Opinion
No. 3:18-cv-01634-HZ
05-16-2019
CINDY MENDOZA; GLORIA BERMUDEZ; LORI SPANO; CEKAIS TONI GANUELAS; REBECCA HEATH; and KARL WADE ROBERTS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MATTHEW GARRETT, in his official capacity as Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation and TOM MCCLELLAN, in his official capacity as Administrator of Driver and Motor Vehicles Division, Oregon Department of Transportation, Defendants.
Emily Teplin Fox Marisa Samuelson Beth Englander Kelsey Heilman OREGON LAW CENTER 522 S.W. Fifth Ave., Suite 812 Portland, Oregon 97204 Jonathan M. Dennis OREGON LAW CENTER 35 S.E. Fifth Ave., Suite 1 Ontario, Oregon 97914 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Ellen Rosenblum ATTORNEY GENERAL Renee Stineman Sadie Forzely Beth Andrews ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL Department of Justice 100 S.W. Market Street Portland, Oregon 97201 Attorneys for Defendants
OPINION & ORDER / / / / / / Emily Teplin Fox
Marisa Samuelson
Beth Englander
Kelsey Heilman
OREGON LAW CENTER
522 S.W. Fifth Ave., Suite 812
Portland, Oregon 97204 Jonathan M. Dennis
OREGON LAW CENTER
35 S.E. Fifth Ave., Suite 1
Ontario, Oregon 97914
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Ellen Rosenblum
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Renee Stineman
Sadie Forzely
Beth Andrews
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Department of Justice
100 S.W. Market Street
Portland, Oregon 97201
Attorneys for Defendants HERNANDEZ, District Judge:
Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a putative class, challenging Oregon's practice of suspending an individual's driver's license for failure to pay "traffic debt." More specifically, the six named Plaintiffs, each of whom lives on an extremely limited income and has had a driver's license suspended because of the inability to pay one or more traffic violation fines and attendant fees and costs, contend that suspending a driver's license for failure to pay traffic debt absent an assessment of an individual's ability to pay, violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants are Matthew Garrett, the Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), and Tom McClellan, the Administrator of ODOT's Driver and Motor Vehicles Division. Together, they are "the DMV."
The term "traffic debt" is used by the parties to refer to fines imposed for traffic violations as well as any additional fees or costs associated with a fine.
This case was filed in September 2018. Simultaneously with filing the original Complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and to certify the class. After the October 11, 2018 oral argument on the preliminary injunction motion, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). In a December 12, 2018 Opinion & Order, I denied Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D. Or. 2018) ("the PI Opinion"). In January 2019, Plaintiffs withdrew the class certification motion. ECF 44. In February 2019, the parties reported that they had stipulated to Plaintiffs' filing a Second Amended Complaint and that Defendants would challenge the sufficiency of that pleading with a motion to dismiss. The Second Amended Complaint (SAC) was filed February 25, 2019, ECF 47, and the motion to dismiss briefing is now complete.
Plaintiffs bring four claims, each alleging a violation of due process, equal protection, or both. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants raise several jurisdictional challenges and additionally argue that all of the claims fail to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because I agree with Defendants that the claims fail to state a claim, I assume without deciding and for the purposes of this Opinion only, that the Court has jurisdiction. Nonetheless, I grant Defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
The PI Opinion contains an extensive discussion of the alleged facts, the Oregon statutory scheme, and the evidence presented in conjunction with the preliminary injunction motion. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1150-62. I do not repeat that discussion here because much of it is still relevant even in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Many of the factual allegations noted in the PI Opinion are repeated in the SAC. All references in the PI Opinion to the text of Oregon statutes remain valid. Any other relevant factual assertions are noted in the discussion below.
STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). However, the court need not accept unsupported conclusory allegations as truthful. Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) ("we do not necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations") (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]" meaning "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). / / /
DISCUSSION
I. Nature of the Claims in the SAC
In the SAC, Plaintiffs bring the same three claims they previously raised, plus one more. All of the claims assert violations of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and/or equal protection clauses. The SAC's first claim is identical to the FAC's first claim and relies on the "fundamental fairness" concept of substantive due process and equal protection as explained by the Supreme Court in cases such as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). SAC ¶¶ 234-39. Plaintiffs contend that under Griffin, "states must provide an evaluation of ability to pay to assess an individual's indigence prior to [] taking any measure that could result in any additional punishment beyond that imposed upon financially solvent individuals." Id. ¶ 237; see also id. ¶ 238 (citing Bearden and alleging that the "Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses prohibit punishing individuals for non-payment without first determining that they had the ability to pay and willfully refused to make a monetary payment.").
