Summary
finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over § 7433 claims because the taxpayer failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
Summary of this case from U.S. v. PorterOpinion
No. C03-2022
October 29, 2003
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to the defendants' June 19, 2003 motion to dismiss (docket number 7). The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion is granted and this case is dismissed.
On April 25, 2003, the plaintiff, Mark Merfeld, who is prosecuting this action pro se, filed this lawsuit alleging that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and IRS employees Daniel Holmes and Arnold Stevenson violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants move to dismiss, arguing: (1) the plaintiff cannot maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any actions against the IRS or the individual defendants in their official capacity because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (3) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief; (4) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief; and (5) because the plaintiff has alternative remedies, he cannot maintain a Bivens action against the individual defendants in their individual capacity.
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the defendants "placed a non judicial lien" on him; that Mr. Holmes "is contacting Plaintiff's creditors and places of business to obtain information without judicial process" and that these "actions have damaged plaintiff's reputation;" that Mr. Holmes "has sent to plaintiff letters making the claim of Plaintiff owing tax;" and that Mr. Holmes "further violates the Plaintiff['s] rights by attempting to impose a cooperate tax on Plaintiff's rights." The plaintiff asks the court to: (1) "stop all collections proceeding against Plaintiff until the court has determined liability;" (2) "identify specifically what the tax is on;" (3) "provide proof as to how the [plaintiff was] involved in a taxable activity;" (4) "produce a certified copy of all laws that apply to [the plaintiff] in this matter;" and (5) to "provide a list naming all agents that had contacted or handled Plaintiff's files." The plaintiff further asks that each defendant be ordered to pay fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in actual damages and three million dollars ($3,000,000) in punitive damages.
The only authority cited by the plaintiff in his complaint is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to bring a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Comiskey v. IFTI Corp., 989 F.2d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)). The plaintiff has failed to allege facts that would satisfy the second element of a § 1983 claim. The plaintiff has not alleged a right that entitles him to due process that has been deprived.
To the extent the plaintiff is seeking damages under Internal Revenue Code §§ 7432, 7433, or 7422, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those claims because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Section 7432 allows a taxpayer to bring a civil action seeking damages against the United States for an IRS employee's failure to release a lien on his property if the taxpayer has exhausted the administrative remedies available within the IRS. 26 U.S.C. § 7432. The plaintiff has not shown he has exhausted his administrative remedies nor has he alleged that the IRS has acted unlawfully in filing or failing to release a lien. Section 7433 allows a taxpayer to file suit against the United States for damages in connection with certain unauthorized collection actions by an IRS employee if the taxpayer first exhausted the administrative remedies available within the IRS. 26 U.S.C. § 7433. The plaintiff again has not demonstrated that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Section 7422 allows for a refund action to be brought in district court if the taxpayer first filed an administrative claim for a refund and also fully paid the amount of the tax at issue. 26 U.S.C. § 7422. To the extent that the plaintiff's allegations are construed as a refund action, he has not demonstrated that he has filed a claim for a refund or that he has fully paid the amount of tax at issue.
To the extent that the plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, this court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such requests. Section 7421 forbids suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax. 26 U.S.C. § 7421. Section 7421 provides that except in certain circumstances, "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall me maintained in any court by any person. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 7421 (a). Although there are exceptions to this section, the plaintiff has not shown that he is eligible for any of them. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an exception exists and he has not done so. See Ponchick v. C.I.R., 854 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1988). Further, the declaratory judgment statute excludes all cases involving federal taxes except actions brought under § 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The plaintiff's allegations cannot be brought under § 7428 and therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claim by the plaintiff that may be construed as a claim for declaratory relief.
To the extent that the plaintiff's complaint could be construed to constitute a Bivens action against defendants Holmes and Stevenson in their personal capacities, it is dismissed. In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court authorized a direct cause of action for damages against federal officials based upon a deprivation of constitutional rights.Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). However, the Court specified two exceptions to the availability of this damages remedy: where Congress has provided an alternative remedy; or where there are "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Krueger v. Lyng, 927 F.2d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396-97).
The remedy provided by Bivens does not extend to "contexts in which it may be inferred that Congress has spoken to the contrary." Sinclair v. Hawke, 314 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 2003). "`When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.'" Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States, 26 F.3d 1448, 1453 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988)). Congress intended to preclude taxpayer suits, such as the one in this case, by providing "specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers" who wish to challenge the activities associated with the collection and assessment of taxes. Id. at 1454. By providing a comprehensive scheme of taxpayer remedies, Congress has precluded a Bivens action against the named defendants in this case. See id. The plaintiff has alternative remedies available to him. He can challenge a tax assessment both judicially and administratively or he can bring a refund action. See id. The plaintiff can bring actions against the United States to recover damages resulting from specific types of misconduct by IRS employees, such as a failure to release a lien on his property. See id. Because the plaintiff has alternative avenues of relief, he is precluded from filing a Bivens action. The plaintiff, therefore, has no claim against Holmes and Stevenson, and this court will dismiss the action against them in their individual capacities.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' June 19, 2003 motion to dismiss (docket number 7) is granted. This case is dismissed.