Once the propriety of the intervention is raised, the intervenor must show she has a "present justiciable interest," "legal or equitable, in the lawsuit." Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982). If an intervenor fails to prove that she has a present justiciable interest in the proceeding, the trial court "may dismiss the intervention," id., or, in appropriate circumstances, sever or separately try it.
Sufficient cause exists for striking an intervention when a would-be intervenor faced with a motion to strike cannot demonstrate a justiciable interest in the lawsuit. Zeifman, 229 S.W.3d at 464 (citing Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499-500 (Tex. 1982); Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. v. Ghiasinejad, 109 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); McCord v. Watts, 777 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ)). This justiciable interest may be either legal or equitable in nature, but must be present and not merely remote or contingent.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 60. When an intervention is challenged by a party's motion to strike, the intervenor bears the burden to demonstrate a "justiciable interest" in the pending suit. In re Union Carbine Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. 2008); Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982); Zeifman v. Michels, 229 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex.App. 2007, pet. denied). The Texas Supreme Court explained the "justiciable interest" requirement:
Sufficient cause exists for striking an intervention when a would-be intervenor faced with a motion to strike cannot demonstrate a justiciable interest in the lawsuit. Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499-500 (Tex. 1982); see Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. v. Ghiasinejad, 109 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); McCord v. Watts, 777 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, no writ). This justiciable interest may be either legal or equitable in nature but must be present and not merely remote or contingent.
Sufficient cause exists for striking an intervention when a would-be intervenor faced with a motion to strike cannot demonstrate a justiciable interest in the lawsuit. Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499-500 (Tex. 1982); see Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. v. Ghiasinejad, 109 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); McCord v. Watts, 777 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, no writ). This justiciable interest may be either legal or equitable in nature but must be present and not merely remote or contingent.
Once a motion to strike has been filed, the burden shifts to the intervenor to show a justiciable interest in the lawsuit. Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982).
Once a motion to strike has been filed, the burden shifts to the intervenor to show a justiciable interest in the lawsuit. Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982). "[T]he 'justiciable interest' requirement is of paramount importance: it defines the category of non-parties who may, without consultation with or permission from the original parties or the court, interject their interests into a pending suit to which the intervenors have not been invited."
If any party to the pending suit moves to strike the intervention, then the intervenor has the burden to show a justiciable interest in the pending suit. In re Union Carbide, 273 S.W.3d at 154-55; Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982); In re Estate of York, 951 S.W.2d 122, 126 n.3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ) ("[T]he intervenor should be given an opportunity to explain, and show proof of, its interest in the lawsuit."); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Pennzoil Co., 866 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (concluding that "a motion to strike a plea in intervention is akin to a special exception or to a motion for summary judgment, asserting that, as a matter of law, the opposing party could not have brought the action or would not be able to defeat recovery"). While the determination of whether a justiciable interest exists based on the pleadings would appear to present a pure question of law, the ultimate determination of whether an intervention should be struck, even if a justiciable interest is shown, has long been held to be vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to strike a petition in intervention for abuse of discretion. See Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982); In re J.P., 196 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, "without reference to any guiding rules or principles."
Thus, Foster Parents must show the trial court abused its discretion in striking their petition in intervention. See Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex.1982) ("It is settled law that a motion to strike an intervention is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."). Before reaching that issue, we first consider the threshold issue of whether Foster Parents had standing to intervene in the Department's suit.