10 O.S. 1991 § 60.6[ 10-60.6]. A parent's willful failure to pay support must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, and the party seeking adoption without consent of the supporting parent bears the burden of proof. Merrell v. Merrell, 1985 OK 107, 712 P.2d 35. Stated otherwise, "[b]ecause a declaration that a child is eligible for adoption without parental consent is itself a final and appealable order, and one which subjects the affected parent to the possibility of having all ties severed, we find the interest involved in such a hearing to rise to the magnitude requiring proof which is clear and convincing." Merrell, 1985 OK 107, 712 P.2d at 39.

We disagree. We addressed the nature of a hearing on adoption without consent in Merrell v. Merrell, 712 P.2d 35, 38-39 (Okla. 1985). We determined in Merrell that the sole issue governed by the procedures of a § 60.7 hearing was the right of parental consent in an adoption proceeding.

The second reason is that such order is contrary to the public policy of this state in that, if permitted to stand, the child would legally be without a father at least until the court determined whether the adoption should be permitted, and if the adoption were to be eventually denied the child would remain fatherless indefinitely. See Merrell v. Merrell, 712 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1985). And finally, our adoption statutes contemplate that even if the adoption were to proceed without the father's consent, he would retain standing to challenge the adoption by proving that the adoption is not in his child's best interest.

The importance of the right to consent to an adoption has been recognized as an important right in and of itself. In re Adoption of Baby Boy K.B., 2011 OK 94, ¶ 8, 264 P.3d 1258; Steltzlen v. Fritz, 2006 OK 20, ¶ 12, 134 P.3d 141; Merrell v. Merrell, 1985 OK 107, ¶ 7, 712 P.2d 35. The law presumes that consent of a child's natural parents is necessary before an adoption may be effected.

The importance of the right to consent to an adoption has been recognized as an important right in and of itself. In re Adoption of Baby Boy K.B., 2011 OK 94, ¶8; Steltzlen v. Fritz, 2006 OK 20, ¶12,134 P.3d 141; Merrell v. Merrell, 1985 OK 107, ¶7, 712 P.2d 35. The law presumes that consent of a child's natural parents is necessary before an adoption may be effected.

At the hearing on the petition for adoption, evidence relevant to matters included in subsection (f) of Section 1912 must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt” in order to support a determination that parental rights should be terminated, including the testimony of an expert witness. ¶ 37 In Merrell v. Merrell, 1985 OK 107, 712 P.2d 35, this Court considered the procedures of 10 O.S. Supp.1975 Section 60.7, the predecessor to the provisions of 10 O.S.2001, Section 7505–4.1. This Court determined “that it is the parental right of consent, rather than the absolute termination of all parental ties to the child, at issue in a section 60.7 hearing, we still ... find the clear and convincing evidence standard ... to be proper.” This position was reiterated in In the Matter of the Adoption of J.R.M. 1995 OK 79, ¶ 17, 899 P.2d 1155, 1161, wherein this Court stated:

¶ 1 In its opinion the court holds that protection of a child's interests in the parent-child status relationship requires the appointment of independent counsel for the minor when a trial court is considering her eligibility for adoption under the terms of 10 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 60.6[ 10-60.6](2). I concur in today's pronouncement by reason of stare decisis, acknowledging that before entry of the decree of adoption and the creation of a new parent-child relationship the appointment of independent counsel for the minor is essential to protect the child's rights and interests. I write separately to clarify this court's earlier holding in Merrell v. Merrell, 712 P.2d 35 (1985), which remains viable since it applies to a phase of the statutorily prescribed procedure for adoptions which is distinct from that addressed in today's holding. The pertinent terms of 10 O.S. 1993 § 60.6[ 10-60.

"In a hearing to determine a child eligible for adoption without the consent of a parent, . . . because of the nature of the rights involved the proof necessary to support the finding of eligibility must be clear and convincing." Merrell v. Merrell, 712 P.2d 35, 37 (Okla. 1985). In this case, the trial court heard the evidence, entering detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and we will not reverse the trial court's conclusion of a child's eligibility for adoption without consent of the biological parent if not against the clear weight of the evidence.

Hammond argues that parental rights are not terminated until the subsequent adoption takes place. They rely on Merrell v. Merrell, 712 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1985). In Merrell, the Court said determination of eligibility to adopt without consent concerns only the parent's right to consent.

However, the termination of parental rights is the result of this process if the petition for a consentless adoption is granted. In Merrell v. Merrell, 712 P.2d 35 (Okla. 1985), the Court held the right adjudicated in a hearing under § 60.6 is the right to consent, rather than the severance of the bond between parent and child. S.A.W. was decided in 1993 [8 years after the Merrell case]; and, the Court's extension of the mandate for appointment of independent counsel for the child in a privately initiated termination suit, involving a consentless adoption for the failure to support, is the later authority.