Opinion
December 27, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, as a matter of discretion, by deleting those provisions of the order which granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a) vacating a notice for discovery and inspection and limiting a notice to take deposition, and those branches of the motion are denied; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to set the time for compliance with the notice for discovery and inspection, and the time and place for taking the deposition.
Since certain enumerated demands in the defendant's demand for a bill of particulars did not seek an amplification of the pleadings, to limit the proof, or prevent surprise at trial, but rather sought evidentiary material, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in striking those demands (see, CPLR 3042 [a]; Keenan v Sears Roebuck Co., 193 A.D.2d 719; Scalone v Phelps Mem. Hosp. Ctr., 184 A.D.2d 65, 76; Twiddy v Standard Mar. Transp. Servs., 162 A.D.2d 264; Nuss v Pettibone Mercury Corp., 112 A.D.2d 744).
However, as the material requested in the defendant's demand for discovery and inspection was material and relevant to the defense of the action, the court improvidently vacated the demand (see, CPLR 3101 [a]; Bigman v Dime Sav. Bank, 153 A.D.2d 912). In addition, the defendant has also made a strong showing of necessity for the plaintiff's tax returns (see, Editel, N.Y. v Liberty Studios, 162 A.D.2d 345; Roth v American Colonial Ins. Co., 159 A.D.2d 370). Mangano, P.J., Rosenblatt, Lawrence, Copertino and Joy, JJ., concur.