However, a handful of more recent cases would lead one to a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Lifestyle Family v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 256 Ga.App. 305 ( 568 S.E.2d 171) (2002); Centre Pointe Investments. v. Frank M. Darby Co., 249 Ga.App. 782 ( 549 S.E.2d 435) (2001); Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, 243 Ga.App. 584 ( 533 S.E.2d 136) (2000); Ideal Realty Co. v. Storch, 124 Ga.App. 271 ( 183 S.E.2d 520) (1971); Erwin v. Wender, 78 Ga.App. 94 ( 50 S.E.2d 244) (1948); Hendrix v. Crosby, 76 Ga.App. 191 ( 45 S.E.2d 448) (1947); Mendenhall v. Adair Realty Loan Co., 67 Ga.App. 154 ( 19 S.E.2d 740) (1942); Johnson v. Lipscomb-Weyman-Chapman Co., 46 Ga.App. 798 ( 169 S.E. 266) (1933). See, e.g., Killearn Partners v. Southeast Properties, 266 Ga.App. 508 ( 597 S.E.2d 578) (2004); Christopher Investment Properties v. Cox, 219 Ga.App. 440 ( 465 S.E.2d 680) (1995); Futch v. Guthrie, 176 Ga.App. 672 ( 337 S.E.2d 384) (1985); Nestlé Co. v. J.H. Ewing Sons, 153 Ga.App. 328 ( 265 S.E.2d 61) (1980); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga.App. 672 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (1978).

However, a handful of more recent cases would lead one to a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Lifestyle Family v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 256 Ga. App. 305 ( 568 SE2d 171) (2002); Centre Pointe Investments v. Frank M. Darby Co., 249 Ga. App. 782 ( 549 SE2d 435) (2001); Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584 ( 533 SE2d 136) (2000); Ideal Realty Co. v. Storch, 124 Ga. App. 271 ( 183 SE2d 520) (1971); Erwin v. Wender, 78 Ga. App. 94 ( 50 SE2d 244) (1948); Hendrix v. Crosby, 76 Ga. App. 191 ( 45 SE2d 448) (1947); Mendenhall v. Adair Realty c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 154 ( 19 SE2d 740) (1942); Johnson v. Lipscomb-Weyman-Chapman Co., 46 Ga. App. 798 ( 169 SE 266) (1933). See, e.g., Killearn Partners v. Southeast Properties, 266 Ga. App. 508 ( 597 SE2d 578) (2004); Christopher Investment Properties v. Cox, 219 Ga. App. 440 ( 465 SE2d 680) (1995); Futch v. Guthrie, 176 Ga. App. 672 ( 337 SE2d 384) (1985); Nestle Co. v. J. H. Ewing Sons, 153 Ga. App. 328 ( 265 SE2d 61) (1980); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672 ( 244 SE2d 622) (1978).

"It is a well-recognized rule that where the owner of property has listed it with a real-estate broker to be sold, and the broker procures a prospective purchaser, and the owner with knowledge of this fact intervenes or sells the property to the customer or prospective purchaser procured by the broker, an inference is authorized that the broker has earned a commission and can recover it from the owner." Mendenhall v. Adair Realty c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 154, 158 ( 19 S.E.2d 740). Where the testimony of a party is equivocal or contradictory it must be construed most strongly against him. Wood v. Frank Graham Co., 91 Ga. App. 621, 627 ( 86 S.E.2d 691). Admissions made in an answer are conclusive against the defendant so long as they remain in the pleadings.

TOWNSEND, J. 1. It is stated in Mendenhall v. Adair Realty c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 154, 158 ( 19 S.E.2d 740) as follows: "It is a recognized rule that where the owner of property has listed it with a real-estate broker to be sold, and the broker procures a prospective purchaser, and the owner with knowledge of this fact intervenes or sells the property to the customer or prospective purchaser procured by the broker, an inference is authorized that the broker has earned a commission and can recover it from the owner." Since the essential allegations of the amended petition, as set out in this statement of facts, affirmatively allege such a situation, the overruling of the general demurrer to the petition was not erroneous.

The jury was authorized, by accepting all of the broker's testimony, rejecting most of the defendant's testimony, and accepting in part and rejecting in part the testimony of the purchaser ( Brown v. O'Neal, 59 Ga. App. 560, 1 S.E.2d 601), to conclude that during the pendency of an agency, unlimited as to time, the broker communicated to the defendant his belief that the prospect would increase his offer by $1,000; that this was on or after June 12, and the defendant did not at that time indicate that she would reduce her price; but that on July 3 she contacted the prospect directly, and he at that time did accept her reduced offer to sell, which was $1,000 greater than his previously stated offer to purchase; that the prospect's desire to purchase the property had been procured by the plaintiff, and that it had remained constant from the time he first saw the property advertised for sale until he purchased it. In Mendenhall v. Adair Realty Co., 67 Ga. App. 154, 158 ( 19 S.E.2d 740), it is stated: "It is a well recognized rule that where the owner of property has listed it with a real-estate broker to be sold, and the broker procures a prospective purchaser, and the owner with knowledge of this fact intervenes or sells the property to the customer or prospective purchaser procured by the broker, an inference is authorized that the broker has earned a commission and can recover it from the owner." Accordingly, here, one construction of the evidence is such as to authorize a finding that the broker procured a prospective purchaser whom he believed, and so informed the owner, would purchase at a stated price, and that the owner, with knowledge of this fact, intervened and sold the property to the customer, before the conclusion of negotiations between them.