinion
CASE NO. 07-3288-SAC.
December 18, 2008
ORDER
On September 25, 2008, the court entered an Order requiring plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be dismissed for the reasons stated therein. Plaintiff has since simultaneously filed a "Motion to Show Cause" (Doc. 12) and a "Motion to Amend Complaint" (Doc. 13). Having considered the materials filed by plaintiff, the court finds as follows.
In his Motion to Show Cause, plaintiff asks the court to grant his Motion to Amend and accept his Amended Complaint as his response to the court's Order to show cause. The court agrees that filing a Motion to Amend was an appropriate response to its Order. Accordingly, the court grants plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause (Doc. 12), and grants his Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 13). The court shall order that plaintiff's Amended Complaint be filed, and accepts the Amended Complaint as his response.
FACTS
In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff drops Leon Schearrer, Pawnee County Sheriff, as defendant and names instead "Pawnee County Sheriff's Office" and "Larned State Hospital." He now alleges the following facts as the basis for his complaint. During plaintiff's confinement at the Larned State Hospital (LSH) for participation in the Sexual Predator Treatment Program, he was tried for a felony offense "committed while in the program." On November 16, 2007, he had a court hearing scheduled on that offense in Pawnee County District Court. The Pawnee County Sheriff's Office was "ordered to do the transport." When the "transport officer" arrived, plaintiff handed him a form, a copy of which is attached to the Amended Complaint. Motion to Amend (Doc. 13), Attachment, Exhibit A. The form is entitled "Notice of Patients Rights" and advises of Mr. Merryfield's beliefs that he had the right not to be transported in restraints and that consequences for violating that right included criminal charges under Kansas law. Kansas and federal statutes are cited in the form. Plaintiff was informed by "the Undersheriff" that "their policies clearly require restraints." Exhibit B attached to the Amended Complaint is the Sheriff's written policies providing that "all inmates being transported outside the jail will be restrained by belly chains, handcuffs, and leg irons." Id., Exhibit B. The policies also provide that "All prisoners will wear handcuffs and leg irons to and from court." The stated "purpose" of using handcuffs during transport is "to reduce the possibility of the prisoner causing harm to the officer, himself, or damage to the transport vehicles," and "to reduce the possibility of escape." An employee of Larned State Hospital who was present at the incident phoned Leo Herrman, apparently another LSH employee, to see what to do and was told by Herrman that plaintiff "would not go out the door without restraints of some kind." Plaintiff was not transported to court that day, but sheriff's officers advised they would return in a week. Plaintiff also alleges that "one time he was denied the ability to go to court and the court issued a bench warrant for him, and that on February 15, April 18, and May 16 of 2008, he was transported "by the Pawnee County Sheriff" in restraints, despite his protests and citation of "the law." Plaintiff alleges that he has logged over 200 trips from the facility with no incidents, and was calm and complacent at all times during each transport.
CLAIMS AND REQUESTED RELIEF
Plaintiff claims that he has a right to be transported without restraints because he is a civilly committed person, not a criminal, and he has provided no immediate reason for defendants to require restraints while transporting him. He cites 42 U.S.C. § 290ii, 42 U.S.C. § 9501, and K.S.A. § 59-2970 and 59-2977 as legal authority for his claim that he has a right to no restraints. He asserts that he was not provided due process before this right was taken by defendants. He also asserts that placing him in restraints is "an excessive use of force."
The United States Supreme Court has held that routinely placing a criminal defendant in shackles visible to a jury, without a special need, violates Due Process. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). This court has found no similar Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent with regard to shackles used for transport of a criminal defendant to and from court proceedings or of a person confined pursuant to a finding of dangerousness for other purposes. The considerations found by the Supreme Court in Deck to "militate against the routine use" of shackles during trial proceedings were their visibly undermining the presumption of innocence, interference with defendant's right to secure a meaningful defense, and affront to courtroom decorum. Id. at 632. Those considerations are not at play in the circumstances underlying plaintiff's claim herein. Nor is plaintiff seeking "quite literally freedom not to be physically strapped to a bed,"see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 118, FN12 (1992); or being subjected to anything like the "hog-tie restraint." Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir. 2008).
