See also Willis v. State, 214 Ga. App. 479-480 (1) ( 448 SE2d 223) (1994). Compare Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 887 (2) ( 293 SE2d 474) (1982). Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts, we conclude that it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that each Appellant was guilty of all of the crimes for which he was convicted.
Brinson v. State, 272 Ga. 345, 347 (1) ( 529 S.E.2d 129) (2000). See also Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 887 (2) ( 293 S.E.2d 474) (1982) ("`aggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) that an assault (as defined in [OCGA § 16-5-20] was committed on the victim; and (2) that it was aggravated by (a) an intention to murder, to rape, or to rob, or (b) use of a deadly weapon . . .'" or by firing a weapon from within a motor vehicle). The indictment charged appellant with aggravated assault by "assault[ing the victim] with a gun, a deadly weapon, by shooting her," and with felony murder, with the underlying felony being aggravated assault "by shooting [the victim] with a deadly weapon."
It follows that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Tiller's guilt of committing an aggravated assault against Reynolds under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) or (2). Jackson v. Virginia, supra. Compare Phillips v. State, 250 Ga. 336, 338 (3) ( 297 S.E.2d 217) (1982) and Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 887 (2) ( 293 S.E.2d 474) (1982) (no evidence of defendant's attempt to commit a violent injury or of victim's reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury). 4.
“[A]ggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) that an assault (as defined in [OCGA § 16–5–20] ) was committed on the victim; and (2) that it was aggravated by (a) an intention to murder, to rape, or to rob, or (b) use of a deadly weapon.” Merrell v. State, 162 Ga.App. 886, 887(2), 293 S.E.2d 474 (1982). Here both aggravated assault counts included the assault element under OCGA § 16–5–20 and the aggravation element under OCGA § 16–5–21.
"[A]ggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) that an assault (as defined in [OCGA § 16-5-20]) was committed on the victim; and (2) that it was aggravated by (a) an intention to murder, to rape, or to rob, or (b) use of a deadly weapon." Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 887 (2) (293 SE2d 474) (1982). Here both aggravated assault counts included the assault element under OCGA § 16-5-20 and the aggravation element under OCGA § 16-5-21.
" Id. at (a) (2). "[A]ggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) that an assault (as defined in [OCGA § 16-5-20]) was committed on the victim; and (2) that it was aggravated by (a) an intention to murder, to rape, or to rob, or (b) use of a deadly weapon. . . ." Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 887 (2) ( 293 SE2d 474) (1982). McGuire asserts that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the two subsections, when the indictment alleged only one manner of aggravated assault.
Because the salient difference between criminal trespass as defined in OCGA § 16-7-21(a) and second degree criminal damage to property is the amount of damage required for conviction, criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of second degree damage to property. See Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 887(3) ( 293 S.E.2d 474) (1982). (Punctuation omitted.)
Motes v. State, 192 Ga. App. 302 ( 384 S.E.2d 463) (1989).Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886 ( 293 S.E.2d 474) (1982). In contrast, in the present case, the victims' testimony clearly establishes reasonable apprehension of harm. While J. B. testified that she did not believe the first shot was a gun firing, she realized she was under attack when the shots hit her house.
Because the salient difference between criminal trespass as defined in OCGA § 16-7-21 (a) and second degree criminal damage to property is the amount of damage required for conviction, criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of second degree criminal damage to property. See Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 887 (3) ( 293 S.E.2d 474) (1982). The trial court therefore did not err in submitting the criminal trespass charge to the jury.
The reference to a lie detector test was insignificant and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 888 (4) ( 293 S.E.2d 474) (1982). 11.