Opinion
01 Civ. 4157 (GEL)
February 26, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
In this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hilden Mendez, a New York State prisoner, sues several correctional officers he claims used unnecessary and excessive force against him, or failed to intervene to protect him during the beating, as well as higher-level prison supervisors whose personal involvement in the incident in question is obscure or non-existent. Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that Mendez has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies within the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). Mendez argues that the exhaustion requirement does not apply to this case, and that if it does, he has satisfied it.
I
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
This is a sensible requirement. Prisoners often resort to federal court to challenge prison rules, practices and regulations. But state prison systems typically provide grievance procedures that offer a forum for prisoner complaints about conditions of confinement. Requiring prisoners to resort first to such procedures has several advantages: If the prison authorities respond favorably to the complaint, the prisoner receives prompt relief, the parties and the courts are spared the burden of litigation, and the strains on federalism of federal court intrusion into state prison administration are avoided. Moreover, federal constitutional constraints on the policy choices of state prison administrators are quite limited, and prisoners may well obtain relief that would be unavailable in federal court by persuading wardens of the merits of their proposals. If the prison authorities reject the grievance, the state's official position on the prisoner's complaint will often be authoritatively clarified by the administrative proceeding.
It may seem strange to apply this provision to the present lawsuit. Mendez does not question any policy, procedure or regulation of DOCS that affects his or other prisoners' daily life in confinement, nor does he claim that being beaten by guards is a routine or condoned part of regular prison life. In normal English usage, the claim that a guard on a single occasion used excessive force — in violation not only of constitutional commands but of DOCS' own regulations — is not a complaint about "prison conditions" but about a particular isolated incident.
Considerations such as these prompted the Court of Appeals for this Circuit to hold that the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) does not apply to excessive force suits. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court, however, has taken a different view, reversing Nussle and holding that the requirement does indeed apply to suits such as this. Porter v. Nussle, No. 00-853, 2002 WL 261683 at *10 (Feb. 26, 2002). It is not for this Court to judge the persuasiveness of the Supreme Court's reasoning, but only to follow what the Supreme Court says is the command of the statute. This lawsuit, therefore, can only proceed after Mendez has exhausted any available administrative remedies.
II
Mendez claims, however, that he has satisfied this requirement, pointing out that he filed a grievance through the appropriate channels, and appealed the adverse finding. But the exhaustion requirement is not satisfied until the administrative process has reached a final result. The documents Mendez submits demonstrate that he has filed an appeal, and that through "administrative oversight" the appeal was not initially processed. (P. Mem. Ex. E.) The documents go on to state that the appeal has now been "forwarded to Central Office Review Committee (CORC)" for "final disposition" and is "pending review by CORC." (P. Mem. Ex. D, E.) Thus, as far as the record before this Court shows, at the time the complaint was filed, administrative review had not been completed, and the requirements of § 1997e(a) had not yet been met.
Of course, in the time that this matter has been pending, administrative remedies might well have been finally exhausted. In that event, it might seem efficient simply to find out what had happened to plaintiffs appeal, and proceed accordingly. However, the Court of Appeals has ruled that from the broader perspective of Congress and appellate judges, the greater good forbids allowing a case to proceed where administrative remedies have been exhausted while the complaint is pending, and requires in such a case dismissal of the complaint, to be re-filed, if the plaintiff wishes, with the addition of paragraphs explaining how administrative remedies have been exhausted. Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001).
Thus, the complaint must be dismissed. When these hurdles have all been cleared, and the administrative remedies duly exhausted, assuming that the plaintiff is not by then exhausted, he will most likely re-file essentially the same lawsuit. If it is meritorious, much time will have been wasted; if it is meritless, no court time will be saved, as the Court will still be faced with the same case to adjudicate. And the interests of efficient judicial administration will thus presumably have been served.
Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed.