Our scope of review in these matters is the same as in cases involving the necessity for service of a common carrier, that is, the order of the commission may not be disturbed in whole or in part except for error of law, lack of evidence to support the finding, determination or order of the commission, or violation of constitutional rights. Merchants Parcel Delivery, Inc. v.Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 150 Pa. Super. 120, 132, 28 A.2d 340. Wiley contends that, where, as here, a shipper has expressed a desire for the services of an admittedly competent contract carrier to promote efficiency and economy in its operation and to obtain a service available to a competitor, the granting of an application to furnish such service as a contract carrier is consistent with the public interest, the policy of the Public Utility Law, and the constitutional rights of the parties.

The need which was demonstrated was in the nature of an extraordinary, restricted, or specialized one, requiring a specialized and integrated type of service calculated to meet the peculiar requirements of the cement industry and such as is usually found in cases involving contract carriers. See Merchants Parcel Delivery, Inc. v.Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 150 Pa. Super. 120, 123, 125, 128, 28 A.2d 340. There is little, if any, practical distinction between a Class D common carrier seeking authority to serve a particular shipper and a contract carrier; it is the substance of the proceeding and its ultimate effect, not the form of the application, which controls.

A common carrier is "one who holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business of transportation of persons or property from place to place for compensation, offering his services to the public generally." Kelly v.General Electric Co., 110 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd, 204 F.2d 692 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886, 74 S.Ct. 137, 98 L.Ed. 390 (1953); see also Merchants Parcel Delivery v.Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 150 Pa. Super. 120, 28 A.2d 340 (1942). The law is well settled in Pennsylvania that only owners/operators of common carriers are held to the highest degree of care.

Appellants are unwilling to undertake the transporting of the raw materials from the collection terminals to the processing plant and no other common carrier service is available for this, the least desirable branch of the transportation service which Inland must have. Since Pamco proposed to provide an integrated specialized service which is not otherwise available we may not set aside the order, since it in other respects, as well, is consistent with the public interest and in accordance with the policy declared in Section 801 of the Public Utility Law, supra. Merchants Par. Del., Inc. v. Pa. P.U.C., 150 Pa. Super. 120, 28 A.2d 340. Moreover, the Commission properly held that the injection of the contract carrier service in competition with existing common carriers, as to one narrow phase of the shipper's requirements, did not affect the result. The Commission has the power to authorize competition where it is necessary to provide adequate service.

In 1934 appellee was certificated as a common carrier by the Public Service Commission. The corporate powers of the appellee were never questioned thereafter until 1950 at a hearing in this proceeding. In Merchants Parcel Delivery, Inc.v. Pa. P. U. C., 150 Pa. Super. 120, 129, 28 A.2d 340, we said: "Differentiating between common and private (contract) carriers, this court held that the test is whether or not such person holds himself out expressly or impliedly, as engaged in the business of supplying his product or service to the public, as a class, or to any limited portion of it, as contradistinguished from holding himself out as serving or ready to serve only particular individuals. Brink's Express Co. v. Public Service Commission et al., 117 Pa. Super. 268, 274, 178 A. 346; Masgai v. Public Service Commission et al., 124 Pa. Super. 370, 188 A. 599.

One of the main purposes in view was to prevent carriers by motor vehicle, which were in reality doing common carrier service, from masquerading as contract carriers, and thus escape the full regulation imposed by the Act on common carriers, thereby injuring and discriminating against common carriers to the damage and detriment of the public interest. See MerchantsParcel Delivery,Inc., v. Penna. P.U. Comm., 150 Pa. Super. 120, 129-132, 135, 28 A.2d 340. Unless such regulation of contract carriers tends to benefit the public interest in common carriers furnishing public service, there is no constitutional ground for its inclusion as part of the law regulating utilities.