Summary
denying plaintiff's motion to compel as moot because defendant finally complied with discovery request
Summary of this case from Romary Associates, Inc. v. Kibbi LLC (N.D.Ind. 9-8-2011)Opinion
NO. 1:02-cv-01881-SEB-VSS
May 13, 2004
ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COMPEL DISCOVERY
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Ryan Merriweather's ("Plaintiff) Motion to Strike Defendant Marion County Sheriff's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment and to Compel Discovery. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(c) and 56(f), Plaintiff contends that Defendant's summary judgment motion should be stricken because Defendant failed to comply with its discovery obligations, and in particular, to answer Plaintiff's repeated requests for Defendant's Jail Incident Reports involving injuries to juveniles from 1995 to the present. For the reasons explained below, we DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion, and we DENY Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
On December 5, 2002, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant asserting that Defendant had deprived Plaintiff of his "liberty interest in bodily integrity" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Defendant had breached its duty of reasonable care under Indiana state law. Compl. ¶ 48. While Plaintiff was incarcerated as a juvenile detainee in the Marion County Jail, he alleges that he was raped and later assaulted and battered by other inmates of the Marion County Jail. Id. ¶ 1.
On April 16, 2003, Plaintiff served Defendant with his first set of interrogatories and related production requests. Plaintiff sought, among other things, "all incident reports," related to "all juvenile inmates who have been injured in the Marion County Lock-up" from 1995 to the present. (Although the request mistakenly named the Lock-up rather than the Jail, the parties have corrected this error.) Defendant's response was due May 19, 2003. At least in part because of the search and sort limitations of the Justice Information System of Indianapolis / Marion County ("JUSTIS"), Defendant's computer system, Defendant was unable to fulfill Plaintiff's request in a timely manner. JUSTIS organizes incident reports chronologically and by the inmate's name rather than by subject.
The deadline for discovery in this case was September 5, 2003. When Defendant had not responded to Plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for production of documents by that date, Plaintiff moved for, and this Court granted, an extension of the discovery deadline up to and including November 4, 2003. See Docket No. 26. The parties do not dispute the importance of the incident reports to Plaintiff's case opposing summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that the incident reports will demonstrate the level and endemic nature of violence in the Marion County Jail, and specifically, in the juvenile cellblock. Plaintiff also believes that the incident reports will give him information about Defendant's past practices as well as potential sources of impeachment for the representations made by Defendant in its motion for summary judgment.
On October 23, 2003, Defendant objected to Plaintiff's discovery request as stated, but offered to search incident reports in a more narrowly defined range. On November 12, 2003, this Court granted Plaintiff's second motion to extend discovery up to and including January 3, 2004. See Docket No. 33. The Order contained the following handwritten notation: "However, the Mag. J. reminds counsel that dispositive motions are due Dec. 5, 2003 any responses will be due precariously close to the conclusion of discovery so discovery had better proceed expeditiously."
Complicating the parties' resolution of this discovery dispute was the fact that Defendant changed its policy regarding the access to its records it would allow opposing counsel. Previous Sheriff administrations had permitted Plaintiff's counsel unfettered access to incident reports, but the newly-elected Sheriff, Frank Anderson, was concerned that such a discovery policy would violate inmates' privacy rights as well as leave Defendant vulnerable to exploitation by attorneys looking for potential lawsuits. On December 3, 2003, defense counsel agreed to provide Plaintiff with the majority of the disputed juvenile incident reports by December 12, 2003, and the remainder no later than December 19, 2003.
On December 4, 2003, this Court granted Defendant's unopposed motion for an extension of time in which to file dispositive motions, giving the parties until December 12, 2003. See Docket No. 34. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on December 12, 2003, in which Defendant disclaimed liability for Plaintiff's federal claims, asserting that it was not deliberately indifferent to the problem of inmate violence in the Marion County Jail, and invoked immunity from Plaintiff's state law claims under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Also on December 12, 2003, Defendant mailed to Plaintiff's counsel approximately eighty pages of JUSTIS Subject Conduct Lists for juvenile inmates whose last names begin with the letters "A" and "B." Subject Conduct Lists are different from Jail Incident Reports in that they list the incident reports for each juvenile, but do not reveal the reports' content. These Subject Conduct Lists were all that defense counsel was able to obtain at that time because Defendant's legal department did not have the manpower to deliver the incident reports to Plaintiff by December 19, 2003, as promised.
