Opinion
No. 14-06-00965-CV
Opinion filed January 29, 2008.
On Appeal from the 234th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2004-22790.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, GUZMAN, and PRICE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Denia M. Mendenhall appeals a summary judgment in favor of the Estate of James Mendenhall, Deceased. In one point of error, Denia Mendenhall contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on res judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises out of a claim filed by Denia Mendenhall (Appellant) against the estate of her father, James Mendenhall. The estate of James Mendenhall (Appellee) was administered in Sangamon County, Illinois, the county of the decedent's residence at the time of his death on August 8, 2003. In October of 2003, Appellant initiated judicial proceedings in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois, to serve as Administrator of her father's assets. Subsequently, Celina Wise, sister of the decedent, produced a will for probate. The will named Celina Wise as sole beneficiary, and was admitted to probate with Celina Wise being appointed executrix of the estate on November 3, 2003.
On May 3, 2004 Appellant filed suit against the estate of her father in the 234th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas seeking damages for rape, assault, battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary and familial duty, and negligent parenting for torts allegedly committed in Texas. On May 4, 2004, Appellant served notice of her Texas claim on the estate of James Mendenhall and executrix Celina Wise in Illinois. This notice was filed with the Illinois probate court and included a copy of the petition filed in the Texas court. Appellant argues that this filing merely placed the probate court on notice that a lawsuit had been filed in Texas. Appellant further contends that the claim against the estate in Illinois was for the amount of any judgment which would be obtained in the Texas cause of action. However, Appellee argues that this filing asserted a claim in the Illinois probate court against the estate in the judicial proceeding already pending. Appellee further contends that the claim asserted in Illinois was identical to the claim asserted in Texas.
On August 1, 2005, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment in Illinois, based on deemed admissions. Appellant responded by filing a motion to strike the Appellee's motion for summary judgment and deemed admissions, arguing that the Illinois court should decline to entertain jurisdiction and defer to the Texas court. The Illinois court disagreed with Appellant and denied her motion to strike and granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment. In the order granting summary judgment, the Illinois court found, inter alia:
1. Denia Mendenhall filed a claim herein on May 3, 2004, for damages for "rape, assault, battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary and familial duty and negligent parenting." Mendenhall attached to this claim a copy of the complaint which she filed for the same alleged acts in the 234th District Court of Harris County, Texas, numbered 2004-22790.
. . .
9. Based on the admissions made in the Demands to Admit, it appears that the Claimant, Denia Mendenhall, has no independent witness to corroborate her claims set forth in the claim filed herein and in the attached copy of her complaint filed in the 234th District Court of Harris County, Texas numbered 2004-22790.
Based on its findings, the Illinois court ordered as follows:
1. Summary judgment is granted in favor of CELINA WISE, as Independent Executor of the Estate of James H. Mendenhall, as to the claim filed herein by Denia Mendenhall.
2. The claim filed herein by Denia Mendenhall on May 3, 2004, for "rape, assault, battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary and familial duty and negligent parenting" incorporating the Texas complaint against the Estate of James H. Mendenhall, deceased, is dismissed with prejudice.
Appellant gave notice of her intent to appeal the summary judgment, but subsequently filed a reply brief advising that court that she was deferring the case to the "Federal Authorities." The Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court dismissed her appeal on June 12, 2006.
On August 1, 2006, Appellee filed its second amended answer in this case asserting that Appellant's claims were barred based on res judicata and Full Faith and Credit principles as a result of the judgment of the Illinois court. Appellee then filed a motion for summary judgment based on these theories. After hearing arguments and receiving supplemental briefing from the parties, the trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the traditional standard for summary judgment, we must determine whether the successful movant at the trial level carried the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). To be entitled to summary judgment, the defendant must conclusively negate at last one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). Under this standard, we take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, and we make all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). If the movant facially establishes its right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-movant to raise a genuine, material fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id.
III. ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
In a single issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment based on res judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Appellant contends that she only filed a cause of action in Harris County, and that the Illinois probate court did not have jurisdiction to render a decision regarding her Texas cause of action. Appellant therefore contends that Appellee did not prove all elements required for summary judgment because no final judgment existed regarding the Texas cause of action, and thus the court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
A. Adjudication of Claims by Illinois Court
After filing a cause of action against the estate of her father in Harris County, Appellant filed a pleading with the Illinois probate court entitled "Estate Claim — Tort," reciting the details of the cause of action filed in Harris County, and attached a copy of the pleading filed in Harris County. Although Appellant contends that this filing was merely to put the Illinois probate court on notice of the Harris County cause of action, this filing gave the probate court authority to adjudicate the claim. See Estate of Rice v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank Trust Co. of Chicago, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1137, 1139, 421 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (2d Dist. 1981) (holding that the trial court "had the authority to adjudicate the matter presented to it by the filing of the document in the form of a claim in the probate court . . . [and] the trial court was not obligated to treat the document filed in the probate proceedings as a mere notice of action pending"). Additionally, the order signed by the Illinois court granting the estate's motion for summary judgment is a final judgment that specifically addressed the Texas cause of action, as shown by the following language included in the judgment:
The claim filed herein by Denia Mendenhall on May 3, 2004, for "rape, assault, battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary and familial duty and negligent parenting" incorporating the Texas complaint against the Estate of James H. Mendenhall, deceased, is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Res Judicata
Appellee responded to the cause of action in Harris County by filing its second amended answer, asserting the affirmative defenses of res judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Appellee then filed a motion for summary judgment in Harris County based on res judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, precludes relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated or those arising out of the same subject matter that could have been litigated in the prior action. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents relitigation of particular issues already resolved in a prior suit. Id. The policies behind the doctrines reflect the need to bring all litigation to an end, prevent vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote judicial economy, and prevent double recovery. Welch v. Hbabar, 110 S.W.3d 601, 609 (Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Res judicata requires proof of the following elements: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised, or could have been raised, in the first action. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 654 (Tex. 1996).
Appellant claims that the estate was unable to satisfy the third requirement because the filing in the Illinois probate court was merely to place the court on notice of the claim pending in Harris County. Appellant contends the cause of action could not be raised in the Illinois proceeding because the Illinois Deadman's Statute barred certain admissions by the decedent that would be admissible under the Deadman's Statute in Texas; however, whether the Texas Deadman's Statute supports broader admissions by the decedent than the comparable Illinois statute has no bearing on the res judicata of the Illinois judgment. We conclude that the estate satisfied all three elements necessary for res judicata: (1) the probate court was a court of competent jurisdiction who rendered a final judgment on the merits regarding the Harris County cause of action, (2) both claims involve the same parties, and (3) the second action is based on the same claims that were raised in the first action. Because movant's summary judgment motion and evidence facially establish the defense of res judicata, and because the non-movant failed to raise a fact issue as to whether the affirmative defense was meritorious, Appellant's challenge to the summary judgment fails. Accordingly, we overrule this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment. Therefore we affirm the judgment of the trial court.