In their second claim, a repeat of the previously-asserted second claim in the FAC, Plaintiffs rely only on the Equal Protection Clause. Id. ¶¶ 240-42. Specifically, they rely on James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), to contend that the state may not distinguish indigent traffic debt debtors from other indigent debtors. Id. They assert that under Strange, equal protection principles are violated by statutes which result in the DMV treating indigent traffic debtors worse than indigent debtors who commit bicycle, pedestrian, or parking offenses; private debtors with delinquent credit card debt; and child support debtors. Id. ¶ 242.
In the SAC's newly added claim, Plaintiffs allege that Oregon Revised Statute § (O.R.S.) 809.416, effectively treats indigent traffic debtors differently based on their poverty. Id. ¶¶ 243-49. They allege that the differential treatment is without a rational basis and violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id. ¶ 249.
Finally, in their fourth claim, Plaintiffs raise the same procedural due process claim they raised in the FAC. Id. ¶¶ 250-57. They allege that they have liberty and property interests in their driver's licenses and their ability to drive legally. Id. ¶ 251. They assert that Defendants violate their procedural due process rights by suspending their driver's licenses without notifying them that they can avoid suspension by submitting proof of their inability to pay their traffic debt and by failing to provide a pre- or post-deprivation hearing on their ability to pay. Id. ¶¶ 252-56. II. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
Because I conclude that none of the claims asserted in the SAC plausibly state a claim, I do not consider Defendants' timeliness argument.
A. First Claim - "Fundamental Fairness" Under Griffin/Bearden
The PI Opinion discussed this claim at length. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1165-76. There, I concluded that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on this "fundamental fairness" claim. Id. at 1175-76. This conclusion was premised on my determinations that Plaintiffs' challenges to the relevant statutes did not implicate a fundamental constitutional right, did not implicate a suspect classification, and that the statutory scheme was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The allegations in the SAC do not compel a different result even under the governing "plausibility" standard at issue in this motion.
My conclusion in the PI Opinion that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of this claim rested on several legal conclusions, including that the law does not recognize a constitutional right to self-sufficiency, to intrastate travel, to a driver's license, or to a particular mode of transportation. Id. at 1172-73. I also concluded, as a matter of law, that the law does not recognize poverty as a suspect class and that statutes which have differing effects on the wealthy and the poor do not, for that reason alone, trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. I further concluded, as a matter of law, that the Griffin/Bearden line of cases did not trigger a heightened level of scrutiny. Id. at 1166-72, 1174. These were legal conclusions based on my analysis of the relevant caselaw, and did not rest on particular facts asserted by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, these conclusions are equally applicable in analyzing the viability of the identical claim on a motion to dismiss.
After reaching these legal determinations, I continued to assess the likelihood of success on the merits of the Griffin/Bearden claim by discussing whether the challenged Oregon statutes were rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1174-75. Because the Griffin/Bearden argument is grounded in concepts of both due process and equal protection, see id. at 1165-68, the relevant legal analysis includes the element of rationality. Id. at 1168. I concluded that the Oregon statutes were rationally related to a legitimate state interest. As a matter of law, I determined that the state has a legitimate interest in enforcing traffic laws. Id. at 1174-75 ("traffic laws exist as a basic manifestation of the state's undisputed interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens") (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) ("the Government . . . has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens")). This was a legal determination, not a factual one. Id. (concluding that the "state has a legitimate interest in punishing, in some form, violations such as speeding, driving while talking on a cell phone, failure to obey a traffic control device, failure to use proper car seats, etc.") Id. Fines, then, are an expression of the state's legitimate interest in enforcing traffic violations. Id. (explaining that fines are rationally related to enforcement of traffic laws and to the deterrence of continued violations). Moreover, I explained that states are entitled to employ enforcement mechanisms to compel payment of the fine as part of their legitimate interest in protecting the safety of its citizens. Id. at 1175 (explaining that "[m]ethods by which the state can enforce compliance with the fine requirement . . . are rationally related to the safety goal. Without a compliance mechanism, the fine is toothless and without deterrent effect. Accordingly, fines are reduced to a judgment, subject to payment or collection by a number of different methods, and eventually or additionally, can result in the violator's license suspension if the fine is unpaid."). In opposing the present motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs concede that the state has a legitimate interest in enforcing the payment of traffic fines. Pls.' Mem. 36-37, ECF 51.
At this point in the PI Opinion analysis, I cited evidence in the preliminary injunction motion record, including statements by judicial officers, that the threat of suspension had motivated even indigent debtors to return to the originating traffic debt court and while not always successful, had resulted in payment compliance in some of those cases. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1175. Here, in the context of a motion to dismiss, relying on such evidence is inappropriate. But, it is also unnecessary. The cited evidence showing that the threat of suspension had compelled payment as to some indigent traffic debtors only bolstered the conclusion that the threat of suspension worked as a compliance mechanism in furtherance of the state's goal to improve citizen safety. That evidence was not necessary, however, to reach the conclusion that the suspension statutes are rationally related to the state's legitimate interest.
