LEWIS, J. We have for review State v. Melton, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM. Pursuant to the supreme court's mandate in State v. Melton, 786 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 2001), we have reconsidered our opinion in Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), in light of Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2000), State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2000), McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2000), and Ellis v. State, 762 So.2d 912 (Fla. 2000). Upon reconsideration, we withdraw our original opinion and remand to the trial court with directions to reinstate the original sentence.
The fourth district agrees. See McFadden v. State, 2000 WL 121793 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 2, 2000); Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Glave v. State, 745 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). But see Smith v. State, 754 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Newsome v. State, 2000 WL 256153 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 8, 2000); McDaniel v. State, 751 So.2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Jones v. State, 751 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, No. 00-282, 99-712 (Fla.
Contra Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659, 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Compare Dragani v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D1341, D1341 (Fla. 5th DCA June 1, 2000), with Alfonso v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D1016, D1016 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 26, 2000). While I would not have reached the constitutional question in Smith, see Lewis, 751 So.2d at 107 — and believe the question was wrongly decided there, see Adams, 750 So.2d at 661; Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188, 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Glave v. State, 745 So.2d 1065, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) — I am bound by Smith, which authorizes imposition of a concurrent sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. See Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), review granted, SC99-164 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000).
Aggravated battery with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)(d), Fla. Stat. One ground that trial counsel could possibly have raised with regard to the Prison Releasee Reoffender sentence was that Bright should not have been sentenced both as an Habitual Felony Offender and a Prison Releasee Reoffender. This court has agreed with the fourth district that a defendant may be sentenced for one offense as either a Habitual Felony Offender or a Prison Releasee Reoffender, but not both. See Lewis v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D144 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 30, 1999; Hamilton v. State, 2000 WL 276061 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 15, 2000); Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Glave v. State, 745 So.2d 1065-66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). However, that does not mean that the defendant is entitled to relief.
However, we agree with Dragani that the trial court should not have sentenced him for both crimes under both the Habitual Offender and the Prison Releasee Reoffender statutes. Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659 (Fla.4th DCA 1999); Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Glave. v. State, 745 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In Thomas v. State, 745 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), we held that concurrent sentences as a violent career criminal and a PRR for two counts of lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child, violated the defendant's double jeopardy rights.
We recognize that the Fourth District has ruled contrary to our opinion in Grant and has held that a sentence imposed under both the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act and the Habitual Offender Statute violates the principle of double jeopardy. See Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Adams v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2394 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 20, 1999); Glave v. State, 745 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Thus, we certify conflict to the extent our holding on the double jeopardy issue conflicts with the Fourth District's decision in these cases.
We agree. This court has recently held that a defendant may be sentenced for one offense as either a habitual felony offender or a prison releasee reoffender, but not both. See Adams v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2394-D2395 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 20, 1999); Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999);Glave v. State, 745 So.2d 1065-66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Accordingly, we reverse and remand solely for resentencing.
We recognize that the Fourth District has ruled contrary to our opinion in Grant and has held that a sentence imposed under both the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act and the Habitual Offender Statute violates the principle of double jeopardy.See Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Adams v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2394 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 20, 1999); Glave v. State, 745 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Thus, we certify conflict to the extent our holding on the double jeopardy issue conflicts with the Fourth District's decision in these cases.
We note, however, that the Fourth District has held that a sentence imposed for the same offense under both the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act and the Habitual Offender Statute violates the principle of double jeopardy. See Adams v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2394 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 20, 1999); Glave v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2546 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 10, 1999); Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188, 1999 WL 966743 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 8, 1999). Therefore, to the extent that our holding on the double jeopardy issue conflicts with the Fourth District's decision in these cases, we certify conflict.