Merrit v. Kitchen

2 Citing cases

  1. Discount Corp. v. Young

    29 S.E.2d 29 (N.C. 1944)   Cited 9 times

    The principle is aptly stated in R. R. v. Simpkins, 178 N.C. 273, 100 S.E. 418, 10 A.L.R., 731. There it was said that the mortgagor left in possession of goods which, in the contemplation of the parties, are to be disposed of by the mortgagor in the ordinary course of trade, is the agent of the mortgagee to the extent that he may pass the title to the goods, sold in the usual way to a purchaser, freed of the mortgage lien. This principle of law was also declared in Bynum v. Miller, 89 N.C. 393; Etheridge v. Hilliard, 100 N.C. 250, 6 S.E. 571; Merritt v. Kitchin, 121 N.C. 148, 28 S.E. 358; Finance Co. v. Cotton Mills Co., 187 N.C. 233 (241), 121 S.E. 439; Boice v. Finance Guaranty Co., 127 Va. 563; 136 A.L.R., 821; 97 A.L.R., 646. While in Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N.C. 154, 144 S.E. 835, it was held that the mere display of a mortgaged automobile in a show window was not sufficient to constitute waiver of the lien, here the evidence indicates in addition a regular course of dealing for the sale of mortgaged motor vehicles and authorized receipt by the mortgagor of the price, including amounts due on the mortgages. Upon the evidence presented in this case we are inclined to agree with the trial judge that plaintiff was not entitled to recover the truck from the defendants Worsley. The judgment of the Superior Court is

  2. Whitehurst v. Garrett

    144 S.E. 835 (N.C. 1928)   Cited 20 times
    In Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N.C. 154 (157), we find: "It is said in Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N.C. at p. 521: `In the construction of our registration laws this Court has very insistently held that no notice, however full and formal, will supply the place of registration. Dye v. Morrison, 181 N.C. 309; Fertilizer Co. v. Lane, 173 N.C. 184; Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N.C. 145....

    In Bynum v. Miller, 89 N.C. at pp. 395-6, it is said by Ashe, J.: "The consent then given by plaintiff to defendant to replenish the stock from time to time, gave him the right to sell, and constituted him his agent for that purpose; and especially is this to be so considered when the deed provides that the entire stock on hand on 15 November, including not only the original stock, but the stock as increased by new purchases, should belong to the mortgagee." See Etheridge v. Hilliard, 100 N.C. 250; Merritt v. Kitchin, 121 N.C. 148; Edwards v. Supply Co., 150 N.C. 171; R. R. v. Simpkins, 178 N.C. 276. In Rogers v. Booker, 184 N.C. at p. 186, it is said: "This was not the case of a mortgage upon a stock of goods which was left in the hands of the mortgagor for sale. There was nothing to indicate in the remotest degree such state of facts.