Inaccuracies existed and Plaintiff received Subject Conduct Lists for some inmates who were not juveniles at the time of their incarceration.
Defense counsel informed senior management at the Sheriffs Department that the plan for producing the incident reports was not working. After debating the issue, Defendant decided that it lacked the manpower to search through the incident reports, determine which were responsive to Plaintiff's discovery request, and produce them. Thus, on January 6, 2004, three days after the close of extended discovery and one week before Plaintiff's response to Defendant's pending summary judgment motion was due, Defendant's counsel called Plaintiff's counsel with the message that Plaintiff's counsel would now be permitted to view the incident reports and designate for copying those it desired. On January 9, 2004, in response to Defendant's summary judgment motion, Plaintiff filed this motion to strike Defendant's motion for summary judgment and to compel discovery.
On January 14, 2004, this Court granted Plaintiff's unopposed motion to stay the summary judgment proceedings pending the resolution of the discovery dispute. On February 16, 2004, the parties finalized arrangements through which the incident reports sought by Plaintiff would be produced. On two successive Saturdays (February 28 and March 6, 2004) Plaintiff's Discovery Group, which consisted of two attorneys, one paralegal, one law school graduate and ten law students, reviewed the jail incident reports, flagging approximately 2,000 reports for reproduction and delivery by Defendant. On May 6, 2004, the date on which Defendant complied with Plaintiff's discovery request, Plaintiff also filed a Second Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Compel Production reiterating its need for the jail incident reports.
Resolution
We greatly appreciate Plaintiff's frustration with this year-long discovery process as well as Plaintiff's counsel's numerous attempts to spur it along. We conclude, however, that Defendant had "substantial justification" for its delay in disclosing the Jail Incident Reports as required by Rule 26(a). Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). As explained above, defense counsel's disclosure of the discovery material was hindered by events outside of his control-the Marion County Jail's outmoded computer technology, the changing discovery policy of the new Sheriff, and the lack of manpower available to sort through the voluminous incident reports. There is no suggestion that Defendant acted in bad faith or that the evidence sought by Plaintiff has been destroyed or otherwise become unavailable due to the delay.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that striking Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) is an inappropriate sanction. It is not in anyone's interest, including the Court's, to strike Defendant's summary judgment motion. The very purpose of the summary judgment procedure is efficiency-to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial. We would have to consider issues of law at trial were they not presented in a motion for summary judgment. In the interest of accuracy and judicial economy, we would rather decide them in the context of well-prepared briefs. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment isDENIED.
Rule 37(c)(1), through a reference to Rule 37(b)(2)(C), authorizes the court, on motion and after affording the parties an opportunity to be heard, to sanction "a party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a)" by "striking out pleadings or parts thereof."
With regard to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery, weDENY it AS MOOT because Defendant has finally complied with Plaintiff's discovery request.
Plaintiff informs us that he will need to review the newly acquired jail incident reports, and based on the information revealed in the reports, to conduct depositions of certain employees of the Marion County Sheriff. Defendant has "agreed not to object to whatever additional time Plaintiff needs to conduct discovery related to his summary judgment response." Def.'s Br. in Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Strike and Compel Discovery p. 6. Because Defendant has disclosed the heretofore unavailable discovery and has agreed to allow Plaintiff extra time to evaluate this discovery and to brief his summary judgment response, we do not think it necessary to "refuse the application for judgment" or to "order a continuance to permit . . . discovery to be had." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Therefore, we DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion and lift the stay on summary judgment activity.
The delayed discovery process and summary judgment briefing schedule necessitate a postponement of the trial date. The June 14, 2004 trial date and the June 3, 2004 final pretrial conference for this case are hereby vacated. The parties are ordered to tender a revised case management plan within 30 days of the date of this entry. (We do not take a position on Plaintiff's need, if any, for additional discovery or on the amount of time it should take him to conduct this discovery and to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment.) In view of the relative age of this case, we will endeavor to consider promptly the motion for summary judgment when it becomes fully briefed.
Conclusion
For the reasons explicated above, we DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion, and weDENY Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. We also lift the stay on summary judgment activity, vacate the June 14, 2004 trial date and the June 3, 2004 final pretrial conference, and order the parties to tender a revised case management plan within 30 days of the date of this entry.It is so ORDERED.