Connecticut courts traditionally have held — in automobile tort cases — that the rule of lex loci delicti applies. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1977); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564, 280 A.2d 875, 876 (1971) (per curiam); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304, 216 A.2d 183, 184 (1966); Chasse v. Albert, 147 Conn. 680, 683, 166 A.2d 148, 150 (1960). Jeppesen relies on that rule.
In tort actions, Connecticut will generally employ the doctrine of lex loci delecti and apply the law of the state where the injury occurred. Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971). In contract cases, Connecticut has traditionally looked for guidance to the substantive laws of the state where the contract was formed or where the contract will have operative effect.
The modern trend has been to move away from the lex loci approach of the Restatement (First) to the more flexible approach of the Restatement (Second). This court previously has endorsed the use, in other contexts, of the Restatement (Second) approach to resolving choice of law questions. For example, although we traditionally had adhered to the lex loci delicti doctrine, which provides that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort claim should be determined by the law of the place of injury; see, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304-305, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928); we expressly abandoned "categorical allegiance" to that doctrine in O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 648, 519 A.2d 13 (1986), in favor of the Restatement (Second) approach. Id., 650.
"This court has traditionally adhered to the doctrine that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort controversy are determined by the law of the place of injury, or lex loci delicti. Gibson v. Fullin, [ 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977)]; Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928)." O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 637. Recently, however, we have recognized that, in certain circumstances in which the traditional doctrine does not apply, the better rule is the analysis contained in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws.
This court has traditionally adhered to the doctrine that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort controversy are determined by the law of the place of injury, or lex loci delicti. Gibson v. Fullin, supra, 411; Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928). Recently, however, we have recognized that there are circumstances in which strict application of the lex loci delicti rule frustrates the legitimate expectations of the parties and undermines an important policy of this state.
At least twenty-eight jurisdictions have recognized the need to make a change in permitting one spouse to maintain an action against the other. Alabama, Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932); Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1966); Alaska, Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Arkansas, Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); California, Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962); Colorado, Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); McSwain v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 386 (E.D.Pa. 1968) (applying Colorado law); Connecticut, Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Idaho, Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974); Indiana, Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Kentucky, Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Layne v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1968); Massachusetts, Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1971); Michigan, Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Minnesota, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Nevada, Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); New Hampshire, Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Schneider v. Schneider, 110 N.H. 70, 260 A.2d 97 (1969); Taylor v. Bullock, 111 N.H. 214, 279 A.2d 585 (1971); New Jersey, Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); New Mexico, Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975) (intentional tort); New York, Jacobs v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 2 Misc.2d 428, 152 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup.Ct. 1956); Keller
In the second case, the fellow employee's contacts with Connecticut were as tenuous as those in the case before us. These cases were decided, of course, before 1967 when the Connecticut Legislature drastically limited the circumstances in which one could recover from a negligent fellow employee by enacting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-293a (1977). On the question of interspousal immunity, the Connecticut court consistently refused to allow one Connecticut spouse to recover from the other who allegedly operated a motor vehicle negligently in a foreign jurisdiction where the local law denied one spouse the capacity to sue the other, even though Connecticut law did not bar such an action as to a Connecticut accident. Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564 (1971), and cases cited. Finally, the result was changed prospectively by statute.
We have held that in motor vehicle cases "[t]he creation and extent of liability are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed." Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734, 142 A.2d 527; see Murray v. Milford, Connecticut, 380 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir.); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 280 A.2d 875; Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304, 216 A.2d 183; Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 283, 113 A.2d 509. In other words, the law of the state where the tort is committed governs the substantive elements of the cause of action and the law of the forum determines the remedy.
The law in Connecticut is clear that in motor vehicle cases "`[t]he creation and extent of liability are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed.' Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734, 142 A.2d 527; see Murray v. Milford, Connecticut, 380 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. [1967]); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 280 A.2d 875; Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304, 216 A.2d 183; Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 283, 113 A.2d 509." Gibson v. Fullin, Supra, 411.
For many years Connecticut followed strictly the rule of lex loci delicti by which the law of the place of injury would apply. Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 280 A.2d 815 (1971). That rule changed, however, to one in which the law of the forum in which the claim was brought would apply if it was determined that the forum state possessed the "most significant relationship" to the occurrence and the parties.