Act or conduct in reckless disregard of the rights of others is improper or wrongful conduct and constitutes wanton misconduct, evincing a reckless indifference to consequences to the life, or limb, or health, or reputation or property rights of another. We define these terms in Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197 ( 139 A. 698) at page 199: "Wanton misconduct is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of action.
Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698 (1928). `It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action.
We are not convinced that this slip was so significant as to affect the outcome of the trial, but in reviewing the evidence we have concluded that it was insufficient to support a finding of wilful misconduct which would bar recovery by the plaintiff in his action for an absolute nuisance. "In nuisance of that order, the fault that bars recovery is fault so extreme as to be equivalent to invitation of injury or, at least, indifference to consequences." Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 393, 155 A. 499 (1931); see Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199 — 200, 139 A. 698 (1928). The only evidence of "wilful misconduct" presented was that the plaintiff drank one and one-half cans of beer during a three and one-half hour fishing outing on the evening of the accident and that a police officer who came to the scene "detected a moderate odor of alcohol" on the plaintiff's breath.
Wilful misconduct is intentional misconduct, and wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct, which is the equivalent of wilful misconduct." Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698. The jury could reasonably have concluded that the act of racing two automobiles, in itself a crime under General Statutes 14-224 (b), on a city street in the night season amounted to gross or wilful misconduct.
Conduct indicating a reckless disregard of the rights of others is quite distinct in its characteristics from merely negligent conduct. It is conduct which indicates an indifference to the consequences of action and constitutes wanton misconduct. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 187, 199, 139 A. 698; Bordonaro v. Senk, supra. Conduct arising from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or from an error of judgment, does not indicate a reckless disregard of the rights of others. In her haste to get home before the threatened thunderstorm broke, the driver of this car turned from the street into the driveway without slackening her speed, with the result that the car failed to make the turn and mounted the curb.
Such a conclusion would determine the defendant's liability without regard to any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 122, 84 A. 301; Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 200, 139 A. 698. The appellant also complains of the charge of the trial court with reference to the claim of wanton misconduct.
"Act or conduct in reckless disregard of the rights of others is improper or wrongful conduct and constitutes wanton misconduct, evincing a reckless indifference to consequences to the life, or limb, or health, or reputation or property rights of another. We define these terms in Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197 ( 139 A. 698) at page 199: 'Wanton misconduct is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of action.
He contends, however, that in light of two modern Supreme Court decision — Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518 (1988) and Elliot v.Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385 (1998) — the term "wilful and malicious" conduct has been merged with and redefined to include common-law reckless or wanton conduct, which "is the equivalent of wilful misconduct." Dubayv. Irish, supra, 207 Conn. at 533 n. 8 (quoting State v. Alterio, 154 Conn. 23, 25-26 (1966) and citing Menzie v. Kalmonowicz, 107 Conn. 197, 199 (1928)). Because common-law recklessness or wantonness does not require proof of intent to cause injury; id. the plaintiff insists that summary judgment must not be entered in this case for failure to plead or present competent evidence that the defendant caused his injuries while acting with such an intent.
Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698 (1928). "It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action."
Some support for this view is found in Bordonaro, supra, 109 Conn. at 431-432, 147 A. at 137: "We define these terms in Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, at page 199, 139 A. 698, 699: "Wanton misconduct is more than neglience, more than gross negligence. It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of action. Wilful misconduct is intentional misconduct, and wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct, which is the equivalent of wilful misconduct.