In the court's prior Order, this statutory authority was rejected as a legal basis for this § 1983 complaint. Plaintiff was informed that these two federal statutes do not provide him with a private cause of action, and that any claim of a violation of state law is not cognizable under § 1983.
Plaintiff asks the court to punish the Pawnee County Sheriff's Office, require the undersheriff to make a formal apology, and require the Pawnee County Sheriff's Office to "follow the law." He further asks the court to order both defendants to "ensure patient's rights are protected."
DISCUSSION
The court finds that plaintiff has cured some noted deficiencies in his original complaint by plainly setting forth the policy of the Sheriff's Department and stating facts indicating he has been transported in restraints pursuant to that policy in his Amended Complaint. However, as plaintiff was informed in the court's prior Order, even if he "alleged facts indicating he was actually placed in restraints for the purpose of transport to court, those facts, without more, fail to state a federal constitutional claim." Moreover, even if he "attacked a particular policy," his claim that a policy of transporting detainees in restraints is per se unconstitutional fails under the applicable legal standards set forth in the court's prior Order. Plaintiff's naming of different defendants, and the additional facts he alleges do not show cause why his claims should not be dismissed for failure to state a federal constitutional violation for the reasons stated in the court's Order of September 25, 2008.
The additional facts alleged by plaintiff are still insufficient to support a claim of punishment without due process. Plaintiff exhibits the printed restraint policies of the Pawnee County Sheriff's Office, which include its purposes. He provides no arguments or facts suggesting the purposes are illegitimate or exaggerated. The stated purposes expressly "advance goals such as preventing escape and assuring the safety of others." As the United Supreme Court has held:
"[T]he proper standard for determining the validity of a (jail) regulation claimed to infringe on a (detainee's) constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is `reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990), citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Under this standard, the facts alleged by plaintiff regarding the sheriff's transport policies, even taken as true and liberally construed, do not indicate those policies fail to comport with constitutional requirements. Id. There can be little doubt as to both the legitimacy and the importance of the governmental interests expressed in the policy. In the words of the Supreme Court:
There are few cases in which the State's interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison environment, which, "by definition," is made up of persons with "a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct."Id. at 225, citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984);Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-562 (1974). The Court's rationale applies to the transport of sexually violent predators as well as inmates, since both, "by definition," are persons with "a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct." Id. Plaintiff still alleges no facts whatsoever suggesting the transportation policy in question "represents a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards or that it is so excessive in relation to" the agency's "security concerns as to be tantamount to punishment." See Thielman v. Leean, 140 F.Supp.2d 982, 992 (W.D.Wis. 2001), aff'd, 282 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, plaintiff alleges no additional facts that support his claim of excessive force. He still alleges neither significant injury nor malicious intent. A plaintiff alleging excessive force but not "significant injury," must present facts showing that the defendant "maliciously and sadistically use[d] force to cause harm." Id., at 9. Mr. Merryfield alleges no facts indicating that a state official's use of force upon him was "objectively unreasonable" and that the official's intent was for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Accepting the facts that are alleged by plaintiff in his Amended Complaint as true, the court finds plaintiff's allegations simply do not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. See Sanders v. Hopkins, 131 F.3d 152 (10th Cir. Dec. 5, 1997, unpublished). For these reasons and those stated in the court's prior Order dated September 25, 2008, the court concludes that this complaint must be dismissed.
A copy of this opinion is attached in compliance with rules of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Show Cause (Doc. 12) and Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 13) are granted as discussed herein, and plaintiff's Amended Complaint attached to his "Motion to Amend Complaint" (Doc. 13) shall be copied and filed by the clerk of the court as plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is dismissed for failure to state facts in support of a claim of federal constitutional violation, and all relief is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
(The Court's decision is referenced in a "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter. See CTA 10 Rule 32.1 before citing.)