As Defendants explain in the briefing of the instant motion, in assessing whether a statute survives rational basis review, a "legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); see also Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Research Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 450, 457 (9th Cir.) ("In defending a statute on rational basis review, the government has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification"; rational basis review requires determining whether the challenged law has a legitimate purpose and then whether the challenged law promotes that purpose) (internal quotation marks omitted)), amended, 881 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2018).
Moreover, the determination of whether a statute has a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest is a question of law, not a question of fact. See, e.g., Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris Cty., 236 F.3d 240, 249 (5th Cir. 2000) (whether rational relationship exists for purposes of substantive due process claim is a question of law reviewed de novo); FM Props. Op. Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 172 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996) (whether zoning ordinance has a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest is question of law for the court); Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 66 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1995) (determining whether a legislative scheme is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest is a question of law for the court); see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 753 (1999) (favorably citing FM Properties for proposition that "rational relationship to legitimate government interest for purposes of substantive due process a question of law for the court"). Furthermore, the PI Opinion explained that even if the challenged statutes were overinclusive by their enforcement as to indigent traffic debtors with no practical means of paying the fine, that did not render the statutes unconstitutional under rational basis review. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. at 1175 (citing cases).
In summary as to the Griffin/Bearden "fundamental fairness" claim, I rely on the legal analysis and discussion in the PI Opinion to conclude that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because as a matter of law, the challenged statutes do not implicate a fundamental constitutional right, do not implicate a suspect classification, and are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
B. Second Claim - Strange Equal Protection
The contours of this claim are fully explained in the PI Opinion. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1176-78. In that Opinion, I explained that the issue presented in Strange was not present here. Id. at 1177. Thus, Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their equal protection theory based on Strange because the challenged statutes in this case do not create an explicit exemption from protections available to other judgment debtors. Id. Alternatively, I concluded that even if Strange applied here, there was a rational relationship between the challenged statutes and the state's legitimate interest in modifying driving conduct to comply with the traffic laws. Id. at 1177-78. Because these legal conclusions were based on an analysis of the caselaw and statutes at issue, they are applicable here. For the reasons explained in the PI Opinion, this claim fails to state a claim.
C. Third Claim - Equal Protection
Although this is a newly added claim in the SAC, I have already addressed the alleged equal protection violation in the context of analyzing the Grffin/Bearden fundamental fairness claim. As explained above, and in the PI Opinion, in determining that the fundamental fairness claim was not likely to succeed on the merits and now, that it fails to state a claim, I already have determined that the claim does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class and that the challenged statutes have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. As a result, Plaintiffs fail to state a viable equal protection claim.
D. Fourth Claim - Procedural Due Process
This claim is a repeat of the procedural due process claim alleged in the FAC and considered in the PI Opinion. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1178-80. There, I agreed with Plaintiffs that as a matter of law, a driver's license is a property interest which triggers procedural due process protections. Id. at 1179. But, based on the relevant test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), I concluded that because (1) the interest at stake was not constitutionally fundamental, (2) there was little risk of erroneous deprivation and little probative value to be gained by additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government had a strong interest in enforcing traffic fines to deter continuing traffic violations, the Oregon statutes challenged here provided constitutionally adequate procedural due process. Id. at 1179-80. Thus, I concluded there was no likelihood of success on the merits of the procedural due process claim. I see no reason to revisit those conclusions which were legal conclusions, not factual determinations. Thus, they are equally applicable here in analyzing the viability of the claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
However, I further address some issues raised in the motion to dismiss briefing. I agree with Plaintiffs that a property right need not be "constitutionally fundamental" to receive procedural due process protections. See Pls.' Mem. 29 ("The Mathews balancing test is not reserved for fundamental rights"). But, "due process is a flexible concept" and the procedures required "in any given case [are] a function of context." Franceschi v. Yee, 887 F.3d 927, 935 (9th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 648 (2018). Mathews provides a balancing test in which the nature of the right at issue, along with the government interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation, impacts the amount of process that is due. Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in describing the Mathews test, has recognized the "strength of the individual's interest" as one of the relevant factors. Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1987) ("To determine what process is due, we must balance the risk of an erroneous deprivation, the state's interest in providing specific procedures and the strength of the individual's interest.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nozzi v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 806 F.3d 1178, 1192 (9th Cir. 2015) (under Mathews, "[w]hich procedures are due in a given case requires a careful analysis of the importance of the rights and the other interests at stake.").
The PI Opinion's description of the right to a driver's license as "not constitutionally fundamental," 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1179, did not suggest that the Mathews test was inapplicable or that deprivation of the right did not trigger due process protections. The PI Opinion engaged in the Mathews analysis after expressly stating that suspensions of driver's licenses do trigger such protections. Id. (concluding that a "driver's license is a significant enough property interest to warrant procedural due process protections"). As the cases indicate, however, recognizing that the right to a driver's license is not a fundamental constitutional right was a proper consideration in the overall Mathews balancing inquiry.
