Mermaid v. N.Y

3 Citing cases

  1. Bracco's Clam & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. N.Y.S. Liquor Auth.

    156 A.D.3d 629 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    say evidence may constitute substantial evidence if sufficiently relevant and probative and may, under appropriate circumstances, form the sole basis for an agency's determination, unless it is seriously controverted (seeMatter of JMH, Inc. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 1260, 1261, 877 N.Y.S.2d 737 ; Matter of S & S Pub, Inc. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 49 A.D.3d 654, 655, 852 N.Y.S.2d 804 ; Matter of A.J. & Taylor Rest. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 214 A.D.2d 727, 625 N.Y.S.2d 623 ).Here, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the respondent's determination, sustaining the two charges that the petitioner violated Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 106(6) and rule 54.2 of the Rules of the New York State Liquor Authority ( 9 NYCRR 48.2 ), is supported by substantial evidence (seeMatter of Willis v. New York State Liq. Auth., 118 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 988 N.Y.S.2d 671 ; Matter of Confetti, Inc. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 44 A.D.3d 1041, 1042, 845 N.Y.S.2d 794 ; cf.Matter of Island Mermaid Rest. Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 52 A.D.3d 603, 604, 859 N.Y.S.2d 732 ). DILLON, J.P., BALKIN, HALL and LASALLE, JJ., concur.

  2. Kinnie v. State Liquor Auth

    64 A.D.3d 1152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    Contrary to the contention of petitioner, the determination that he suffered or permitted gambling on the licensed premises on October 6, 2006 is supported by substantial evidence ( see § 106 [6]; Matter of Shorts Bar of Rochester Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 17 AD3d 1101, 1102). Respondent "`demonstrated that [petitioner] had knowledge or the opportunity through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge of the alleged acts'" ( Matter of Island Mermaid Rest. Corp. v New York State Liq. Auth., 52 AD3d 603, 604 [2008], quoting Matter of Leake v Sarafan, 35 NY2d 83, 86). We agree with petitioner, however, that the determination that he suffered or permitted an excessive amount of noise to occur on the licensed premises on January 6, 2007 is not supported by substantial evidence.

  3. In re 47 Ave. B. East Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority

    65 A.D.3d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 10 times

    In other words, the rule improperly imputes an employee's knowledge of improper activity to the petitioner. ( Matter of Island Mermaid Rest. Corp. v New York State Liq. Auth., 52 AD3d 603, 604 [2d Dept 2008] [absent evidence that a liquor licensee or someone vested with managerial or supervisory authority whose knowledge could be imputed to licensee knew or should have known of improper activity on licensed premises, a finding that the licensee "suffered or permitted" improper conduct, in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, cannot be sustained].) As such, rule 48.2 is beyond the rule-making authority of the SLA because section 106 (6) of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law requires that the licensee (or someone vested with managerial authority) "suffer or permit" the "disorder[]."