The defendants, in support of their motion, relied on some of the plaintiffs own medical reports. One such report was that of the plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Joyce Goldenberg, which revealed the existence of a significant limitation in the plaintiffs right knee flexion ( see Guerrero v Bernstein, 57 AD3d 845; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). The other was an operative report of the plaintiffs treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Richard Seldes, which revealed, inter alia, the existence of a tear in the posterior horn of the medial meniscus in the right knee.

These are the type of measurements necessary to meet plaintiff's burden of proof. See, e.g., Toure, 98 N.Y.2d at 350 ("an expert's designation of a numeric percentage of a plaintiff's loss of range of motion can be used to substantiate a claim of serious injury") (internal citations omitted); Mendola v. Demetres, 212 A.D.2d 515, 515, 622 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (2d Dep't 1995) (physician's specific measurements of limited range of thoraco/lumbar motion in all directions was sufficient to defeat summary judgment) (internal citations omitted). All four affirmations also concluded that Tenzen's loss of range of motion was permanent.

In general, the type of limitations to one's movement that Plaintiff's expert measured, discussed supra, would raise a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. See, e.g., Toure, 98 N.Y.2d at 350 (finding that "[i]n order to prove the extent or degree of physical limitation, an expert's designation of a numeric percentage of a plaintiff's loss of range of motion can be used to substantiate a claim of serious injury") (internal citations omitted); Mendola v. Demetres, 622 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (2d Dep't 1995) (finding that plaintiff's showing that his limitation of motion was "supported . . . by specific measurements concerning [the] limitations" was sufficient to defeat summary judgment) (internal citations omitted). However, courts have typically held that limitations in range of motion that are less than 20 percent are not sufficiently significant to constitute a serious injury. Hodder v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 335, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (pointing out that, "[w]hile there is no set percentage for determining whether a limitation in range of motion is sufficient to establish `serious injury,' the cases have generally found that a limitation of twenty percent or more is significant for summary judgment purposes . . . [and that] less than 20% limitation has been found insufficient") (collecting cases).

In support of their motions, they relied upon, inter alia, the medical reports of the plaintiffs treating physicians. At least two of those reports revealed that the plaintiff had significant limitations in her cervical and lumbar spine range of motion more than seven months post-accident ( see Guerrero v Bernstein, 57 AD3d 845; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). Since the defendants did not meet their prima facie burdens, it is unnecessary to decide whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Guerrero v Bernstein, 57 AD3d at 845; Coscia v 938 Trading Corp., 283 AD2d 538).

Furthermore, the defendants submitted contradictory proof as to whether the injured plaintiff's lumbar spine condition was caused by the subject accident or a degenerative disease ( see, Julemis v Gates, 281 AD2d 396; DeVeglio v Oliveri, 277 AD2d 345). Accordingly, the defendants failed to establish a prima facie case that the injuries allegedly sustained by Phyllis Coscia were not serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) ( see, Mariaca-Olmos v Mizrhy, 226 AD2d 437; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to consider whether the plaintiff's' papers in opposition to the defendants' motion were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see, Chaplin v Taylor, 273 AD2d 188; Mariaca-Olmos v Mizrhy, supra)" In light of my conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed for the reasons stated above, I need not and do not pass on defendants' additional arguments.

In support of the defendants' motion, they relied upon, inter alia, the medical reports of the injured plaintiff's treating physicians. Those reports revealed the existence of significant limitations of motion in the cervical and thoracic regions of the injured plaintiff's spinal column ( see Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). Since the defendants did not meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to decide whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff's in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Coscia v 938 Trading Corp., 283 AD2d 538).

In support of that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by Jessica, the defendants relied upon, inter alia, Jessica's medical reports and records. One of these noted the existence of limitations in the range of motion of her cervical spine without sufficient quantification or qualification to establish that the limitation of motion was not significant ( see Brown v Motor Veh. Ace. Indent. Corp., 33 AD3d 832; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515; see also Smith v Delcore, 29 AD3d 890; Sano v Gorelik, 24 AD3d 747; Kaminsky v Waldner, 19 AD3d 370). Moreover, the affirmed medical report of the defendants' examining neurologist noted that she had "full" range of motion in her neck, yet he failed to state what objective testing he used to arrive at his conclusion that she did not have any limitations ( see McCrary v Street, 34 AD3d 768; Ilardo v New York City Tr. Auth., 28 AD3d 610, 611; Kelly v Rehfeld, 26 AD3d 469, 470; Nembhard v Delatorre, 16 AD3d 390, 391; Black v Robinson, 305 AD2d 438, 439). Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, we need not consider the sufficiency of the papers submitted in opposition to the defendants' motion ( see Coscia v 938 Trading Corp., 283 AD2d 538). The Supreme Court, however, erred in denying that branch of the plaintiffs' cross motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

The report of the plaintiff's treating chiropractor, who examined the plaintiff several days after the subject accident, established limitations in the plaintiff's thoracolumbar spine range of motion and the report of the plaintiffs treating physician noted fractures in the plaintiff's cervical spine. The defendants' submission of these documents precluded a finding that they were entitled to judgment dismissing the complaint as a matter of law ( see Lesane v Tejada, 15 AD3d 358; Kolios v Znack, 237 AD2d 333; Mendola v Demetres, 212 AD2d 515). Since the defendants failed to satisfy their burden in support of the motion, we need not address the sufficiency of the plaintiff's papers submitted in opposition ( see Coscia v 938 Trading Corp., supra).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The defendant's motion papers failed to establish, prima facie, his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Junco v. Ranzi, 288 A.D.2d 440; Mendola v. Demetres, 212 A.D.2d 515; Flangan v. Hoeg, 212 A.D.2d 756). RITTER, J.P., FLORIO, GOLDSTEIN, LUCIANO and COZIER, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law — 5102(d) (see, Mendola v. Demetres, 212 A.D.2d 515). Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment was properly denied (see, Coscia v. 938 Trading Corp., 283 A.D.2d 538; Osada v. Taub, 259 A.D.2d 473; Mastromonica v. Conklin, 246 A.D.2d 581; Thomas v. Joyner, 237 A.D.2d 347). RITTER, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, FRIEDMANN, FEUERSTEIN and CRANE, JJ., concur.