Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak

13 Citing cases

  1. Hartford Federal Savings Loan Assn. v. Lenczyk

    153 Conn. 457 (Conn. 1966)   Cited 58 times

    Although 49-14 is silent as to the deduction of prior encumbrances from the appraised value, it is well settled that the court should deduct from the amount of the appraisal the aggregate of prior claims against the property in order to determine the value of the security and hence the extent to Which the debt or obligation has been satisfied by the application to it of the foreclosed property. Sisson v. Tubbs, 50 Conn. 292, 294; Wilcox v. Bliss, 116 Conn. 329, 334, 164 A. 659; Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 608, 1 A.2d 134. In this case the court found that the sewer assessment was made by the sewer authority of the town of Farmington pursuant to chapter 103 of the General Statutes.

  2. Crane v. Loomis

    128 Conn. 697 (Conn. 1942)   Cited 23 times
    In Crane, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the failure of the plaintiff to refer to General Statutes ยง 5084 (predecessor to ยง 49-15) in challenging the motion to open the judgment constituted a waiver by the plaintiff to the invocation of that statute. It specifically stated that " [i]n the absence of waiver, the reopening of a judgment after [the vesting of title] was erroneous."

    In the absence of waiver, the reopening of a judgment after that time was erroneous. Ferguson v. Sabo, 115 Conn. 619, 623, 162 A. 844; Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 610, 1 A.2d 134. The defendants contend that, because it does not appear from the report of the hearing on September 19th, contained in the record, that plaintiff's counsel specifically referred to 5084, any objection based upon that statute was waived. That the trial court understood that this claim was in issue appears from the finding that it was one of the claims made by the plaintiff at the hearing.

  3. Bank of Stamford v. Alaimo

    31 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 21 times

    Once title has passed in a strict foreclosure, as in this case, a final judgment has occurred that cannot be opened. Barclays Bank of New York v. Ivler, 20 Conn. App. 163, 166, 565 A.2d 252, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 792 (1989); Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc. v. Molnar, 10 Conn. App. 160, 162, 521 A.2d 1065 (1987); see Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 610-11, 1 A.2d 134 (1938). Any claims by the defendant that were made or could have been made in the foreclosure proceeding cannot be relitigated in the deficiency hearing.

  4. Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc. v. Molnar

    10 Conn. App. 160 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 28 times

    (Emphasis added.) Both the Supreme Court and this court have ruled that, under this statute, a judgment of foreclosure cannot be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer. Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 610-11, 1 A.2d 134 (1938); City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Miko, 1 Conn. App. 30, 34 n. 2, 467 A.2d 929 (1983). In this case, absolute title had vested in the plaintiff before the defendants filed their motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure.

  5. City Savings Bank v. Miko

    1 Conn. App. 30 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 34 times
    In City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Miko, 1 Conn. App. 30, 467 A.2d 929 (1983), a defendant argued that in a deficiency judgment proceeding after strict foreclosure, the attorneys' fee provision in a note would be inapplicable.

    Were this not so, there would be no finality to the finding of value based on the day title vested in the plaintiff. A judgment of foreclosure cannot be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer. Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 611, 1 A.2d 134 (1938). Error in opening after law day may be waived.

  6. City of Stamford v. Pepaj

    No. FSTCV136019608S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2016)

    Both the Supreme Court and this court have ruled that, under this statute, a judgment of foreclosure cannot be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer. Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 610-11, 1 A.2d 134 (1938); City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Miko, 1 Conn.App. 30, 34 n.2, 467 A.2d 929 (1983). In this case, absolute title had vested in the plaintiff before the defendants filed their motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure.

  7. Mallette v. Bank of New York as Trustees

    2007 Ct. Sup. 13755 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    The law in our jurisdiction is clear that a judgment of foreclosure cannot be open after the title has become absolute. Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 611 (1938). Error in opening after law day may be waived.

  8. NAUGATUCK VALLEY SAV. AND LOAN v. PINO

    1997 Ct. Sup. 826 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    "Both the Supreme Court and [the appellate] court have ruled that, under this statute, a judgment of foreclosure cannot be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer." Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc. v. Molnar, 10 Conn. App. 160, 162, 521 A.2d 1065 (1987), citing Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 610-11, 1 A.2d 134 (1938); City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Miko, 1 Conn. App. 30, 34 n. 2, 467 A.2d 929 (1983). "Nevertheless, courts will recognize instances where the effect of the judgment may be collaterally attacked. Courts of equity may grant relief from the operation of a judgment when to enforce it would be unconscionable . . . or when a party can establish facts tending to show fraud, accident or mistake in connection with the entry of the original judgment of foreclosure."

  9. First Nationwide Bank v. Lewis

    1996 Ct. Sup. 2345 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)

    (Emphasis added.) "`Both the Supreme Court and [the appellate] have ruled that, under this statute, a judgment of foreclosure cannot be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer. Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 610-11, 1 A.2d 134 (1938);City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Miko, 1 Conn. App. 30, 34, n. 2, 467 A.2d 929 (1983).'" Werner v. Neal, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 336 (June 8, 1995, Pellegrino, J.), citing Merry-Go-round Enterprises, Inc. v. Molnar, 10 Conn. App. 160, 162, 521 A.2d 1065 (1987).

  10. Werner v. Neal

    1995 Ct. Sup. 7244 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    General Statutes ยง 49-15. "Both the Supreme Court and [the appellate] court have ruled that, under this statute, a judgment of foreclosure cannot be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer.Meriden Savings Bank v. Sujdak, 124 Conn. 604, 610-11, 1 A.2d 134 (1938); City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Miko, 1 Conn. App. 30, 34 n. 2, 467 A.2d 929 (1983)." Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc. v. Molnar, 10 Conn. App. 160, 162, 521 A.2d 1065 (1987).