VonHoffman v. City of Quincy (4 Wall. 535) cited on this point, and approved 2. Although such laws be enacted, mandamus, to compel her to exercise that power to the extent she possessed it before their passage, will lie at the suit of a party to such a contract who has no other adequate remedy to enforce it. 3. Meriwether v. Garrett ( 102 U.S. 472), distinguished. Mr. George S. Lacey for the plaintiff.

The amount is fixed by the statute, to be paid on the outstanding capital stock of the corporation each year, and capable of being enforced by action against the will of the taxpayer. As was said by Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court in Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 513: "Taxes are not debts. It was so held by this court in the case of Oregon v. Lane County, reported in 7 Wallace. Debts are obligations for the payment of money founded upon contract, express or implied. Taxes are imposts levied for the support of the Government, or for some special purpose authorized by it.

United States v. Chamberlain, 219 U.S. 250. Lane v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 and Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, distinguished. In this case, the debtor has not been divested of its property in any of the methods which the statute prescribes.

Second, it was held that the writ of mandamus would not lie to compel the collection of taxes when there was no person against whom the writ could operate. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 501 (1880); id., at 515 (Field, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]hen the law is gone, and the office of the collector abolished, there is nothing upon which the courts can act"); cf. Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358, 368 (1881) (distinguishing Meriwether, supra). This exception also has no application to this case, where there are state and local officials invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax and where, as matters now stand, the District Court need only prevent those officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD.

Voorhies v. Houston, 70 Tex. 331; HidalgoCounty v. Morey, 74 F.2d 101; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535. The tax being sanctioned by the State, and provision therefor being required as a prerequisite to the issuance of the bonds, and the bonds being issued for the performance of a public purpose by a governmental agency of the State, neither the State nor the Federal Government can interfere — the State, because it cannot impair the obligation of contracts, and the Federal Government because it cannot impair the sovereignty of the State. Rorick v. Commissioners, Everglades Drainage District, 57 F.2d 1048; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71. Irrigation, drainage, and related public projects are all State governmental functions.

Taxes constitute a liability only when they become due or at the earliest when they are assessed. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472. That T.D. 2433 was not intended to permit taxpayers to deduct reserves for taxes is indicated not only by the contemporaneous action of the Commissioner, but also by the specific provisions of T.D. 2490, issued January 2, 1918, nearly a year after T.D. 2433, under which Treasury Decision taxes deductible were without qualification described as "taxes paid within the year." The appellees' munitions tax for 1916 did not accrue until 1917, in which year it was first assessed, became due and payable, and was in fact paid, and consequently it was properly deducted from income for that year.

What it does possess, however, is the power to coerce the performance by the legislature of a duty necessary to be performed, in order to effectuate its decrees. Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, and Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, relate to the judicial inability to levy taxes directly, not questioning the power to compel their levy in proper cases by those who are authorized to do so. Cf. Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. 435; Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655.

That part of the act of June 13, 1898, requiring stamps on deeds does not create a liability authorizing an action of debt against one failing to comply with its requirements. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472; Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. 426; Fleshman v. McClain, 105 F. 610; McClain v. Fleshman, 106 F. 880; United States v. Chamberlin, 156 F. 881. The remedies and penalties prescribed by said part of said act for a violation thereof are exclusive. Cases supra, and United States v. Truck's Admr., 27 F. 541; S.C., 28 F. 846; Craft v. Schafer, 153 F. 175; Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U.S. 550; Barkley v. Levee Comrs., 93 U.S. 258; Heine v. Board of Comrs., 19 Wall. 655.

This court has many times had occasion to consider and decide the nature of municipal corporations, their rights and duties, and the rights of their citizens and creditors. Maryland v. Balt. Ohio Railroad, 3 How. 534, 550; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Company, 10 How. 511, 533, 534, 536; United States v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 322, 329; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 308, 310-312; Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 114; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 654; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 524, 525, 531, 532; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 511; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, 80; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231, 241; Worcester v. Worcester Street Railway Company, 196 U.S. 539, 549; Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233. It would be unnecessary and unprofitable to analyze these decisions or quote from the opinions rendered. We think the following principles have been established by them and have become settled doctrines of this court, to be acted upon wherever they are applicable.

Revised Statutes, 1895, Arts. 3902, 4270, 4271, 4272; Palo Pinto Co. v. Gano, 60 Tex. 251 [ 60 Tex. 251]; Worley v. State, 48 Tex. 12 [ 48 Tex. 12]. Upon the decision of this court in United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, and the surrender by the political department of the state government of all claim to or right of control over, the territory formerly embraced in the geographical limits of Greer County, Texas, the title to the lands involved in this suit was extinguished, and the lands reverted to the State. 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 169 a; Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 512; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698[ 11 Tex. 698], 706. The grant was not a contract within the meaning of § 10, Art. I, Const. United States.