In light of the plain and unambiguous language of § 4-160b (a), we decline to adopt the state's proffered construction of the statute. As we recently explained in Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank , 340 Conn. 711, 265 A.3d 870 (2021), "[p]laintiffs are not foreclosed from suing multiple defendants, either jointly or separately, for injuries for which each is liable, nor are they foreclosed from obtaining multiple judgments against joint [or successive] tortfeasors. ... This rule is based on the sound policy that seeks to ensure that parties will recover for their damages. ... The possible rendition of multiple judgments does not, however, defeat the proposition that a litigant may recover just damages only once. ... Double recovery is foreclosed by the rule that only one satisfaction may be obtained for a loss that is the subject of two or more judgments. ... In general, a loss is satisfied when a judgment ... rendered in favor of the plaintiff in compensation for the loss has been paid in full.
In such cases, we may be more flexible in distinguishing between an unraised claim, for which review is sometimes, but not always, improper, and an unraised legal argument in support of a claim that has been raised, for which review may be proper. See, e.g., Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank , 340 Conn. 711, 732, 265 A.3d 870 (2021). Arbitration is different.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963); see also, e.g., Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 340 Conn. 711, 724, 265 A.3d 870 (2021) (''[t]he full faith and credit clause requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it'' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The police obtained his cell phone and cell phone number from his mother as the direct and proximate result of an interrogation that we presume was illegal, and precisely the same analysis applies to both. See, e.g., Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 340 Conn. 711, 732, 265 A.3d 870 (2021) ("[w]e may … review legal arguments that differ from those raised by the parties if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim before the court" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the burden is not on the defendant to establish that tile presumed constitutional violation was harmless; the burden instead rests on the state, and the state has failed to explain why the cell site location data can be treated any differently from the cell phone itself in this respect.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 340 Conn. 711, 754, 265 A.3d 870 (2021). She also relies on a sentence from Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House, supra, 202 Conn. 106, 520 A.2d 162, in which this court stated that §§ 42a-2-711 and 42a-2-608, "read in, conjunction, envision a rule that requires a seller to return the buyer’s purchase price in toto when he has delivered nonconforming goods under circumstances that afford a buyer a right to reject or to revoke acceptance." Id., at 115, 520 A.2d 162.
But this court is addressing an important legal issue, and we are not bound by the precise rubric and line drawing employed by the parties in arguing their respective positions. See, e.g., Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank , 340 Conn. 711, 732, 265 A.3d 870 (2021) ("it is well established that [w]e may ... review legal arguments that differ from those raised by the parties if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim before the court" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is especially true when, as here, the scope of a court's subject matter jurisdiction is being adjudicated.