e a private right of action, and although § 12601 contains a civil component, it provides authority singularly to the Attorney General, id. at 12601(b); see Crosby v. Catret, 308 Fed.Appx. 453, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242); Johnson v. D.C. Crim. Just. Act, 305 Fed.Appx. 662, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (same); Chaney v. Races and Aces, 590 Fed.Appx. 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding that §§ 241 and 242 fail to provide a private right of action and that 34 U.S.C. § 12601, formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141, may only be brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States) (citations omitted); Tucker v. Elk City Pol. Dep't, No. 22-6023, 2022 WL 2165508, at *1 (10th Cir. June 16, 2022) (same) (quoting Tucker v. U.S.Ct. of Appeals for Tenth Cir., 815 Fed.Appx. 292, 294 (10th Cir. 2020) (also same)); Medina v. City of Wellington, 432 Fed.Appx. 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2011) (same); Harris v. United States, 686 Fed.Appx. 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (same); Steinhardt v. Bernardsville Pol. Dep't, No. 20-2825, 2021 WL 3929321, at *2 n.2 (3rd Cir. Sept. 2, 2021) (per curiam) (holding that neither § 241 nor § 12601 provide private rights of action); Dantzler v. Dep't of Just., 20-cv-01505, 2021 WL 2809125, at *7 n.9 (D.D.C. July 6, 2021) (no private right of action under § 12601, formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141); Doe v. Lucero, No. 10-1008, 2010 WL 2484518, at *1 (D.D.C. June 15, 2010) (same). Even if plaintiff was afforded a cause of action, it is unclear how, if at all, 34 U.S.C. § 12601 can plausibly apply to plaintiff's claims, as that statute governs the deprivation of juvenile rights.
Plaintiff's claims 1-5 and 7-8 fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because these federal claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Mendia v. City of Wellington, 432 F. App'x 796, 797 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) (providing that "a dismissal under Heck is for failure to state a claim, which falls under Rule 12(b)(6)" and that "a dismissal under Heck is without prejudice"). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that prisoners are prohibited from recovering damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "if a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated."
While the law is not entirely uniform, a defendant's argument that a plaintiff's claim is barred by Heck is probably not a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction and probably should be brought via Rule 12(b)(6). See Ortiz v. New Jersey State Police, 747 F. App'x 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018); Topa v. Melendez, 739 F. App'x 516, 518 (11th Cir. 2018); Mendia v. City of Wellington, 432 F. App'x 796, 798 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011); Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2011); but see Spencer v. Gidley, No. 15-11822, 2015 WL 4642904, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2015). Here, though, the Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) distinction does not matter—Defendants' Heck argument does not warrant dismissal.
Claims that are Heck barred are not subject to dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), however, and instead should be addressed under Rule 12(b)(6). SeeJohnson v. McElveen , 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996) ; see alsoMendia v. City of Wellington , 2011 432 F. App'x 796, 797 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) ("a dismissal under Heck is for failure to state a claim, which falls under Rule 12(b)(6)") (citing Hafed v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons , 635 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011). Defendants' arguments for dismissal based on Heck will therefore be construed as arising under Rule 12(b)(6).
Despite presenting several challenges to his convictions and sentence, no court has ever questioned the validity of plaintiff's convictions and sentence. Thus, plaintiff's instant action is barred by Heck and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Mendia v. City of Wellington, 432 Fed. Appx. 796, 797 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that because the Heck bar is jurisdictional, dismissals pursuant to that bar are appropriately entered under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6)). VI. Conclusion
Under Heck, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are premature and will remain so until the convictions are invalidated. Except as to those claims for which the Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Mendia v. City of Wellington, 432 F. App'x 796, 798 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that "a dismissal under Heck is for failure to state a claim, which falls under Rule 12(b)(6)" and "is without prejudice"). C. Plaintiff's Motions for Preliminary Injunction
" Id. Accordingly, a claim barred by Heck is not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), but instead should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "with prejudice to being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met." See id.; see also Mendia v. City of Wellington, 2011 432 F. App'x 796, 797 n. 1 (10th Cir. Aug. 15, 2011) ("a dismissal under Heck is for failure to state a claim, which falls under Rule 12(b)(6)"), citing Hafed v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2011). Because Defendant has also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) based on Heck, construction of her Rule 12(b)(1) motion as arising under Rule 12(b)(6) is unnecessary.
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which provides the United States Attorney General with authority to maintain a civil action relating to certain rights deprivations, does not provide a private cause of action to the plaintiffs in this case. See Mendia v. City of Wellington, 432 F. App'x 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). Plaintiffs do not indicate which subdivision of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 they believe to be applicable under the facts alleged, and the allegations in the Complaint do not state a claim under any of those subdivisions.
18 U.S.C. § 245, the statute under which the plaintiff brings suit, is a criminal statute providing for fines and/or imprisonment of individuals found guilty of certain civil rights violations, and does not provide a private cause of action for aggrieved citizens. Mendia v. City of Wellington, 432 F. App'x 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2011); Cordell v. Town of Signal Mountain, No. 1:13-CV-137, 2014 WL 5704662, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2014). Accordingly, the plaintiff lacks statutory standing to bring this action, and her complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The statute does not, however, provide a private right of action. Mendia v. City of Wellington, No. 10-1132-MLB, 2010 WL 4513408, at *5 (D. Kan. Nov. 2, 2010), aff'd, 432 F. App'x 796 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff's § 14141 action is therefore dismissed.