Samuels v. State, 849 N.E.2d 689, 690 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied; Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 981 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans, denied. The only inquiry which is relevant to this determination is whether the kind of claim advanced by a petitioner in the post-conviction court falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon that court by constitution or statute. Samuels, 849 N.E.2d at 690-91; Members, 851 N.E.2d at 981.
[¶10] The State's assertions are grossly overbroad. In support of those statements, the State cites Membres v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied, and Kimrey v. Donahue, 861 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), trans. denied. In Membres, we simply held that the post-conviction petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his request for additional credit time. 851 N.E.2d
[6] [5] When a request for educational credit time is denied, "a person must exhaust his administrative remedies within the [Department of Correction ("DOC")] before appealing to a court because determinations altering credit time are the responsibility of the DOC." Stevens v. State, 895 N.E.2d 418, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); see also Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 982-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In Members, we concluded that
(6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy[.]Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 981-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [8] On appeal, Woodring does not identify the subsection of Post-Conviction Rule 1 that applies to his breach of plea agreement claims.
denied. When educational credit time is denied, a person must exhaust his administrative remedies within the DOC before appealing to a court because determinations altering credit time are the responsibility of the DOC. Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). In this appeal, Stevens filed an appendix, which he alleges contains the materials he filed with the trial court and which were returned to him when the court denied his petition.
Another is when it appears to the court on appeal that the proceeding below adjudicated an unauthorized petition for post-conviction relief. Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 981 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). But, to repeat, such orders typically express the court's concern that it does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Res judicata, however, is a substantive defense, not a matter of jurisdiction.
We find authority for the second ground on which the Court of Appeals dismissed in Members v. State, where Hollis Members filed a petition for the award of educational credit time for a high school diploma he had received. 851 N.E.2d 979 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). Members's appeal was dismissed because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies with the DOC.
Accordingly, Williams is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. See Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (noting that IDOC is responsible for post-sentencing credit-time determinations and that defendant must "exhaust all of his administrative remedies with the [IDOC] before resorting to the judicial system")
We cannot say the PCR court erred in finding Jenkins failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.See, e.g., Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (dismissing appeal because PCR court had not had authority to review petition for educational credit time when petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies). We note the post-conviction court entered two final orders.
Doctor, however, contends that this court, via its motions panel, has already considered the merits of this issue and denied the State's motion to dismiss. Although we are reluctant to do so “absent clear authority establishing that it erred as a matter of law[,]” it is well established that our court “has inherent authority” to reconsider any ruling by the motions panel “while an appeal remains in fieri. ” Treacy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 634, 636 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citing Davis v. State, 771 N.E.2d 647, 649 n. 5 (Ind.2002), abrogated on other grounds by In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965 (Ind.2014) ), trans. denied; Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 981 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). [14] In this case, there is no dispute that Doctor's interlocutory appeal is discretionary rather than a matter of right.