Opinion
F086734
01-26-2024
In re O.V. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.V., Defendant and Appellant.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Breana McMahon, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County Nos. 20JP-00044A, 20JP-00044B, 20JP-00044C &20JP-00044D . Mark V. Bacciarini, Judge.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Breana McMahon, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
Appellant R.V. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights as to her four minor children (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 366.26). On appeal, mother contends the court erred by declining to apply the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). Finding no error, we affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2020, then seven-year-old O.V., then four-year-old R.V., then two-year-old S.M., and then seven-month-old E.V. were initially removed from mother's home due to substance abuse issues and untreated mental health issues. The children were placed together in a foster home, the Merced County Human Services Agency (agency) filed a juvenile dependency petition, and the juvenile court subsequently ordered the children detained.
None of the children's presumed or alleged fathers participated meaningfully in the proceedings, and none are a party to this appeal. We omit facts pertaining to them as they are not relevant to the issue on appeal.
At the jurisdiction hearing conducted on July 28, 2020, the juvenile court found O.V. came within the court's jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), R.V. under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), and S.M. and E.V. under section 300, subdivisions (b), (g), and (j). The matter was continued for disposition.
On August 3, 2020, the children were moved together to the home of a nonrelative extended family member (NREFM).
At the disposition hearing conducted on September 23, 2020, the juvenile court ordered the children removed from the physical custody of the parents, and mother was ordered to participate in family reunification services.
Mother made progress on her case plan, and on May 10, 2021, the court ordered the children be returned to her custody on family maintenance services. At subsequent family maintenance review hearings, the court continued jurisdiction and ordered mother to continue participating in services.
On August 2, 2022, the agency filed a supplemental dependency petition alleging the children came within the court's jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). It was alleged mother had used methamphetamine and was unable to provide adequate supervision of the children in violation of a safety plan to which she had previously agreed. Upon initial removal, O.V. and R.V. were placed together with a relative, and S.M. and E.V. were placed together in a foster home. Shortly after, S.M. and E.V. were placed with a NREFM.
At the hearing on the section 387 petition on August 3, 2022, the juvenile court found parental placement was no longer appropriate and placed temporary custody with the agency.
At the disposition hearing conducted on December 13, 2022, the court terminated mother's reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing.
The agency's section 366. 26 report dated May 22, 2023, recommended the court order termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption for the children. O.V. stated that she enjoyed living with her care provider but wished she had her sisters with her. She reported she was happy and would like to remain in her home permanently, stating "I get taken care of." R.V. stated he enjoyed his placement and, as to his permanent plan, stated he wanted to go back to his mother's home. S.M. appeared overall happy and comfortable in her home, and E.V. was unable to provide a meaningful statement due to her age.
O.V. and R.V's care provider was going "back and forth" between legal guardianship and adoption but was leaning more toward adoption in order to provide them with stability and permanency. O.V. and R.V.'s care providers had known O.V. and R.V. since birth and were close family members.
S.M. and E.V.'s care providers wanted to adopt S.M. and E.V. rather than be legal guardians because "they were concerned the mother will have the opportunity to obtain custody of the children only to neglect them again." The care providers had been in the children's lives since they were infants and saw them as their own children.
The report indicated the care providers would "arrange visitation for the siblings." The report further indicated that there were "no factors precluding adoption." At a contested section 366.26 hearing conducted on August 1, 2023, the social worker testified mother had been consistent with visits. She arrived on time, and the children were glad to see her. She brought snacks and activities. She was not always appropriate with the children by speaking about the case on some occasions. The children did not experience separation issues when visits were concluded. The social worker opined mother and the children had a bond that had since been disrupted because they were removed, placed back with her, and removed again. The social worker had not heard the children or care providers indicate the children would like to go home to their mother. The children interacted with each other at visits and appeared to enjoy each other's company. When asked if the older children played with the younger children, the social worker responded, "In part, yes."
