No. 05-07-00617-CR
Opinion Filed January 7, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 219-81961-06.
Before Justices O'NEILL, RICHTER, and LANG. Opinion By Justice O'NEILL.
MICHAEL J. O'NEILL, Justice.
A jury convicted Anthony Lee Mendez of possession with intent to deliver four grams or more, but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine, and assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment and a $5000 fine. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm.
Background
On August 9, 2006, McKinney police officers were dispatched to a car dealership on a disturbance call between a man and his girlfriend that could possibly involve a firearm. When officers arrived, they saw appellant and his companion Rocky Margraves walking from the service center area and getting into appellant's vehicle. Several officers saw Margraves reaching towards the floorboard area when he got into the vehicle. The officers detained appellant and Margraves, then patted them down for weapons. One officer pulled a sandwich bag containing marijuana out of appellant's pocket. The officer arrested appellant. At the same time, another officer arrested Margraves after he found a large amount of cash in Margraves' pocket. Officer Jose Quiles testified that when he searched appellant, he found two blue plastic bags in appellant's pockets. One bag contained cocaine that was individually packaged in seven small baggies, and one bag contained methamphetamine that was individually packaged in twelve small baggies. Officer Devin McAloon testified that when he searched Margraves, he found $6,686 in cash in his pockets. Margraves said he was carrying the cash to purchase a car at the dealership. Officer Randall Meyer testified that when he searched appellant's vehicle, he found a loaded Glock .40-caliber handgun underneath the front passenger seat where Margraves had been sitting. None of the officers found any drug paraphernalia on appellant or in his vehicle. All of the officers testified they believed appellant and Margraves were selling drugs together. Officer Keith Lee testified that based upon his experience and training, people who sell drugs often do so in teams of two, with one holding the actual product and the other holding the money. Further, the presence of more than one type of drug also indicates an intent to sell those drugs. Officer Quiles testified that based upon his experience and training in drug dealing, he believed the amount of drugs found in appellant's pockets was substantial and not for personal use. Narcotics detective Chris Grollnek concurred that the amount of drugs found in appellant's pockets indicated they were not for personal use. Grollnek testified the cocaine found in appellant's pockets totaled 2.91 grams and had a street value from $40 to $80 per gram, and the methamphetamine totaled 5.28 grams with a street value from $50 to $100 per gram. Grollnek testified he believed the amount and packaging of the drugs indicated they were to be redistributed and were not for personal use. Officer McAloon testified the fact that appellant had the drugs and Margraves had a large amount of cash and a gun indicated they were working together in selling the drugs. Appellant did not testify during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. Applicable Law
In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Bates v. State, 155 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 282 (U.S. 2007); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 87 (U.S. 2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly or intentionally possessed with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (d) (Vernon 2003). To do so, the State had to prove appellant exercised actual care, control, or management over the methamphetamine and knew it was contraband. See Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The control over the contraband need not be exclusive, but can be jointly exercised by more than one person. See id. at 831. Links between appellant and the contraband must be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). No set formula of facts exists to dictate a finding of links sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession. See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 830. It is the logical force of the evidence, and not the number of links, that supports a fact-finder's verdict. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 166 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). Possible links include: (1) whether the accused was present when the drugs were found, (2) the amount of drugs found, (3) whether there was drug paraphernalia found with the drugs, (4) the manner of packaging of the drugs found, and (5) whether the accused possessed weapons or a large amount of cash. See Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd). Discussion
The jury was charged it could find appellant guilty of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine as a principal, guilty as a party to the offense, guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession of methamphetamine, or not guilty. The jury also received the same charge with respect to the cocaine. The jury reached a guilty verdict in the methamphetamine case, but deadlocked in the cocaine case. The trial judge declared a mistrial in the cocaine case, then proceeded to the punishment phase in the methamphetamine case. Although appellant concedes the evidence was sufficient to prove he possessed methamphetamine, he argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show his intent to deliver it. Appellant asserts that because there was not a large quantity of drugs found, and the money and gun found did not belong to him, the evidence is insufficient to show intent to deliver. Appellant also contends that because the jury rejected the officers' testimony in the cocaine case, and both the methamphetamine and cocaine were found in the same pocket, the evidence is logically insufficient to find him guilty in the methamphetamine case. The State responds that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Officers found twelve individually packaged baggies that contained methamphetamine in appellant's pockets. Appellant's companion carried almost $7000 in cash in his pocket, and a loaded firearm was found under the seat where he had been sitting. There was no drug paraphernalia found on appellant or inside his vehicle indicating appellant was a drug user. Several officers testified the quantity of methamphetamine and the manner in which it was packaged indicated it was for resale and not for personal use. Grollnek, a narcotics detective, testified the quantity and manner of packaging of the methamphetamine indicated an intent to deliver the drugs. Grollnek's and other officers' testimony concerning intent to deliver refuted appellant's hypothesis of possession for personal use. See Branch v. State, 833 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd); see also Jones v. State, 195 S.W.3d 279, 288 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). Moreover, the officers testified the presence of both methamphetamine and cocaine indicated an intent to sell the drugs, and people who sell drugs usually travel in pairs with one typically carrying the drugs and the other carrying the cash and a weapon for security. It was the jury's function to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9. The jury is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence, and we must afford due deference to its determination. See Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625. The jury was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Viewing the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's convictions for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415; Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 166; Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92. We resolve appellant's issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.