Opinion
Case No. 2D17-3446 Case No. 2D17-3446
10-14-2020
Jonathan MELVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Jonathan Melvis, pro se. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Jonathan Melvis, pro se.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellant's motion for rehearing is granted to the extent that the opinion dated June 28, 2019, is hereby withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted therefor. In all other respects, the motion is denied. Appellant's motion for rehearing en banc is denied. Appellant's motion for certification is denied.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.
MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, CLERK
Jonathan Melvis appeals an order summarily denying his amended motion to correct illegal sentence, which he filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Because Mr. Melvis's argument in ground two of his motion is conclusively refuted by the record, we affirm the denial of relief on that ground without discussion. We write to explain our affirmance of the summary denial of relief on ground one.
Mr. Melvis was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for aggravated battery with great bodily harm while using a deadly weapon. He committed the offense when he was fifteen years old. We affirmed Mr. Melvis's judgment and sentence without written opinion. Melvis v. State, 967 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). After the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and the Florida Legislature adopted chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, Mr. Melvis filed a motion and an amended motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing in ground one that his sentence is unconstitutional and that he is entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220. In Graham, the Supreme Court adopted a categorical rule prohibiting the imposition of a life sentence without parole on juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide offenses. Subsequently, the legislature adopted chapter 2014-220 to satisfy the dictates of Graham. Mr. Melvis argued that his sentence is unconstitutional under Graham and its progeny because those cases require the trial court to take into consideration during sentencing his lessened culpability as a juvenile at the time of his offense and his greater capacity for rehabilitation. He also argued that his sentence fails to provide him with a meaningful opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation as required by Graham. He sought resentencing under chapter 2014-220, codified in pertinent part at sections 775.082 and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2015), in accordance with the holdings in Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015), and Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015), so that he could obtain review of his sentence after fifteen years.
Mr. Melvis was initially charged with attempted first-degree murder but entered an open guilty plea to the reduced charge of aggravated battery with great bodily harm while using a deadly weapon under section 784.045(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
We observe that Mr. Melvis would not be entitled to judicial review of his sentence for a nonhomicide offense punishable by up to thirty years' imprisonment under sections 775.082(1)(b), (3)(a)(5), (3)(b)(2), (3)(c), and 921.1402(2) because those provisions do not apply to his offense. See State v. Purdy, 252 So. 3d 723 (Fla. 2018) (observing that the special sentencing rules for juveniles convicted of certain serious felonies that were adopted in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2015), "by their express terms, apply only to homicide offenses ... and nonhomicide offenses that can be punished by life").
The postconviction court summarily denied relief on ground one. Citing to Williams v. State, 197 So. 3d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), the court stated that Mr. Melvis's thirty-year sentence was not unconstitutional under Graham and its progeny because it did not constitute a de facto life sentence. The court reasoned that because Mr. Melvis's sentence was not unconstitutional under Graham, he was not entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220. After the postconviction court denied Mr. Melvis's motion for rehearing, he filed this appeal.
Because it appeared that Mr. Melvis was entitled to relief under the thencontrolling Florida case law interpreting Graham, we directed the State to respond. In its response, the State conceded that Mr. Melvis's sentence was unconstitutional under Graham and that he was entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220. While the State's response was pending, the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018). Shortly after the State filed its response, the court issued its decision in Franklin v. State, 258 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 2018). Because Michel and Franklin called into question, without directly disapproving, the rationale in the Florida Supreme Court's and this court's prior cases interpreting Graham, we directed the State to supplement its response to address the effect of Michel and Franklin on Mr. Melvis's argument in ground one. Following the State's supplemental response and Mr. Melvis's reply, we issued a decision affirming the postconviction court's order without written opinion.
This case law included the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017) ; Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 2016) ; Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015) ; and Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015), as more fully discussed below. It also included this court's decisions in Cuevas v. State, 241 So. 3d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ; Blount v. State, 238 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ; Alfaro v. State, 233 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ; and Mosier v. State, 235 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), in which we found that sentences for terms of years similar to that imposed on Mr. Melvis were unconstitutional under the Florida Supreme Court's decisions interpreting Graham and that the defendants in those cases were entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220.
