The note and mortgages given under such circumstances cannot be deemed valid and binding. It was decided in Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, that if a promise is entirely disconnected with the illegal act and is founded on a new consideration, it is not affected by the act, although it was known to the party to whom the promise was made, and although he was the contriver and conductor of the illegal act. In this case, however, the sole consideration for the note was the plaintiff's fear of a criminal prosecution against her husband, induced by the representations made by the defendant for the express purpose of obtaining it. It was given in expectation of and for the purpose of preventing such prosecution, and is void. Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N.H. 508; Plumer v. Smith, 5 N.H. 553; Severance v. Kimball, 8 N.H. 386; Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N.H. 197; Alexander v. Pierce, 10 N.H. 494; Clark v. Pease, 41 N.H. 414; Merrill v. Carr, 60 N.H. 114; Bank v. Buzzell, 61 N.H. 612; Proctor v. Lane, 62 N.H. 457. A party who pays money under duress may recover it back. Richardson v. Duncan, supra. Decree for the plaintiff.

Her verbal admission of the authority of her husband to sign the note was coupled with the protest that it was only a signing as surety, and ratified nothing not before authorized. Her promise to pay, made under a threat of a criminal prosecution of her husband, and in consideration of the plaintiffs' forbearing to prosecute, was void, even if it had other consideration. Merrill v. Carr, 60 N.H. 114. The understanding of the plaintiffs at the time the note was signed, derived from the unauthorized acts and representations of the husband, and not induced by anything the defendant did, had no bearing upon the question at issue, and was properly excluded.