State ex rel. Dean v. Daues, 321 Mo. 1151; Graves v. Little Tarkio Drain. Dist. No. 1, 345 Mo. 557; State ex rel. v. Harter, 188 Mo. l.c. 529; Strottman v. Railroad, 211 Mo. l.c. 251; De Jarnett v. Tickameyer, 328 Mo. 153; Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 330 Mo. 526; Costilo v. State Highway Comm., 312 Mo. 264. (16) A statute is to be construed in the light of the law and the decisions as they exist at the time of its passage. 59 C.J., p. 1065; General Box Co. v. Mo. Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 845; Schott v. Continental Auto Ins. Underwriters, 326 Mo. 92; State ex rel. Westhues v. Sullivan, 283 Mo. 546; Meridith v. State Tax Comm., 163 Or. 305, 96 P.2d 1082; Mississippi State Tax Comm. v. Brown, 193 So. 794. (17) Uniformity under the State Constitution and equal protection under the laws of the Federal Constitution are one and the same. State Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 3; Federal Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Sec. 1; State v. Pierce Petroleum Corp., 318 Mo. 1020. (18) The question of constitutionality of a statute must be raised in the pleadings.
In determining legislative intent at the time of enacting a law, it is proper to consider decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting or affecting the constitutionality of any of the provisions thereof. ( Meredith v. State Tax Com., (Or.) 96 P.2d 1082, 125 A.L.R. 1417.) PER CURIAM.
105 N.W.2d 14. Molitor v. Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 86 A.L.R.2d 469 (1959), cert. den. 362 U.S. 968, 80 S.Ct. 955, 4 L.Ed.2d 900. See, e.g. Meredith v. State Tax Commission, 163 Or. 305, 96 P.2d 1082, 125 A.L.R. 1417. Sometimes a jurisprudential statement of the obvious is difficult to find, but a diligent search has produced at least one:
No federal statute has been suggested authorizing the taxation of the logs in question, and we must look to the decisions of the courts to determine if immunity is waived. In the case of Meredith v. State Tax Commission, 163 Or. 305, 96 P.2d 1082, 125 ALR 1417, speaking through Mr. Justice BAILEY, this court, in a case involving the taxation of an employe of the United States, held that the decisions of the Supreme Court are controlling and have the force and effect of law. In the case of S.R.A. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 90 L ed 851, 860, 66 S Ct 749, the Supreme Court of the United States had before it the question of whether or not the state of Minnesota could tax realty, legal title to which was in the United States, but which had been sold to a buyer under an executory contract of sale, the possession of the same being in the buyer and the instalment payments on the purchase price of the property having not been fully made.
We quote from the latter case at page 477: "When the national government lawfully acts through a corporation which it owns and controls, those activities are governmental functions entitled to whatever tax immunity attaches to those functions when carried on by the government itself through its departments." See, also, Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 84 L.Ed., 11, 60 S.Ct., 15, 124 A. L. R., 1263; Meredith v. Tax Commission, 163 Ore., 305, 96 P.2d 1082, 125 A. L. R., 1417; Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 345, 68 L.Ed., 328, 44 S.Ct., 121. We shall inquire, then, into the nature of the corporate instrumentality, with which we are dealing, and the objective sought to be accomplished by the exercise of its corporate power.
In fact, it would be less persuasive to believe that the legislature intended to tax the officers of a separate sovereignty than that they intended to tax officers of their own sovereignty if at some time the same would not be unconstitutional. This conclusion finds support in both reasoning and principal in Meredith v. Tax Commission, 163 Ore. 305, 96 P.2d 1082, 125 A.L.R. 1417, quoted with approval in Girard v. Defenbach, supra. This legislative intent, or lack of taxing intent, is further shown by the amendment of 1941, ch. 12, 1941 S. L., p. 27, expressly taxing such federal salaries.