Opinion
24A-CT-114
06-05-2024
Ruben Mendez, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Starbucks Corporation and Crossings at Hobart-I, LLC, Appellees-Defendants
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Matthew J. Warring Sophia J. Arshad Arshad, Pangere and Warring, LLP Merrillville, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE - STARBUCKS CORPORATION Mark M. Holdridge Hume Smith Geddes Green and Simmons LLP Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE - CROSSINGS AT HOBART-I, LLC Crystal G. Rowe Jacob W. Zigenfus Kightlinger & Gray, LLP New Albany, Indiana John H. Halstead Samantha J. Mihail Kightlinger & Gray, LLP Merrillville, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable Stephen E. Scheele, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45D05-2001-CT-000016
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Matthew J. Warring Sophia J. Arshad Arshad, Pangere and Warring, LLP Merrillville, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE - STARBUCKS CORPORATION Mark M. Holdridge Hume Smith Geddes Green and Simmons LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE - CROSSINGS AT HOBART-I, LLC Crystal G. Rowe Jacob W. Zigenfus Kightlinger & Gray, LLP New Albany, Indiana John H. Halstead Samantha J. Mihail Kightlinger & Gray, LLP Merrillville, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FELIX, JUDGES
Statement of Case
[¶ 1] In 2018, Ruben Mendez was exiting his car to visit a Starbucks store when he slipped and fell in an icy parking lot owned by Crossings at Hobart-I, LLC ("Crossings"). Mendez sued Crossings and Starbucks Corporation ("Starbucks") for negligence, and Crossings and Starbucks (collectively, the "Defendants") separately filed motions for summary judgment on Mendez's claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and denied Mendez's subsequent motion to correct error. Mendez now appeals and presents one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
[¶ 2] We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Starbucks, reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Crossings, and remand for further proceedings on Mendez's claim against Crossings.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶ 3] At approximately 7 a.m. on January 24, 2018, Mendez parked in a handicapped parking space in the parking lot at the Starbucks store located in a strip mall at 2381 East 81st Avenue, Hobart, Indiana. As Mendez was shutting his car door, he slipped and fell, landing on his buttocks and elbow. Mendez believed he fell because "the ground was kind of real lightly snow covered . . . and apparently there was ice underneath." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 135; Appellant's App. Vol. III at 88. Mendez got up by himself and proceeded into the Starbucks store. According to Mendez, some Starbucks employees had seen him fall and asked if he was hurt, to which he responded, "I think more my pride than anything else." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 144; Appellant's App Vol. III at 97. After receiving his order, Mendez left the Starbucks store, got back in his car, and went to work.
[¶ 4] At the time of Mendez's fall, Crossings owned the strip mall in which the Starbucks store was located, and Starbucks leased its space from Crossings. Pursuant to Section 1 of Starbucks's lease with Crossings, Starbucks leased 2,000 square feet of floor area from Crossings, and pursuant to Sections 6.1 and 6.2, Starbucks was generally responsible for maintaining the leased space while Crossings was generally responsible for maintaining the common areas of the strip mall, including the parking lot.
[¶ 5] Additionally, Crossings had contracted Advance Sweeping Services, Inc. ("Advance") to perform snow and ice removal in the parking lot of the strip mall. The day before Mendez's fall, six Advance employees spent four hours applying salt to the strip mall's parking lot. The day of Mendez's fall, but after he fell, eight Advance employees spent four hours applying salt to the strip mall's parking lot. Weather reports show that there was likely between 0.01 and 0.02 inches of ice on the ground and trace amounts of snow accumulation in the Hobart area. Mendez did not see ice on the ground either before or after his fall; rather, he "knew [the ice]" was on the ground because he could "feel it." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 143-44; Appellant's App. Vol. III at 96-97.
[¶ 6] On January 4, 2020, Mendez sued Starbucks, Crossings, and Advance for negligence relating to his 2018 fall. On December 23, 2022, Advance filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty to remove snow and ice from the parking lot where Mendez fell. On March 3, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Advance.
[¶ 7] On July 12, 2023, Crossings filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it did not violate any duty owed to Mendez. Two days later, Starbucks filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it did not control or possess the area where Mendez fell. Mendez filed his responses to the Defendants' motions. The trial court granted the Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Mendez subsequently filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued.
