Opinion
No. CV 05 4000741
September 22, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus; it has not been amended. In the petition, the petitioner claims that he was inappropriately placed in administrative segregation and unjustly denied eligibility to earn good time credit while in segregation. The respondent's return denies the petitioner's claims. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the habeas petition on February 28, 2006, which was denied on March 21, 2006.
The matter came before this court on May 17, 2006, for a trial on the merits. At that time, the parties indicated that there was no dispute concerning the facts of the petitioner's case. Based upon that stipulation, this court determined that a full trial would be unnecessary. Some documents were admitted into evidence, however, including department of corrections timesheets and a restrictive status hearing report. The parties were ordered to submit post-trial briefs addressing one legal issue: Whether the Commissioner of Correction has the authority to preclude inmates who are otherwise eligible for earning statutory good time credit from earning such credit. That is the only issue currently before this court.
Findings of Fact
1. In March 1987, the petitioner was arrested and charged with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70. The approximate date of the offense was March 11, 1987.
2. While in pretrial confinement, the petitioner escaped from the custody of the Correctional Institution at Somers and fled to Canada. On or about June 14, 2002, the petitioner was returned to Connecticut and the custody of the department of correction. Upon his return, the petitioner faced the initial charge for which he was awaiting trial in 1987, as well as new charges stemming from his escape.
3. The petitioner's criminal history includes numerous attempts to escape and successful escapes from custody.
4. On July 9, 2002, a hearing was held by the department of correction to consider the petitioner's placement in administrative segregation. Recommendation for the placement was based on the petitioner's propensity to escape. The petitioner had no objection to his placement in administrative segregation; he merely stated at the hearing that he wanted "to make sure that all procedures are followed." It was ultimately determined that the petitioner's placement in administrative segregation was warranted.
5. Based on department of correction administrative rules, the petitioner was ineligible to earn statutory good time credit while in administrative segregation. None of the petitioner's previously earned good time credits were forfeited.
6. On March 5, 2003, the petitioner was sentenced to one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70, one count of escape in the first degree in violation of § 53a-169, and two counts of burglary in the second degree in violation of § 53a-102.
7. The petitioner was released from administrative segregation in March 2004. As a result of his time in segregation, the petitioner was ineligible to earn approximately 187 good time credits. This total includes approximately 76 presentence good time credits for the time following the petitioner's July 2002 placement in administrative segregation until his sentencing in March 2003, as well as approximately 111 statutory good time credits for the time following the petitioner's sentencing on March 5, 2003 until his release from administrative segregation in March 2004.
8. Additional facts shall be discussed as necessary.
Discussion of Law
It is axiomatic that the courts have no business in trying to micromanage the day-to-day operation of the department of corrections. "Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Meachum, 238 Conn. 692, 733-34, 680 A.2d 262 (1996). The courts should, therefore, afford a high degree of deference to the department of corrections in its job of management of the corrections system.
The management of the department of correction and its correctional institutions has been delegated to the Commissioner of Correction by the legislature. The duties of the commissioner are outlined in General Statutes § 18-81, which provides in relevant part:
The Commissioner of Correction shall administer, coordinate and control the operations of the department and shall be responsible for the overall supervision and direction of all institutions, facilities and activities of the department. The commissioner shall establish rules for the administrative practices and custodial and rehabilitative methods of said institutions and facilities in accordance with recognized correctional standards . . . The commissioner shall be responsible for establishing disciplinary, diagnostic, classifications, [and] treatment . . . programs throughout the department.
Under § 18-81, the commissioner has the express authority to establish and promulgate administrative rules for the management of prisons and inmates. Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, 50 Conn.App. 421, 432, 434-35, 718 A.2d 487 (1998), aff'd, CT Page 17659 249 Conn. 499, 733 A.2d 833 (1999). This includes the establishment of rules concerning the term of an inmate's sentence through the conferment and forfeiture of good time credit. See Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 94 Conn.App. 210, 216, 893 A.2d 445 (2006); State v. Fiore, 35 Conn.Sup. 544, 548, 396 A.2d 144 (App.Sess.), cert. denied, 174 Conn. 794, 382 A.2d 540 (1978). "[G]ood time is a commutation of a sentence, affecting an inmate's parole and discharge dates, thereby serving an important rehabilitative function by allowing an inmate the opportunity to earn an earlier release for himself . . . The purpose of the . . . good time award is to aid the rehabilitative process and to mitigate the severity of punishment by rewarding a prisoner for his good conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 264 Conn. 214, 217 n. 2, 756 A.2d 1264 (2000), quoting Alexander v. Robinson, 185 Conn. 540, 543-44, 441 A.2d 166 (1981).