Mr. Melvis thereafter filed a motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc. In his motion, he argues that our decision affirming his thirty-year sentence overlooked our holdings in Cuevas v. State, 241 So. 3d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ; Blount v. State, 238 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ; Alfaro v. State, 233 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ; and Mosier v. State, 235 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), in which we found that sentences for terms of years similar to his were unconstitutional under the Florida Supreme Court's decisions interpreting Graham. We held that the appellants in those cases were entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220 in accordance with the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017) ; Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 2016) ; and Henry, 175 So. 3d 675. Mr. Melvis also filed a motion to certify conflict with the decisions in Alfaro, 233 So. 2d 515, and Burrows v. State, 219 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). We stayed disposition of these motions pending the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 2020), which reviewed a Fourth District decision that certified conflict with Cuevas, Blount, Alfaro, Mosier, Burrows, Katwaroo v. State, 237 So. 3d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), and Tarrand v. State, 199 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
In Pedroza, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the Fourth District's decision upholding a forty-year sentence for second-degree murder imposed upon a juvenile offender. 291 So. 3d at 543. The supreme court held that the sentence was not unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which extended the holding in Graham to juvenile homicide offenders, and that Pedroza was not entitled to resentencing. Id.
In reaching this holding, the supreme court noted that the above conflict cases required resentencing for juvenile offenders who had received similar or lesser term-of-years sentences. Id. at 544-45. These holdings were based upon the district courts' interpretation of the supreme court's decisions in Kelsey and Johnson as mandating resentencing for all juvenile offenders sentenced to more than twenty years' imprisonment without the opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Id. In disapproving the conflict decisions, the supreme court stated that "to the extent [it] ha[d] previously instructed that resentencing is required for all juvenile offenders serving sentences longer than twenty years without the opportunity for early release based on judicial review, it did so in error." Id. at 543. The court clarified its statement in Henry that under Graham the Eighth Amendment "is implicated when a juvenile nonhomicide offender's sentence does not afford any 'meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,' "as applicable only to " 'lengthy' term-of-years sentences that approach or envelop the entirety of a defendant's 'natural life.' " Id. at 546. (quoting Henry, 175 So. 3d at 679.). In addition, it clarified its holding in Kelsey requiring resentencing for juvenile offenders sentenced to more than twenty years' imprisonment as limited to a "narrow class" of juvenile offenders who had sentences that violated Graham and were resentenced before the adoption of chapter 2014-220. Id. at 546-48. The court also receded from the test it had announced in Johnson, which set forth requirements for a juvenile's sentence to comply with the dictates of Graham. Id. at 548. The Johnson test stated that for a juvenile sentence to be constitutional under Graham, the juvenile must be given an opportunity for release before the end of the sentence, the opportunity must be based upon demonstrated rehabilitation and maturity, and the opportunity must be provided before the end of the juvenile's natural life. Id. at 548 (quoting Johnson, 215 So. 3d at 1243 ). In receding from the Johnson test, the supreme court held that "a juvenile offender's sentence does not implicate Graham ... unless it meets the threshold requirement of being a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence." Id. at 548. Finally, the court disapproved the holdings in Cuevas, Blount, Alfaro, Mosier, Burrows, Katwaroo, and Tarrand "to the extent they hold that resentencing is required for all juvenile offenders serving a sentence longer than twenty years without the opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 549.
Applying the supreme court's decision in Pedroza to Mr. Melvis's arguments in this case, we must conclude that his thirty-year sentence is not unconstitutional under the holding in Graham because it is not a life sentence or the functional equivalent of a life sentence. Accordingly, he is not entitled to resentencing. We therefore affirm the postconviction court's order denying Mr. Melvis's amended motion to correct illegal sentence.
Affirmed.
NORTHCUTT, SILBERMAN, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
Judge Silberman has been substituted for Judge Crenshaw, who was on the original panel.