Opinion
12-03-2015
Sheila E. Shea, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Albany (Shannon Stockwell of counsel), for appellant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Zainab A. Chaudhry of counsel), for respondents.
Sheila E. Shea, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Albany (Shannon Stockwell of counsel), for appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Zainab A. Chaudhry of counsel), for respondents.
Before: McCARTHY, J.P., ROSE, LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ.
ROSE, J.Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ellis, J.), entered November 14, 2014 in Franklin County, which, among other things, granted defendants' cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
William T., a convicted sex offender on probation and with a long history of mental illness, resided in facilities operated by the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (hereinafter OPWDD). After his probation expired, the Acting Director of the OPWDD facility where William T. was then a resident applied to retain him involuntarily pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 15.13(b). Supreme Court (Feldstein, J.) dismissed the application and ordered that William T. be released. The Acting Director immediately appealed and, relying upon the automatic stay provision of CPLR 5519(a)(1), refused to allow William T. to leave the facility. William T. then cross-appealed and, on his behalf, plaintiff commenced this separate declaratory judgment action challenging the application of the automatic stay. When plaintiff moved for summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief, defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court (Ellis, J.) granted defendants' cross motion, prompting this appeal by plaintiff.
The appeal is moot and must be dismissed. During the pendency of this appeal, we heard and decided the cross appeals of the underlying order in the retention proceeding (Matter of William T., 126 A.D.3d 1108, 5 N.Y.S.3d 563 [2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 912, 2015 WL 3892345 [2015] ). There, based upon our conclusion that the Acting Director proved by clear and convincing evidence that William T.'s continued involuntary retention at the OPWDD facility was required, we reversed the order of Supreme Court (Feldstein, J.) releasing William T. (id. at 1110, 5 N.Y.S.3d 563 ). Since then, William T. has been involuntarily retained at the facility by the authority of our decision and not by virtue of the automatic stay at issue here. Thus, any attempt at this time to determine the propriety of the automatic stay on the merits would have no direct impact on the rights of the parties (see Coleman v. Daines, 19 N.Y.3d 1087, 1090, 955 N.Y.S.2d 831, 979 N.E.2d 1158 [2012] ; Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ; Matter of Tompkins County [Tompkins County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn., Inc.], 126 A.D.3d 1156, 1157, 5 N.Y.S.3d 579 [2015] ).Nor does the exception to the mootness doctrine apply. While the central issue in this case—i.e., the applicability of the automatic stay provision of CPLR 5519(a)(1) to appeals by the state in retention proceedings—might be likely to recur and substantial in nature, it is not likely to evade judicial review (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d at 714–715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 ; cf. Matter of Bryant v. Board of Educ., Chenango Forks Cent. Sch. Dist., 107 A.D.3d 1170, 1171, 968 N.Y.S.2d 806 [2013] ; Matter of Patrick BB., 267 A.D.2d 853, 854, 700 N.Y.S.2d 301 [1999] ; but see Matter of Nile W., 64 A.D.3d 717, 719, 882 N.Y.S.2d 690 [2009] ). Indeed, if the state appeals the denial of any future retention application, William T. may move this Court to vacate, limit or modify the automatic stay (see CPLR 5519[c] ). We note that such a motion could have been—but was not—made in the earlier appeal from the underlying order (see generally Matter of William T., 126 A.D.3d at 1108–1109, 5 N.Y.S.3d 563 ).
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
McCARTHY, J.P., LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ., concur.