Opinion
2004-1478 Q C.
Decided July 1, 2005.
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Civil Court, Queens County (V. Brathwaite Nelson, J.), entered July 27, 2004, which denied her motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability against defendant Lukasz Pisarczyk.
Order unanimously reversed without costs and plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as against defendant Lukasz Pisarczyk granted.
Before: PRESENT: July 1, 2005 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS PRESENT: GOLIA, J.P., RIOS and BELEN, JJ.
A rear-end collision is sufficient to create a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the offending vehicle, and imposes a duty of explanation on the operator of the vehicle ( see Vecchio v. Hildebrand, 304 AD2d 749; Levine v. Taylor, 268 AD2d 566). If the operator of the vehicle cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, then summary judgment on the issue of liability may be awarded against such operator ( see Mendiolaza v. Novinski, 268 AD2d 462). Notwithstanding the contention of defendant Pisarczyk, the operator of the rear vehicle, that the lead vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger came to a sudden stop, defendant's submissions in opposition to plaintiff's motion do not show that the other vehicle came to a sudden stop, nor do they offer any non-negligent explanation as to how the accident occurred, and are therefore insufficient to rebut the inference of negligence. It is noted that statements in a police accident report constitute hearsay and are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Bates v. Yasin, 13 AD3d 474; Lacagnino v. Gonzalez, 306 AD2d 250). In any event, a claim that the driver of the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of plaintiff ( see Mendiolaza v. Novinski, 268 AD2d 462, supra).