Mendez fails to provide record citations for all statements of fact-including quoted material-in the Argument section of both his briefs, which violates Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Starbucks fails to support several statements of fact and law with citations to the record and authority, respectively, which violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Likewise, Crossings fails to support several statements of fact and law with citations to the record and authority, respectively, which violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), and it fails to provide record citations for all statements of fact in the Statement of Case section of its brief, which violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). The parties' noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 does not substantially impede our review of this appeal, so we choose to address the merits thereof. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). We remind counsel that the purpose of our appellate rules-especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs-"is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case." Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021)).
Discussion and Decision
[¶ 8] Mendez argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, we review summary judgment decisions de novo, which means we apply the same standard as the trial court. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 644 (Ind. 2023) (quoting 624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Hous. Auth., 193 N.E.3d 381, 384 (Ind. 2022)). Summary judgment is proper only "if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). "A fact is 'material' if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is 'genuine' if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences." City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009)).
[¶ 9] We consider only those portions of the pleadings, depositions, and any other matters specifically designated to the trial court by the parties for purposes of the summary judgment motion. T.R. 56(C), (H). We resolve "all factual inferences and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue" in favor of the nonmovant. Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). In so doing, "we give careful scrutiny to make sure the nonmovant's day in court is not improperly denied." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016)).
[¶ 10] The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wireman v. LaPorte Hosp. Co., 205 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Serbon v. City of E. Chicago, 194 N.E.3d 84, 91 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022)), reh'g denied (Apr. 5, 2023), trans. denied, 211 N.E.3d 1007 (Ind. 2023). Only if the moving party meets this prima facie burden does the burden then shift to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Serbon, 194 N.E.3d at 91).
Mendez's claims against the Defendants are based solely on negligence. "The essential elements for a negligence action are '(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a breach of the duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach of duty.'" Yost v. Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 515 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. 2011)). "Absent a duty, there can be no breach and, hence, no liability." Pennington v. Mem'l Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc., 223 N.E.3d 1086, 1096 (Ind. 2024) (citing Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar &Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016)). Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care "is a question of law for the court to decide." Id. (quoting Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386-87). Both Starbucks and Crossings sought summary judgment, asserting they did not owe Mendez a duty of care. We address each party's arguments in turn.
Starbucks Did Not Owe Mendez a Duty of Care Regarding Dangerous Conditions in the Strip Mall's Parking Lot
[¶ 11] Starbucks sought summary judgment, asserting that it did not owe Mendez a duty of care because it did not possess the parking lot in which he fell. Crossings is the lessor of the Starbucks store and the owner of the store and parking lot; Starbucks is the lessee of the store. When a landowner is a lessor and the lessee is in full control of the leased premises, the lessor "under many circumstances has no liability to tenants or others for injuries on the property." Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 515 (quoting Dutchmen Mfg., Inc. v. Reynolds, 849 N.E.2d 516, 525 (Ind. 2006)). Here, per the terms of the lease between Starbucks and Crossings, the leased premises consists of only the Starbucks store and does not include the parking lot outside of the store. Mendez has not designated any evidence that demonstrates Starbucks exercised any control over or otherwise possessed the parking lot, so we must conclude that Starbucks did not owe Mendez a duty of care regarding the condition of the parking lot. See Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 515-16; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965). Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Starbucks.
Crossings Owed Mendez a Duty of Care Regarding Dangerous Conditions in the Strip Mall's Parking Lot, and Questions of Fact Remain that Prevent Entry of Summary Judgment
[¶ 12] Crossings sought summary judgment, asserting it did not owe Mendez a duty regarding potentially slick conditions because those conditions were open and obvious, and, in the alternative, it took reasonable care of the premises and thus did not breach its duty to Mendez. As the owner and possessor of the parking lot, Crossings is subject to liability for Mendez's fall-related injuries if, but only if, (a) Crossings knew or by the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered the slick conditions, and should have realized that those conditions involved an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees; (b) Crossings should have expected that Mendez would not discover or realize the danger of the slick conditions, or that he would fail to protect himself against the danger; and (c) Crossings failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Mendez against the danger. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965); Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097 (recognizing adoption of Section 343).
Crossings does not dispute that Mendez was an invitee.
[¶13] As our Supreme Court has explained:
Under this test, foreseeability is an element of duty. The duty to exercise reasonable care extends to an unreasonable risk of harm that the defendant should realize exists and should expect invitees to overlook or fail to protect themselves against.
