DECIDED FEBRUARY 7, 1974. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 129 Ga. App. 707 ( 200 S.E.2d 921). Kaler, Karesh Frankel, Jerry L. Sims, for appellant.

Based upon these facts, it follows that FS was entitled to recover its statutory attorney fees from Kroger. See Term Net, supra, 277 Ga. at 344-345; see also Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707, 709(5) ( 200 SE2d 921) (1973) (jury issue lacking where note provided for attorney fees of 15 percent). Because the amount to be awarded was subject to simple computation by application of the unambiguous rate of 15 percent, a hearing was not required "merely to effect this computation."

A plaintiff who is entitled to a summary judgment on a document establishing "evidence of indebtedness," within the meaning of OCGA § 13-1-11 (a) "is also entitled to a judgment for attorney fees thereon." See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707 (5) ( 200 S.E.2d 921). As the amount of attorney fees to be awarded in cases such as this is subject to computation by using either without variance, or by substantially complying with, the unambiguous statutory formula of OCGA § 13-1-11 (a) (2), a hearing is not required merely to effect this computation.

The court also found that the defendant having executed the two time differential agreements in December 1976, and January 1981, this specifically showed that he knew when he signed the note sued on that he had agreed for the past five years to pay interest on the entire account at the same rate of 18% per annum. Further, under the authority of Ameagle Contractors v. Va. Supply Well Co., 144 Ga. App. 477 (1) ( 241 S.E.2d 594), the execution of a note in payment of an account operates to cut off all defenses to the account of which the maker had knowledge, hence, defendant was barred from pleading usury with reference to the making of the note which was for more than $100,000, citing such cases as Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707 ( 200 S.E.2d 921); Reid v. Nat. Bank of Ga., 149 Ga. App. 834 ( 256 S.E.2d 82). Defendant appeals. Held: 1. The case sub judice involves farm supplies supplied to a farmer in his business and is clearly one of a commercial account.

d. On cross appeal CS argues that because the trial court granted its motion for summary judgment on the contract, it was also entitled to summary judgment for attorney fees in the amount of 15%, as provided for in the contract. We agree. CS presented evidence of compliance with the requirements of Code Ann. § 20-506, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment in favor of CS on its claim for attorney fees. Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707, 709 (5) ( 200 S.E.2d 921) (1973), aff'd 231 Ga. 680 ( 203 S.E.2d 479) (1974). Sawyer's argument that the debt had not yet matured (see Code Ann. § 20-506) by virtue of the extension agreement is without merit, as we have determined that no viable extension agreement existed.

A party may consent in advance to the conduct of future transactions and will not be heard to "claim his own discharge" upon the occurrence of that conduct. See Reeves v. Hunnicutt, 119 Ga. App. 806, 807 ( 168 S.E.2d 663) (1969); also McGarr v. Bank of Pinehurst, 159 Ga. App. 116 ( 282 S.E.2d 739) (1981); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707 ( 200 S.E.2d 921) (1973), affirmed, 231 Ga. 680 ( 203 S.E.2d 479) (1974). The loan agreement and the obligations flowing from it represent the very kind of credit Thurmond and the other guarantors were seeking when they signed the guaranty.

Code Ann. § 57-119 (Ga. L. 1969, pp. 80, 81) now allows parties to loans of more than $100,000 to agree in writing to pay whatever rate of interest they may choose with no restrictions. See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707, 708 (2) ( 200 S.E.2d 921) (1973). 1. Count 1 alleged, for various reasons, that the $20,000 "service fee" should be treated as interest and used in the computation of usury, and that the non-interest bearing escrow fund for the replacement of the security was an indirect device to enable the lender to reserve, charge or take for a loan or advance of money a true rate of interest greater than 8% a year.

A co-maker is not allowed to plead failure of consideration because he did not receive the money (although in this case she did receive some of the benefits). The money was received by either or both of them, and they are bound. Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707, 709 (3) ( 200 S.E.2d 921); Feltman v. National Bank of Ga., 146 Ga. App. 434, 436 (1) ( 246 S.E.2d 447). 3.

The amount of the note being greater than $100,000, neither a corporation nor an individual may plead usury as a defense thereto. Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger, 129 Ga. App. 707 ( 200 S.E.2d 921) (1973). The statute specifically provides that a person to whom it is applicable includes but is not limited to "individuals, group of individuals, corporations, ... joint arrangements, ... or other entities of any nature whatsoever."

The financing agreement between Harold Dye as president of Holloway Enterprises and appellant referred specifically to seven Holloway contracts then in effect and provided that in consideration of the assignment of the seven named contracts, appellant would pay Holloway a stated percentage of the money due under the contracts. The trial court, construing the "Unconditional Guaranty and Indemnification" and "Financing Agreement" as one contract (see, e.g., Berger v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 231 Ga. 680 ( 203 S.E.2d 479), reversing holding in 129 Ga. App. 707 (1) ( 200 S.E.2d 921), held that the alleged unconditional guaranty executed by appellees "was limited to any liability that may arise from the seven (7) contracts assigned in the [the Financing Agreement]; thus to make the sureties liable for any obligations arising out of contracts beyond the seven (7) assigned would be an increase of the risk of the sureties and an [unwarranted and impermissible] extension of the sureties liability by implication ..." The trial court further held that appellees could not be liable under the surety instrument for the debt in the instant case, because such debt did not involve any contract recited in the financing agreement.