Mother testified that she was requesting the court order a plan of guardianship for the children. She believed there was a bond between she and the children and that it would be detrimental to them to sever the relationship, especially the two oldest children because they had spent most of their lives with her. At visits, the children "shower [her] with love and kisses." They play and do activities. At the end of visits, the children are sad, and the three-year-old cries. When asked if she believed it would be detrimental to the children if her parental rights were terminated, she stated, "Being a single mom of all my kids, we have always had a close bond. They have always been close together. And I feel that it would be detrimental because they do miss me." She went on to say, "And, just me, I can't live without my kids. I have been here this long fighting for them. I am not going to give up." She had continued to participate in services after her reunification services were terminated.
Mother testified another reason she was asking for guardianship was that the children would be harmed if they were separated from each other "because they grew up together."
Counsel for the department argued the children were adoptable and that neither the beneficial parent-child relationship nor sibling relationship exception applied. Mother argued both exceptions applied. Counsel for the children submitted without argument.
In ruling, the court noted it read and considered the agency's report and "f[ound] it to be rather insightful and in great detail," including the adoption assessment, as well as the other evidence presented. The court further noted that mother's testimony "was based mostly on her beliefs and not facts." The court found that the children were likely to be adopted, "according to the report from the [a]gency, which, again, the Court finds to be insightful and quite helpful," terminated parental rights, and ordered adoption as the children's permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the court erred by declining to apply the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights. We disagree.
Pursuant to the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights, the juvenile court may decide not to terminate parental rights when it finds "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" where "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) The court must "tak[e] into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (Ibid.)
The "purpose of [the sibling relationship] exception is to preserve long-standing sibling relationships that serve as 'anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.'" (In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 437.) The" 'strong language'" used by the Legislature to describe the sibling relationship exception creates a" 'heavy burden for the party opposing adoption.'" (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) The bill's author wrote that use of the sibling relationship exception" 'will likely be rare,'" which has been interpreted to mean that "the child's relationship with his or her siblings would rarely be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption." (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 950.)
We review the court's factual findings for substantial evidence and its" 'weighing of competing interests'" for abuse of discretion. (In re Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.)
Here, we conclude the juvenile court's implied finding that the sibling exception did not apply was supported by the record, and its decision not to apply it was not an abuse of discretion. The court was reasonable in determining mother was unable to carry her burden that the sibling relationship exception applied. The court noted it did not find mother's testimony persuasive, and mother did not offer any other evidence to support her contention the exception applied. On the other hand, nothing in the agency's report indicated that any of the children's relationships with one another would outweigh the benefits of adoption. While the children had spent most of their lives together, including a substantial amount of time during the reunification period, they had been in two separate homes for approximately a year without any documented negative incident related to the separation. The report indicated the care providers would schedule future sibling visitation, and no evidence was presented to refute this. We acknowledge O.V. expressed she would have liked to live with her younger siblings. This did not compel the court, however, to apply the exception in light of the rest of the evidence, including that the children were generally happy and stable with care providers they had known since birth who were willing and able to provide them with the permanence of adoption.
For the first time in her reply brief, mother suggests that the California Supreme Court case, In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, stands for the proposition that the juvenile court is required to set forth "an analysis of the enumerated exception, step by step" on the record. We do not find Caden C. sets forth a requirement that the court detail its analysis on why it is not applying an exception to parental rights on the record, and while the juvenile court did not directly address the exceptions to parental rights, we find no legal deficiency in its ruling. As stated in In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, "we infer from section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)-under which the juvenile court is required to 'state its reasons in writing or on the record' when it makes a finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child-that the court is not required to make findings when it concludes that parental rights termination would not be detrimental." (A.L., at p. 1156.) "[A]lthough a statement by the trial court of its findings (or reasons) for its decision is helpful in conducting appellate review, it was not a legal requirement in this instance." (Ibid.)
For the reasons set forth, we conclude the juvenile court did not err by declining to apply the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
[*] Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and DeSantos, J.