Opinion
No. COA10-1115
Filed 19 July 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by petitioner from order entered 14 May 2010 by Judge James U. Downs in Macon County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 February 2011.
Jones, Key, Melvin, Patton, by Richard Melvin, for petitioner-appellant. Womble Carlyle Sandridge Rice, PLLC, by Elizabeth K. Arias, for respondent-appellee.
Macon County No. 10 SP 33.
Petitioner Richard Melvin appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the issue in this case has already been decided by a Florida court, the United States Constitution requires that North Carolina give full faith and credit to the order entered in Florida. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court.
Facts
Mr. Melvin is the son of Marie K. Melvin who died testate on 22 May 2006. At the time of Ms. Melvin's death, she was domiciled in the State of Florida. Respondent Wachovia Bank, N.A. was named personal representative of her estate. Because Ms. Melvin was a Florida resident at the time of her death, Wachovia administered her estate in Florida. Wachovia also served as trustee of Ms. Melvin's Living Trust created under a trust agreement dated 2 September 2005 ("the 2005 Trust").
Ms. Melvin had a second separate living trust created in 1983 ("the 1983 Trust"). Mr. Melvin and Wachovia were co-trustees of the 1983 Trust. The 1983 Trust provided that administration expenses of Ms. Melvin's estate would be paid by the 1983 Trust.
In the course of administering Ms. Melvin's estate, Wachovia determined that it needed to transfer title to property owned by Ms. Melvin in Macon County, North Carolina from the estate to the 2005 Trust. In order to do so, Wachovia opened an ancillary administration file in Macon County. On 20 February 2007, Wachovia, in its capacity as personal representative of Ms. Melvin's estate, executed a deed transferring title of the Macon County real estate to the 2005 Trust. Wachovia filed a North Carolina Final Account for the estate on 12 August 2008. The Final Account indicated that no administrative fees were paid to Wachovia for the ancillary administration of the estate in North Carolina.
On 26 August 2008, following a motion by Wachovia, the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, Florida, Probate Division, entered an "Agreed Order Granting Petition to Determine Personal Representative's Fees, Trustee's Fees and Attorney's Fees" (the "Florida order"). The Florida order states:
1. The Personal Representative's fees, the Trustee's fees and the Attorney's fees requested in the petition are approved in the following amounts:
a. Personal Representative's and Trustee's fees totaling $44,571.76 of which $29,777.34 have been previously paid. This amount includes all fees for Wachovia Bank, N.A. as ancillary administrator in Macon County, North Carolina; and
b. Attorney's fees in the amount of $46,101.00, plus costs in the amount of $1,471.31 for a total of $47,481.31.
2. The extraordinary fees of the Personal Representative requested by Wachovia Bank, N.A. in the petition are reduced by $4,000 to a total amount of $2,197.50; and
3. Pursuant to Article Ninth of The Marie K. Melvin Living Trust u/a/d September 2, 2005, the above amounts are to be paid by the Trustees of the Marie K. Melvin Living Trust u/a/d July 15, 1983.
This Order intentionally does not address the allocation of these fees as that issue was not before the Court at this time.
(Emphasis added.) There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Melvin appealed the Florida order.
In January 2010, Mr. Melvin filed a petition in Macon County Superior Court. The petition alleged that Wachovia "charged a fee through the domicillary [sic] estate, according to [Mr. Melvin's] information and belief, in excess of $10,000.00 for purported `services' related to North Carolina property owned by decedent Marie K. Melvin in file #06-E-312, including executing a deed as trustee under the testamentary trust of Marie K. Melvin dated September 2, 2005 (see Books #F-31 at page 2070 and #I-31 at page 451 in the Office of the Register of Deeds for Macon County, North Carolina) without qualifying as such pursuant to N.C.G.S. Chapter 36C." According to the petition, the fees charged by Wachovia were "excessive and unreasonable" and should be returned to the 1983 Trust.
Wachovia moved to dismiss the proceeding on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and lack of standing. In an order entered 19 March 2010, the Clerk granted the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, Mr. Melvin filed a notice of appeal to superior court and a petition for writ of mandamus "to compel the exercise of jurisdiction."
On 14 May 2010, the trial court entered an order finding the following:
1. Marie K. Melvin was a Florida resident whose estate was administered in Florida by [Wachovia]. [Wachovia] was named as the personal representative of the Estate under Ms. Melvin's Last Will and Testament.
2. The only action taken by [Wachovia] in North Carolina with respect to the Estate of Marie K. Melvin was an ancillary administration of the Estate conducted in Macon County. A copy of all documents filed in the ancillary administration, including a copy of Ms. Melvin's Last Will and Testament, is located in Macon County Estate File No. 06 E 312.
