Opinion
1:01-cv-60
February 28, 2001
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134,110 Stat.1321(1996) ("PLRA"), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiffs pro se Complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiffs allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Riverside Correctional Facility. Plaintiff sues Officer Belfior, claiming that Belfior wrote a false major misconduct ticket against him for disobeying a direct order. While Plaintiff was in the kitchen area on July 11, 2000, Officer Belfior ordered him to return oranges that Plaintiff intended to take with him for a snack. According to Plaintiff, he is a diabetic and the oranges were an authorized dietary snack to prevent "low sugar attacks." Plaintiff claims that while he was entitled to the oranges, he complied with Belfior's order Plaintiff alleges that despite his compliance, Belfior gave him a major misconduct ticket for disobeying a direct order. Following a major misconduct hearing that was held on July 26, 2000, the Hearing Officer found Plaintiff guilty. (See Attach. to Compl., Major Misconduct Hearing Report, 7/26/00). The Hearing Officer gave the following reasons for his finding:
Hearing Officer finds that the four oranges in question were NOT the prisoner dietary snack that he claims he is authorized, as he himself admits that the snack bags are sent to his unit at 8 PM at night, and he feels they are insufficient due to lack of fruit and has complained to his dietician about this. Therefore, the four oranges he is alleged to have had at 1220 were not an authorized dietary snack; at best they are something this prisoner himself chose to take from the kitchen to supplement his diet in ADDITION to his normal meal and snack.
Hearing Officer finds based on the statement of the reporter Belfior that this prisoner was told by him to give him the four oranges that he (Menefee) had, and that Menefee heard this order (Menefee admits the stopping by the officer and the conversation — merely disputes its content and whether he obeyed); therefore Menefee heard the order by admission and proximity, and that Menefee did not obey the order to give the oranges to Officer Belfior as told. The order was not to place them back on the line or dispose of them, it was to give them to Belfior. Therefore, since Menefee did not give the oranges to the reporter Belfior when told, he disobeyed the direct order. Hearing Officer specifically finds that order reasonable as the oranges were NOT his snack nor was he in medical extremis at the time. The order could have been complied with and would not have endangered Menefee (who admits himself he would be sent a snack from the kitchen everyday at 8 PM). The order was not in contradiction of prior, but presently effective orders, therefore Menefee should have obeyed it. Later giving the oranges back to Officer Jackson was NOT compliance with the order of Belfior
As a result of his misconduct conviction, Plaintiff received three days of toplock. In addition, good-time credits are automatically forfeited for the month that the guilty finding is made. SeeMICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33; MICH. DEFT OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.03.105, 1BB (eff. Jan. 1, 1999). Furthermore, the warden must order forfeiture of previously accumulated credits in cases involving assaultive behavior and may order forfeiture in other types of cases. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33; Policy Directive 03.03.105, ACC. For relief, Plaintiff seeks restoration of his good-time credits, as well as an unspecified amount of monetary damages for mental distress.
II. Failure to state a claim
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v Corr. Corp. of Am.,102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A prisoner given the sanction of toplock is restricted to his own cell, room, or bunk and bunk area. MICH. DEFT OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.03.105, 1 S (eff. Jan. 1, 1999).
Plaintiff claims that he was falsely charged and convicted of a major misconduct for disobeying a direct order. The Supreme Court has held that a claim alleging deceit and bias on the part of the decision maker necessarily implies the invalidity of the punishment imposed and is not cognizable under § 1983 until the conviction has been overturned. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). The Court relied upon Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [overturned]." Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646 (emphasis in original). Thus, where a prisoner's claim of unfair procedures in a disciplinary hearing necessarily implies the invalidity of the deprivation of good-time credits, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless Plaintiff first shows that his misconduct conviction has been invalidated. Id.; see also Burton v. Rowley, 2000 WL 1679463, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000) (unpublished table disposition) (holding that a prisoner's claim that his due process and Eighth Amendment rights were violated by false misconduct charges is not cognizable under § 1983 because it necessarily implies the invalidity of the guilty findings on the misconduct tickets); Bailey v. McCoy, 1999 WL 777351, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1999) (unpublished table disposition) (collecting Sixth Circuit decisions applying Edwards to procedural due process challenges).
In order to attempt to invalidate a conviction under Michigan law, a prisoner may seek a rehearing of a decision made by the Hearings Division. SeeMICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.254; Policy Directive 03.03.105, ¶ X. Thereafter, the prisoner may appeal the misconduct conviction to the state circuit court. SeeMICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.255(2); Policy Directive 03.03.105, ¶ AA (concerning appeal) If the prisoner is unsuccessful in the circuit court, he could then apply for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. SeeMICH. CT. R. 7.203(B); 7.302. If the prisoner is not successful in the state courts, he may then seek to overturn the conviction by bringing a federal habeas corpus action.
In the present case, Plaintiff does not indicate that he even sought a rehearing or appealed his misconduct conviction to the state courts. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that his conviction has been invalidated. Therefore, his claim is not presently cognizable.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's action fails to state a claim; therefore, it will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $105 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If Plaintiff is barred, he will be required to pay the $105 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
A misconduct conviction results in the loss of good-time credits, which is equivalent to a loss of a "shortened prison sentence." See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). A challenge to a "shortened prison sentence" is a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement that is properly brought as an action for habeas corpus relief. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). However, a prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before bringing a habeas corpus action, which would include appealing the conviction through the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion filed this date:
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (c).
For the same reasons that the court dismisses the action, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a)(3); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997).
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).