In cases involving conditions on the land or premises, section 343's foreseeability analysis focuses specifically on the condition that allegedly resulted in injury.Pennington, 223 N.E.3d at 1097 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists Regarding Whether the Slick Condition of the Parking Lot Was Open and Obvious
[¶ 14] Crossings contends that Mendez's claim is barred under the open and obvious rule. Section 343A(1) of the Restatement Second of Torts provides that a "possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any . . . condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." See PSI Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 829 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965)), aff'd on reh'g, 834 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Helms v. Carmel High Sch. Vocational Bldg. Trades Corp., 854 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 2006); Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965)). For a dangerous condition to be "known," the invitee must not only know the condition exists, but also must recognize the condition is dangerous and "the probability and gravity of the threatened harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmt. b (1965). For a dangerous condition to be "obvious," "both the condition and the risk [must be] apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment." Id.
[¶ 15] Here, Crossings has designated evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mendez, shows Mendez looked at the surface of the parking lot before exiting his vehicle and saw that it was covered in a "real light dusting" of snow. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 84. However, Crossings has not designated evidence that shows Mendez knew there was ice on the ground. Mendez's deposition testimony demonstrates the presence of ice was not readily apparent before or even after his fall, yet Crossings's designated weather reports indicate that there was likely ice on the ground. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Mendez knew there was ice or whether the presence of ice was obvious.
A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists Regarding Whether Crossings Exercised Reasonable Care in Protecting Mendez from the Slick Condition of the Parking Lot
[¶ 16] Crossings next argues that to the extent it owed Mendez a duty of care, it exercised reasonable care in protecting Mendez from the danger of ice and snow. "If a duty of care exists, the determination of whether a breach of duty occurred is a factual question requiring an evaluation of the landowner's conduct with respect to the requisite standard of care." Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 20 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (quoting Countrymark Coop. Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), trans. denied). Accordingly, summary judgment is "rarely appropriate" in negligence cases because they "are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person-one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Id. (quoting Countrymark Coop., 892 N.E.2d at 688).
[¶ 17] Regarding snow and ice removal, a possessor of land has "a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to maintain its business premises, including ensuring that the sidewalks and parking lots are in a reasonably safe condition. This duty includes clearing areas such as sidewalks and parking lots of the natural accumulations of snow and ice." Henderson v. Reid Hosp. &Healthcare Servs., 17 N.E.3d 311, 319 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). In such circumstances, "the landlord or landowner is entitled to actual or constructive notice of the presence of snow or ice and a reasonable opportunity to remove it." Id.
[¶ 18] In support of its motion for summary judgment, Crossings points to several weather reports and Advance's treatment of the parking lot. In particular, Crossings's designated evidence shows it had contracted Advance to perform snow and ice removal in the parking lot of the strip mall. The day before Mendez's fall, six Advance employees spent four hours applying salt to the strip mall's parking lot. The day of Mendez's fall, but after he fell, eight Advance employees spent four hours applying salt to the strip mall's parking lot. Weather reports show that there was likely between 0.01 and 0.02 inches of ice on the ground and trace amounts of snow accumulation in the Hobart area. While this designated evidence shows that Crossings took some efforts to remove snow, ice, or both from the strip mall parking lot, we cannot say as a matter of law that Crossings's efforts were reasonable; that is a question for the finder of fact. See Miller, 45 N.E.3d at 20 (quoting Countrymark Coop., 892 N.E.2d at 688).
[¶ 19] Furthermore, Crossings has not designated evidence that demonstrates when it received notice of slick conditions at the strip mall or that it had and took advantage of a reasonable opportunity to remove those slick conditions. Crossings therefore failed to meet its prima facie burden. See Wireman, 205 N.E.3d at 1045 (citing Serbon, 194 N.E.3d at 91); Henderson, 17 N.E.3d at 319. Based on the foregoing, summary judgment in favor of Crossings is inappropriate because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Crossings exercised reasonable care in addressing the slick condition of the parking lot.
Conclusion
[¶ 20] In sum, Starbucks did not owe Mendez a duty of care regarding snow and ice in the parking lot because Starbucks did not have possession of or control over the parking lot. There are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the slick condition of the parking lot was open and obvious such that Crossings did not owe Mendez a duty and whether Crossings exercised reasonable care in protecting Mendez from the slick condition of the parking lot. Accordingly, Starbucks is entitled to summary judgment on Mendez's negligence claim against it, but Crossings is not entitled to summary judgment on Mendez's negligence claim against it. We therefore affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Starbucks, reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Crossings, and remand for trial on Mendez's negligence claim against Crossings.
[¶ 21] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.
Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.