Merchants' Mfr. INTER-INS. v. Hansen

9 Citing cases

  1. In re Soliz

    77 B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)   Cited 2 times

    A full coverage policy would insure against fire, theft, collision, property damage, and indemnity on the owner's liability, including a defense by the company of any action brought against the insured. Merchants' Manufacturers' Inter-Insurance Alliance v. Hansen, 258 S.W. 257 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1924) writ dism'd. See also, 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 926 (1946).

  2. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause

    727 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App. 1987)   Cited 15 times
    Finding statements of operative facts admissible in context of mutual mistake claim

    Several of these no evidence and insufficient evidence points hinge upon Sharp's role in the transaction and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that Sharp was an agent of Hall (which in turn would make him a subagent of Cherokee since Hall was involved in the purchasing on Cherokee's behalf). There are a number of Texas cases that indicate that the principal is bound by a mistake between the agent and a third party as to the terms of a contract. State v. Wales, supra; Hutchins v. Birdsong, 258 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Merchants' Manufacturers' Inter-Insurance Alliance v. Hansen, 258 S.W. 257 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1924, writ dism'd). As in many cases involving agency, there is no direct testimony as to what authority was delegated to Sharp.

  3. City of Lawrenceburg v. Cas. Co.

    16 Tenn. App. 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933)   Cited 18 times

    In Stevens v. Equity Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 66 Mont. 461, 213 P. 1110, it was said that an insured has a right to rely on the good faith of insurer and his agent, and it is not carelessness on his part to suppose that a policy has been issued that will give protection under the stated facts relating to the application, and, in an action for a fire loss where the policy did not conform to the statements made by the insured to the agent taking the application, the failure of the insured to inspect a policy after the receipt was not negligence barring recovery in action to reform the policy. The same rule was applied in Farwell v. Home Insurance Company, 136 F., 93, 68 C.C.A., 557, and in Merchants' Manufacturers' Inter-Insurance Alliance v. Hansen (Tex. Civ. App.), 258 S.W. 257. The defense of laches is not available, for there is no evidence that lapse of time has prejudiced the rights or interests of the defendant company.

  4. S. Casualty Co. v. Flowers

    23 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)   Cited 3 times

    As shown by the findings of the trial court, the principal testimony upon which the court found that Robbins agreed to issue the policy was that of Flowers, to the effect that Robbins told him that the Packard eight was fully covered, but there was no evidence introduced to show the amount for which the new car would be insured, nor the risk against which the insurance would apply, nor for how long the insurance should continue, nor what premium would be charged therefor. In Merchants' Manufacturers' Inter-Insurance Alliance v. Hansen (Tex.Civ.App.) 258 S.W. 257, 258, referring to a policy with full coverage clause, it is said: "Such a policy means, and was understood by the parties to mean, a policy that insures against risks of fire, theft, collision, property damage, and indemnity on owner's liability." See, also, McQuaid v. Ætna Ins. Co., 226 Mass. 281, 115 N.E. 428, by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.

  5. Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Woodward

    12 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)   Cited 1 times

    While the court cannot make a new contract for the parties, the court may make the policy contract speak the agreement as made. Where the assured accepts a policy without dissent, the presumption is that he knows its contents, and the burden then is upon him to overcome such presumption by proving that he did not know its contents, as by showing that when he received it he put it away without examining it, or that he relied upon the knowledge of the insurer and supposed that he had correctly drawn the policy. Other cases we have examined which announce the same rule, and to which we refer without comment: Merchants' Manufacturers' Inter-Insurance Alliance v. Hansen (Tex.Civ.App.) 258 S.W. 257; Henenberg v. Winnet al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 1 S.W.2d 432. We think the above cases completely answer several of appellant's propositions and contrary to its contention.

  6. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Baker

    5 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)   Cited 11 times
    In American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Baker (Tex.Civ.App.) 5 S.W.2d 252, it was held that a clause of an automobile policy insuring against loss or damage from accidental collision did not cover damage from hail, since in the usual and popular understanding of the term a "collision" does not result from a force of gravity alone, especially when unaided by any human agency.

    The controversy in the case arises over the meaning of clause (c) above, and the letter above written by the agent accompanying the delivery of the policy was introduced in evidence over appellant's objection, timely made, and especially the phrase, "renewing the full coverage on Louise's car," to show that appellant construed said clause in effect to cover any kind of an injury to said car. But we think the term "full coverage," as used in said letter, was intended to mean only that said policy covered fire, perils of transportation, theft, and pilferage, and collision with another automobile, vehicle or object; in other words, the policy covered all kinds of insurance usually embraced under the above-mentioned heads, and in no way tended to broaden or construe any one of the written clauses of the policy sued upon. Merchants' Manufacturers' Inter-Insurance Alliance v. Hansen (Tex.Civ.App.) 258 S.W. 257. We think said letter was immaterial and appellant's objection to its introduction should have been sustained.

  7. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Hinton

    298 S.W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)   Cited 1 times

    Where fraud, accident, or mistake is relied on to modify, substitute, or add to the terms of a written contract, the evidence must be clear and convincing that the contract as written is not the one that was in contemplation of the parties when they made it, and which they believed had embodied in it the terms and provisions agreed upon. In this, policies of insurance do not differ from other contracts, Merchants' Manufacturers' Inter-Insurance Alliance v. Hansen (Tex.Civ.App.) 258 S.W. 257. The plaintiff's evidence is wholly insufficient to establish his contention of fraud, accident, or mistake, and it furnishes no sufficient basis for the finding of the jury in that respect.

  8. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Todd

    283 S.W. 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)   Cited 1 times

    The common practice, is, moreover, not to read the policy, and a growing number of courts, recognizing that the custom of the community is one of the circumstances determining a standard of due care, have held this practice not to be negligence. Accordingly policies have been reformed for mutual mistake, although the mistake must have become apparent to the insured if he had examined the contract. Merchants' Manufacturers' Alliance v. Hansen (Tex.Civ.App.) 258 S.W. 257. Similarly, in suits on the policy, courts have not let failure so to examine prevent recovery, relying on the ground of waiver or estoppel.

  9. N. River v. Corsicana Warehouse

    281 S.W. 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)   Cited 2 times

    We think the authorities amply sustain our views in this regard, and deem it necessary only to give the citations without discussion. Ins. Co. v. Hansen (Tex.Civ.App.) 258 S.W. 257; Williams v. Ins. Co. (C. C.) 24 F. 625 (opinion by Mr. Justice Miller of the U.S. Supreme Court); Farwell v. Ins. Co., 136 F. 93, 68 C.C.A. 557 (by U.S. Circuit Court, 5th Circuit); Hollin v Benefit Ass'n, 96 A. 71, 88 N.J. Law, 204; Hay v. Ins. Co., 77 N.Y. 235, 33 Am.Rep. 607; Palmer v. Ins. Co., 9 A. 248, 54 Conn. 488; Oil Co. v. Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.S. 45, 7 Misc.Rep. 695; Merriam v. Leeper, 185 N.W. 134, 192 Iowa 587; Parchen v. Chessman, 142 P. 631, 146 P. 469, 49 Mont. 326; Avery v. Ins. Soc., 23 N.E. 3, 117 N.Y. 451; Clem v. Ins. Co., 29 Mo. App. 666. Under the undisputed evidence, we hold appellant entitled to have the policy in suit reformed so as to contain the distribution average clause.