Merchants' & Manufacturers' Bank v. Hammer

3 Citing cases

  1. Bishop v. Jones

    207 Miss. 423 (Miss. 1949)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that because the respondents-appellees in a habeas corpus proceeding did not file a cross-appeal, they could not challenge a ruling by trial judge in favor of the petitioner and "were not entitled to be heard in [the Supreme Court] except in support of the decree of the trial court"

    This court has no jurisdiction, being an appellate court only, to reverse the findings of the chancellor as to the sufficiency of the proceedings since there has been no cross-appeal by the respondent. In the case of Merchants' Manufacturers' Bank of Ellisville v. Hammer, et al., 166 Miss. 383, 148 So. 641, this court said: "Counsel for appellees, Hammer and Eyrich, undertake to argue that there was error in the decree of the chancellor in holding that clause was inserted by mistake. There was no appeal here as to that, and the decree is final in that respect, and is supported by the evidence in the case.

  2. Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corp.

    193 Miss. 675 (Miss. 1942)   Cited 52 times

    Courts will not make a new agreement for the parties, but will reform their written instrument so it will express their true bargain. Brimm v. McGee, 119 Miss. 52, 80 So. 379; Smith et al. v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 178 Miss. 600, 173 So. 673; Dead River Fishing Hunting Club v. Stovall, supra; Merchants' and Manufacturers' Bank v. Hammer, 166 Miss. 383, 148 So. 641; McDaniel v. Inzer (Miss.), 52 So. 359; McAllister v. Richardson, 103 Miss. 418, 60 So. 570. The clear intention expressed in the cover-all clause in the lease, to lease "all land owned or claimed" by Cummings, and the provision in the lease with respect to the payment of delay rental on the basis of $1.00 per acre on 155 acres of land, have been previously discussed.

  3. State Life Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Hardy

    189 Miss. 266 (Miss. 1940)   Cited 39 times
    In State Life Insurance Company of Indianapolis v. Hendy, 195 So. 708, it is said: "Without proof of special damages, a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case may recover damages for (a) the harm to his reputation which normally results from such an accusation as that brought against him, and (b) the distress which normally results from the initiation of such proceedings."

    The principal is not liable for the acts of an agent unless (a) the agent acts within the scope of his authority, or (b) the agent is specifically authorized to act, or (c) the act of the agent is ratified. Russell v. Palatine Ins. Co., 63 So. 644, 106 Miss. 290, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 471; Young v. L.B. Price Mercantile Co., 148 So. 641, 166 Miss. 383; Staples v. Schmid (R.I.), 19 L.R.A. 824; Bushard v. United Investment Co., 121 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637, 35 A.L.R. 637, 644; 2 R.C.L. Supp. 1325; 3 R.C.L. Supp. 852; 11 R.C.L. 810, par. 23; 18 R.C.L. 811, par. 266; Hudson v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 280 S.W. 403. The plaintiff must allege and prove, in a case of malicious prosecution, both want of probable cause and malice.