Additionally, a problem I see in Plaintiffs' argument is their assertion that their indigence absolves them of the obligation to pay the traffic debt. Their procedural due process claim faults the challenged Oregon statutes for failing to notify them that they "can avoid suspension by submitting proof of their inability to pay their traffic fines." SAC ¶ 253. Their due process contention is not limited to the opportunity to request a fee waiver based on their indigence. Instead, they go further and assert that they have a constitutional right to non-payment of the fine because of their poverty. The caselaw does not support this position.
As explained above and in the PI Opinion, there is no constitutional right to self-sufficiency and correspondingly, there is no constitutional prohibition on poverty. Poverty is not a suspect class. Therefore, depriving an individual of a property right on the basis of an inability to pay does not violate the Constitution absent a showing that such deprivation impairs a fundamental right or interest. See PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1165-76 (discussing Griffin/Bearden fundamental fairness claim); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379-83 (1973) (unconstitutional for state to condition access to court for divorce proceeding on payment of court fees and costs because it deprived individuals of fundamental right to access the courts which in turn impaired constitutionally-important marital and associational interests); cf. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (requiring indigent debtor to pay mandatory filing fee in bankruptcy case not unconstitutional because the debtor's "alleged interest in the elimination of his debt burden, and in obtaining his desired new start in life, although important and so recognized by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, does not rise to the same constitutional level [as the interests at issue in Boddie]."). Accordingly, as I suggested in the PI Opinion in distinguishing a Michigan case, it is error to find a procedural due process violation based on the absence of notice to traffic debtors that their indigence will act as a fee waiver. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1179 & n.8 (explaining that Plaintiffs' articulation of the risk of erroneous deprivation was misplaced because their characterization of the deprivation was founded upon an assumption that there is a constitutional right to an indigency determination and exception to payment in the first place; further distinguishing Fowler v. Johnson, No. 17-11441, 2017 WL 6379676 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2017), rev'd, Nos. 17-2504/8-1089 (6th Cir. May 8, 2019), for that reason).
Finally, Plaintiffs, as they did in the preliminary injunction motion briefing, again point to Fowler where the district court concluded in a similar case that the Griffin/Bearden and Strange claims were unlikely to succeed but still concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their procedural due process claim. Pls.' Mem. 29-30. However, after briefing on the instant motion was complete and while the motion was under advisement, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court in Fowler. Fowler v. Benson, Nos. 17-2504/18-1089, 2019 WL 2017748 (6th Cir. May 8, 2019). Plaintiffs also note a similar, recent Virginia case, Stinnie v. Holcomb, 355 F. Supp. 3d 514 (W.D. Va. 2018), which found a likelihood of success on the merits of a procedural due process claim. Putting aside any possible analytical legal error in these district court cases rendering them unpersuasive in my opinion, Fowler and Stinnie are independently distinguishable because the statutes at issue are not comparable to Oregon's. As I explained in the PI Opinion, the Michigan statutes at issue in Fowler were distinguishable because, unlike Oregon's statute, they lacked a pre-suspension notice. PI Op., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1179 n.8. I adhere to that conclusion.
In the Virginia case, the statute at issue did not give the plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard regarding their default or to present evidence of their inability to pay. Notably, the challenged Virginia statute lacked any pre-suspension notice at the time of payment default. In Virginia, the DMV, upon notice of a payment default, automatically records a license suspension with no pre-suspension notice to the licensee. Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 521-23. The DMV sends the traffic debtor a letter informing the defaulted individual that his or her license has already been suspended for failure to pay traffic debt. Id. There is no pre-suspension notice and no indication that the traffic debtor may return to the traffic court to address the debt and the suspension. Thus, the Virginia statute at issue in Stinnie, like the Michigan one at issue in Fowler, is distinguishable from the Oregon one challenged here. As a result, I do not find the conclusions reached in those cases persuasive.
Oregon's scheme provides for a sixty-day pre-suspension notice with instructions to return to the traffic court to avoid suspension. While the pre-suspension notice under Oregon law does not inform the traffic debtor that by returning to traffic court a payment plan may be available, the notice makes clear that the traffic debtor may return to traffic court to address the debt. Given the nature of the right at issue, the low risk of erroneous deprivation, and the strong interest in enforcing traffic fines, the Oregon statutes comport with procedural due process requirements. / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / III. Leave to Amend
The SAC is Plaintiffs' third pleading setting forth the same three claims. The additional equal protection claim in the SAC overlaps with one of the original three claims. As explained above, my conclusions are conclusions of law. As such, it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs leave to amend. Accordingly, I dismiss the claims with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss [48] is granted. All claims are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 16 day of May, 2019
/s/_________
Marco A. Hernandez
United States District Judge