Through the authority obtained under § 18-81, the commissioner has established administrative rules that limit the dispensing of good time credit to certain classes of inmates. Relevant to the petitioner's case are inmates classified in administrative segregation. Inmates in administrative segregation are those who require additional oversight and management. Placement in administrative segregation is warranted for inmates "whose behavior or management factors pose a threat to the security of the facility or a risk to the safety of staff or other inmates and that inmate can no longer be safely managed in general population." Administrative Directive 9.4, paragraph 3. Thus, to better control the behavior of inmates who pose a significant security or safety risk, inmates classified in administrative segregation are precluded from earning good time credit. See Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 50 Conn.App. 432; Administrative Directive 9.4, paragraph 5.
The petitioner claims that the Commissioner of Correction lacks the statutory authority to create rules that deny inmates who are otherwise eligible to earn good time credit the opportunity to acquire such credit. To address this issue, this court first looks at the foundation of the right to earn good time credit.
An inmate's right to earn good time credit is not found in the Connecticut constitution; it is a matter of legislative grace. Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 94 Conn.App. 213. The applicable statutes governing an inmate's good time eligibility are determined by the date of the offense for which the inmate is incarcerated. Here, the petitioner is imprisoned for offenses that occurred in 1987.
Two types of good time credit are applicable to this case because the petitioner's classification in administrative segregation spanned time spent in presentence and postsentence confinement. "The first type, presentence good time credit, also known as jail credit good time, is credit toward a reduction of an inmate's sentence that is earned for good behavior while the inmate is in custody prior to sentencing." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 254 Conn. 217 n. 2. General Statutes § 18-98d(b) governs presentence good time credit. Section 18-98d(b) provides that any person confined to a correctional institution for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, "if such person obeys the rules of the facility . . . may receive a good conduct reduction of . . . any sentence not suspended . . ." (Emphasis added.)
"The second type of good time credit, known as statutory good time credit, is credit earned by a sentenced inmate for his or her good behavior." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 254 Conn. 217 n. 2. Section § 18-7a(c) governs statutory good time credit, which provides: "[a]ny person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1983, may . . . by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a reduction of his sentence as such sentence is served . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Next, the meaning of the statutes must be ascertained. To determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs the court to first consider the text of the statutes. Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005). It is well established that the language of § 18-7a(c) is plain and unambiguous. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 94 Conn.App. 215. "The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DiPaolo, 88 Conn.App. 53, 58, 868 A.2d 98 (2005). Sections 18-7a(c) and 18-98d(b) were drafted using much of the same language; and like § 18-7a(c), the language in § 18-98d(b) does not permit more than one plausible meaning.
General Statutes § 1-2z provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
Of importance to the present case is the meaning of one particular word. In both statutes, the legislature chose to use the word "may" instead of "shall" to empower the Commissioner of Correction to commute an inmate's sentence using good tine credit. The use of the permissive term "may" rather than the mandatory term "shall" indicates that this legislative directive is discretionary. See Bailey v. State, 66 Conn.App. 592, 604, 783 A.2d 491 (2001). It is clear, therefore, that based on the language of these statutes the commissioner is not required to award good time credit; it is entirely at the commissioner's discretion. See Abed v. Commissioner of Correction, 43 Conn.App. 176, 180-81, 682 A.2d 558, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937, 684 A.2d 707 (1996).
Finally, this court turns to the specific issue raised by the petitioner concerning the ineligibility of inmates in administrative segregation to earn good time credit. This issue has already been addressed by the Connecticut Appellate Court. As in the petitioner's case, the complainants in Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 50 Conn.App. 423-24, were classified in administrative segregation and denied the eligibility to earn statutory good time credit. In Beasley, the Appellate Court held that the Commissioner of Correction was granted the statutory authority to adopt and enforce administrative rules that prevent certain classifications of inmates from earning good time credit under General Statutes §§ 18-81 and 18-7a(c). Id., 434-35. Based on the similar purpose and language of § 18-98d(b), this holding can also be applied to the commissioner's authority to deny presentence good time credit. The petitioner, therefore, cannot prevail on his claim. For this court "[t]o conclude otherwise would render the discretionary nature of [§§]18-7a(c) [and 18-98d(b)] superfluous." Id., 435.
Although Administrative Directive 9.4, paragraph 5, does not explicitly preclude inmates in administrative segregation from the eligibility to earn presentence good time credit — only statutory good time is specifically referenced — it does not impact this court's determination that the Commissioner of Correction has the legislative authority to deny inmates in administrative segregation from earning presentence good time credit.
Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.