Opinion
Record No. 1117-93-3
Decided: January 10, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY, Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge
David D. Walker for appellant.
Thomas C. Daniel, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Coleman and Senior Judge Hodges
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
David Morris Meredith contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his 1986 Roanoke County traffic court misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence ("DUI"). He argues that the conviction order was not admissible because the evidence failed to prove that it was signed by the presiding judge as required by Sec. 16.1-94. We find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the presiding judge signed the conviction order; therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the order into evidence.
The defendant was charged with DUI second offense. Code Sec. 18.2-270 provides for enhancing the punishment of a defendant who has previously been convicted of one or more DUI offenses. The purpose of this statute "is to enable the court or jury to impose a heavier punishment when the accused is tried for and convicted of an offense charged as a second or subsequent offense. To effect this purpose, the prior offense must be charged and proven [by the Commonwealth]." Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 413, 4 S.E.2d 762, 766 (1939).
The face of the warrant, offered to prove that in 1986 Meredith was convicted in Roanoke County General District Court of DUI, shows that he was present at the court proceeding, that he pled not guilty, that he was found guilty, and that he was assessed costs. The judge's initials are affixed to a line designated "judge" that was stamped on the back of the warrant. The judge's initials are located immediately below a stamped paragraph that designated the amount of the fine and suspension of Meredith's operator's license. The date of April 3, 1986, the same date as that noted on the front of the warrant as the hearing date, is written above the judge's initials on the back of the warrant. On a preprinted line at the foot of the warrant which had the designation "Judge" printed under, it contained no signature of the judge. The defendant argues that because the judge had not signed or initialed that line, no judgment order of conviction had been entered.
A judgment may be entered in a court not of record on the warrant itself. See Code Sec. 16.1-94. To effectuate a valid judgment, Code Sec. 16.1-94 requires that the warrant be signed by the judge, or that the judge's signature be affixed by facsimile stamp, in which case the judge must initial the warrant. The requirement of the statute is procedural only. See Barkman v. Chevalier, 214 Va. 6, 7, 196 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1973). "It is designed to allow a court not of record to enter an informal order on the face of the pleadings in disposing of cases." Id. The trial court found that such an informal order was entered on the warrant in 1986 convicting Meredith of DUI. The notation on the warrant charging Meredith with DUI was dated, it was regular on its face, it contained the fine and suspension of operator's license and an ASAP referral, and it contained the judge's initials. The face of the warrant shows that the judge found Meredith guilty. We cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that the trial judge signed and entered an order of conviction and in admitting the order as evidence of Meredith's prior DUI conviction.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.