Opinion
4:24CV00433-LPR
11-08-2024
CRYSTAL MERRITT, on behalf of herself and all other Arkansas Tay Payers, Plaintiff, v. WELLPATH, LLC; and THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
On Behalf of the Plaintiff: MR. LUCIEN R. GILLHAM, SUTTER & GILLHAM, PLLC On Behalf of the Defendant Wellpath: MR. ROBERT RYAN YOUNGER QUATTLEBAUM, GROOMS & TULL, PLLC. On Behalf of the Defendant Ark. Department of Corrections: MR. RYAN C. HALE, ARKANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
APPEARANCES:
On Behalf of the Plaintiff: MR. LUCIEN R. GILLHAM, SUTTER & GILLHAM, PLLC
On Behalf of the Defendant Wellpath: MR. ROBERT RYAN YOUNGER QUATTLEBAUM, GROOMS & TULL, PLLC.
On Behalf of the Defendant Ark. Department of Corrections: MR. RYAN C. HALE, ARKANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEE P. RUDOFSKY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE,
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF COURT'S RULING
Proceedings reported by machine stenography. Transcript prepared utilizing computer-aided transcription.
(Partial Transcript - Court's Ruling.)
THE COURT: Everybody be seated.
Okay. I think that I can give you a ruling from the bench today, which I have, after five years, decided when I can do that, I should do that. It gives the parties closure and the ability to move forward one way or the other; rather than, quite frankly, putting you in the queue and not getting to you for a little while in terms of writing an opinion.
To be fair, I would actually like to write on this. I think it's an interesting issue. But instead of this being about me, I'm going to make it about you all, which it is, so I'm going to give you an answer quickly.
I am going to remand this case. I do not believe that I have standing here. I don't believe that the federal court has standing here, and I think it would violate Article III. Here, I'm talking specifically about the illegal exaction claim. It would violate Article III for me to exercise federal jurisdiction.
Let me just, I guess, quickly say as to the FOIA claim, I think it's moot. I think it's been conceded as moot, and I certainly believe it's moot. Quite frankly, either way, given that I'm dismissing -- not dismissing, given that I'm remanding the illegal exaction claim for lack of Article III jurisdiction, the FOIA claim wouldn't remain here anyway because I don't think it would meet any of the removal requirements or I would have any jurisdiction over it. I think even if I had discretion on that, the right thing to do would be to remand it. But let me concentrate for a second on the illegal exaction claim.
I think here in federal court, this runs into the precise problem discussed in Frothingham. I certainly don't think it meets the exception in Flast, certainly as Flast has been interpreted and narrowed in recent years by cases like Hein; that's not exclusively Hein, but other cases as well. Daimler and other cases actually make it clear that Frothingham is not just sort of about federal taxpayer standing; those principles also apply when you're dealing with taxpayer standing in a state like the State of Arkansas. Ultimately, I do not think that there is a concrete and particularized injury here that would satisfy what I will call the Frothingham-Flast-Hein test or line of cases.
I understand, and I have looked at, what Defendants have said in terms of Farrell v. Oliver and Ward v. Farrell. No. 1, I agree with the Plaintiffs that it's dicta; although it seems to be, you know, considered dicta. I agree that as a practical -- as a technical matter, it is dicta. No. 2, I guess what I will say is -- when I say it's dicta, it's because in both those cases, really, what is going on is an interpretation of Article 16, Section 13 of the Arkansas constitution; and then, you know, they're basically saying, those cases, well, even if this wasn't the way we interpreted that article, there is still this general theory of taxpayers being the equitable owners of public funds. But I will say, were I to truly consider this language, I don't think it changes anything. And if it was, quite frankly, it would be an exception that swallowed the rule because, even if this affected whether the injury was concrete, I don't think it affected -- I don't think it makes this injury particularized.
The Plaintiff here has the same ability and equal share to sue that any other Plaintiff in Arkansas would, and I think that is what causes the real significant problem under Frothingham and then under cases like Hein. The fact that Plaintiff doesn't have any interest that is really, you know, special or individualized to her, the interest she has here is the same interest that any other Arkansas taxpayer would have. And I think if we opened up the federal courts to those kind of cases, like the U.S. Supreme Court has said in Hein and like the U.S. Supreme Court has said in Frothingham, that would essentially signal the end of any real Article III boundaries.
Because I'm really relying on Frothingham and Daimler and Hein and the tests in there, I'm not going to sort of go on and, you know, get down to the granular level other than to repeat what I said before: I do not believe that the Plaintiff here with the illegal exaction claim has any concrete or particularized injury that she is suing over. She is essentially asking for disgorgement of money from -- some unidentified amount of money, but in the tens of millions of dollars from Wellpath back to either the Department of Corrections or the State.
I don't think any of that is traceable either to a benefit that the Plaintiff will get or avoid or a detriment the Plaintiff will get or avoid. It's certainly not traceable to any kind of action that might or might not happen to her specifically, whether we're talking about employment or, you know, as a prisoner, which she never is, and there's no suggestion she's going to be. All of that put together tells me that this is not the type of injury that gives rise -- I mean, there is no injury I guess is my point, but this is not the type of claim that gives rise to standing for a Plaintiff here in federal court.
The last thing I will say is I don't think that this is what Defendants were arguing, but I just want to note, obviously, that in cases like Spokeo and Trans Union, the Supreme Court has been pretty clear that neither congress nor a state -- I'm adding the state part, but neither congress nor a state can essentially manufacture standing through a statute. There is either standing or there is not. You know, a statutory injury on its own is not enough.
Now, quite frankly, I want to be clear, that's not why I'm rejecting the Farrell v. Oliver and Ward v. Farrell equitable property argument because I don't think those two are exactly the same thing. I do think that the best argument Defendants have is the equitable property argument. But, again, I don't think it ultimately changes anything, especially with respect to the particularized, or unparticularized as the case may be, nature of the injury.
So all of that being said, I don't think there is standing here. I don't think I can exercise jurisdiction; and given that, as Defendants concede, the right thing to do is remand the case to state court, clearly that claim but, also, in my view, remand the FOIA claim. No. 1, because I don't have jurisdiction over it because it's moot. And, No. 2, because in any event, it wouldn't stay here on its own. I don't think that would be the right decision under a number of cases with respect to supplemental jurisdiction.
So before I stop, does anybody have anything they would like me to clarify, add, or explain more? Plaintiff?
MR. GILLHAM: No, sir.
THE COURT: Defendants?
MR. HALE: No, Your Honor.
MR. YOUNGER: Your Honor, the only point of clarification is whether the injunctive relief or lack thereof played at all in the analysis.
THE COURT: In the standing analysis, the injunctive relief did not play a part. No. 1, I don't think they are actually seeking injunctive relief. No. 2, were they seeking
injunctive relief and were I to put that into my analysis, it doesn't change anything for me because there is no -- as far as I can tell, there is no likely or very likely injury, again, particularized to the Plaintiff that an injunction would fix or change or respond to. So I don't think that changes anything with respect to the Plaintiff we have here and whether that Plaintiff would have standing in this case.
But, again -- so that's on the illegal exaction part of it. On the mootness part of it, I think the FOIA part of this is moot regardless.
MR. YOUNGER: Thank you, Your Honor.(End of Partial Transcript.)
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.