3. [Wachovia] and [Mr. Melvin] serve as co-Trustees of the Marie K. Melvin Living Trust dated July 15, 1983. The Marie K. Melvin Living Trust is domiciled and administered in Florida.
4. A Florida Order entitled Agreed Order Granting Petition to Determine Personal Representative's Fees, Trustee's Fees and Attorney's Fees was entered by The Circuit Court For Palm Beach County, Florida, Probate Division, on August 26, 2008 in File No. 502006CP002712XXXXMB (the "Florida Order"). The Florida Order awarded both personal representative fees and trustee fees to [Wachovia].
5. The Florida courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any and all issues related to the fees awarded to [Wachovia] in the Florida Order.
6. The North Carolina courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised in [Mr. Melvin's] Petition, including all issues related to fees paid to [Wachovia] (whether paid as personal representative fees or trustee fees) under the Florida Order.
7. Where, as in this matter, appeal of a matter is the proper remedy, mandamus is improper and a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus must be denied.
The decretal portion of the order indicated that the court was affirming the order entered 19 March 2010 "on the basis that the North Carolina courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised by [Mr. Melvin] in this matter." The court also determined that mandamus was improper and, therefore, denied the petition for writ of mandamus. Mr. Melvin filed notice of appeal from the 14 May 2010 order.
Discussion
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling that North Carolina lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. "The standard of review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, a court may consider matters outside of the pleadings." Keith v. Wallerich, 201 N.C. App. 550, 554, 687 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
Mr. Melvin has violated various provisions of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, including single-spacing his brief. In our discretion, however, we elect not to sanction Mr. Melvin for those violations.
While Mr. Melvin claims that North Carolina is not bound by the Florida order, Wachovia insists that North Carolina is required to give full faith and credit to the Florida order. "The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires North Carolina to enforce a judgment rendered in another state, if the judgment is valid under the laws of that state." Fla. Nat'l Bank v. Satterfield, 90 N.C. App. 105, 107, 367 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1988). See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state."). See also Thrasher v. Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. 534, 543, 167 S.E.2d 549, 555 (1969) (holding that North Carolina courts must give full faith and credit to decree of Massachusetts court and that "this bars the plaintiff from this collateral attack in North Carolina").
In researching this issue, we have looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. In Amant v. Callahan, 341 Ark. 857, 861, 20 S.W.3d 896, 898 (2000), the Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed with the appellants' assertion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause barred certain Arkansas fee awards in an Arkansas probate proceeding to the extent those fee awards had previously been denied in Oklahoma. The court observed that the Arkansas trial court had found that many of the fees at issue consisted of fees expressly denied by the Oklahoma probate court in an ancillary proceeding, a decision not appealed by the appellees in Oklahoma. Id. After noting that the Oklahoma court had jurisdiction over the proceeding before it, the Arkansas Supreme Court held: "[T]he orders of the Oklahoma probate court concerning fees to the executor, attorney, and accountant for the estate are entitled to full faith and credit under the United States Constitution and are therefore impervious to collateral attack in Arkansas state courts." Id. at 862, 20 S.W.3d at 899.
Here, there is no dispute that the Florida court had jurisdiction over the proceeding before it. Further, the Florida order stated that the fees it awarded included all fees for Wachovia as ancillary administrator of the Macon County property. The petition, in this case, attempts to litigate the same issue already decided by the Florida court. Consequently, we conclude that North Carolina was bound to give full faith and credit to the Florida order.
To allow Mr. Melvin's petition would be to allow a North Carolina court to review a Florida court's determination of the proper amount of fees to be awarded for administration of a Florida estate and trust. The Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits us from doing so. Any challenge to the Florida order should have been by appeal in Florida and not through a collateral attack in North Carolina.
We note that Sisk v. Transylvania Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 364 N.C. 172, 695 S.E.2d 429 (2010), the only authority cited by Mr. Melvin in arguing that a "North Carolina Court is not bound by a ruling of another State," does not address the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In Sisk, the Supreme Court simply held that a North Carolina trial court deciding whether to revoke the pro hac vice status of two out-of-state attorneys because of violations of North Carolina's Rules of Professional Conduct was not bound by a Kentucky order in an unrelated case involving the same attorneys that concluded the attorneys had not violated Kentucky's ethical rules. Id. at 182, 695 S.E.2d at 436. Nothing in Sisk suggests that in this case a North Carolina court would have authority to effectively overturn the Florida order.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court properly determined that North Carolina lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Consequently, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).