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. James A. SANDERS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.B. HOPKINS, Floyd Garner, Sgt. Perice, Sgt. Williams, Deputy Fuji, E.J. Morris, Deputy Rios, Deputy Still, Lt. Melton, Lt. Arnold, Sgt. Owens, Deputy Bess, Deputy Johnson, Deputy Fields, Deputy Morgan, Deputy Coubock, Deputy Allen, Deputy Hopewell and Georgia Miller, Defendants-Appellees. Case No. 97-3082 Dec. 5, 1997.Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT FN*
FN* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. SeeFed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
James Sanders, proceeding pro se and in forma pau-peris, claims that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Wyandotte County Jail in Kansas City. He also claims that he was denied due process and equal protection of the laws. The district court dismissed his action for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
"We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo." Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1996). The plaintiffs complaint must be construed liberally, and all well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true. Swanson v. Bixler. 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). In addition, we are required to construe Mr. Sanders's pleadings liberally because he is proceeding pro se. Shabazz v. Askins, 14 F.3d 533, 535 (10th Cir. 1994). "A district court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1201 (citing Conley v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)) (citation omitted).
Mr. Sanders was sent to disciplinary segregation for a jail infraction. Rec. vol. 1, doc. 2 at 2 (Complaint filed Sept. 5, 1996). As part of this disciplinary measure, prison officials required Mr. Sanders to wear handcuffs and ankle shackles whenever he exited his cell. This included while bathing or showering. Id. While he was showering with these restraints, Mr. Sanders fell and sustained a head injury. Id.
Mr. Sanders claims that requiring him to wear handcuffs and ankle shackles while showering contravened the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The Supreme Court has instructed that claims involving conditions of confinement brought by pretrial detainees should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). The due process standard is used because the Eighth Amendment is concerned with punishment, and a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt. Id. The central inquiry then becomes whether the challenged condition of confinement amounts to a "punishment." Id. at 535. "[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to `punishment.'" Id. at 539. Maintaining jail security and effectively managing a detention facility are valid objectives which may justify the imposition of certain restrictions. Id. at 540.
*2 As noted above, Mr. Sanders was placed in disciplinary segregation. He does not challenge his placement there; he challenges only the use of restraints while showering. Prison officials are to be "accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id. at 547. The condition or restriction of requiring a pretrial detainee in disciplinary segregation to wear restraints while showering is reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective of promoting security in the detention facility. Thus, under Bell, it does not amount to a "punishment" which would violate the detainee's due process rights.
Even were we to analyze Mr. Sanders's claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the more specific provisions of the Eighth Amendment, we would still affirm the district court's dismissal of the claim. One of the elements that a plaintiff must establish in order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, when conditions of confinement are at issue, is that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety. Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1204 (citation omitted). "Deliberate indifference" is demonstrated when the prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). Requiring an inmate who is in disciplinary segregation to shower in handcuffs and ankle shackles does not evince deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety. See Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 631 (2nd Cir. 1996) (requiring an inmate on "lockdown" to shower while wearing leg irons does not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring an inmate who had assaulted prison guards and fellow inmates to shower while wearing handcuffs and ankle shackles does not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment). Thus., whether analyzed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, Mr. Sanders has failed to state a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
In addition to his Eighth Amendment and due process claims, Mr. Sanders further claims that requiring him to wear handcuffs and ankle shackles in the shower violated the Equal Protection Clause because other similarly situated inmates were not restrained while bathing. Furthermore, he argues that if convicted murderers are not restrained while bathing, then he, a pretrial detainee, should not have been so restrained. However, the fact that other prisoners were not restrained while showering does not establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Unless Mr. Sanders is a member of a suspect class, or a fundamental right is at stake, which Mr. Sanders does not allege, disparate treatment need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1207. As stated above, maintaining jail security is a legitimate governmental purpose. Prison officials have wide discretion to determine what measures should be taken in order to preserve order and security in a detention facility. Determining that a particular inmate poses a security risk to fellow inmates and to corrections personnel, and requiring that inmate to wear ankle and wrist restraints, is certainly within this discretion.
*3 We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Mr. Sanders's claims. The mandate shall issue forth-with.
C.A. 10 (Kan.), 1997.
Sanders v. Hopkins
131 F.3d 152, 1997 WL 755276 (C.A. 10 (Kan.)).
97 CJ C.A.R. 3304