Opinion
CASE NO. C09-0233-JCC.
July 29, 2009
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant City of Burlington, Youngquist, and Wilson's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14), Plaintiffs' Response (Dkt. No. 17), and Defendants' Reply (Dkt. No. 19). Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion for the reasons that follow.
Skagit 911 Emergency Communications is the only defendant that did not join in the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from the brief stop and arrest of Plaintiff Robert Melton by Burlington police officers Eric Youngquist and Stacy Wilson. Robert and Lori Melton bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers violated Robert Melton's civil rights when they briefly detained him based on reports that the vehicle he was driving was stolen.
Although this action is brought by both Robert and Lori Melton, the Court will refer to Robert Melton as "Plaintiff" for ease of reference.
On November 5, 2004, two women, Jessica Rainwater and Tessa Halterman, called Skagit 911 Emergency Communications ("Skagit 911") to report they were following a black Honda Civic, license plate number 281-PFG, that they believed had been stolen from their friend, Brynn Riggins. (911 Audio (Dkt. No. 16).) The emergency call was answered by Skagit 911 employee Thomas Burris, who was in communication with Halterman throughout the incident. (Burris Dep. 6:20-23 (Dkt. No. 15 at 18).) A second Skagit 911 employee, Krista Gottschalk, worked the call as a dispatcher, in tandem with Burris. ( Id.) While Burris was speaking with Halterman, Gottschalk simultaneously dispatched and communicated with the Burlington police officers. ( Id. 6:24-7:5, 16:5-9.) Meanwhile, Halterman and Rainwater continued to follow the suspected stolen vehicle, providing ongoing updates about its location. (911 Audio (Dkt. No. 16).) Within about six minutes of being dispatched, the responding officers were able to locate the suspect vehicle. ( Id.)
All of the relevant phone and radio communications relating to this incident are contained in two audio CDs that have been filed with the Court. ( See 911 Audio (Dkt. No. 16); Smith Decl., Exs. 1, 2 (Dkt. No. 15 at 4-7).) The Court has thoroughly reviewed the CDs, and neither party disputes their authenticity or accuracy.
The first officers to respond to the dispatch were defendant officers Wilson and Youngquist. (Youngquist Dep. 3, 7 (Dkt. No. 18 at 15-16).) A third officer, Officer Rogge, responded shortly thereafter and arrived on the scene in time to help make the arrest. (Wilson Dep. 6 (Dkt. No. 18 at 26).) Wilson and Youngquist located the suspect vehicle and decided to engage a felony stop. (Youngquist Dep. 7-8 (Dkt. No. 18 at 16-17).) Based on the information provided by dispatch, both officers believed the vehicle to be stolen at the time. ( Id. 12:24-14:12; Wilson Dep. 17 (Dkt. No. 15 at 30).) They identified a safe place to pull the vehicle over and approached the car with their weapons drawn. (Wilson Dep. 11-14 (Dkt. No. 15 at 26-29).) They then ordered the driver, Plaintiff Robert Melton, out of the car and onto the ground and handcuffed him. ( Id.) Plaintiff was compliant throughout the stop and detention. ( Id.) The officers detained Plaintiff for approximately five or six minutes before determining that the vehicle was not stolen. (Youngquist Dep. 28 (Dkt. No. 15 at 47).) Upon learning that Plaintiff was the registered owner of the black Honda Civic, license number 281-PFG, the officers immediately released him. ( Id.)
The confusion leading to the arrest was caused by a second vehicle, which was stolen, that had a very similar license plate number: 281-PZG. When Gottschalk ran a search for license number 281-PFG on her computer, the search yielded not only information about the vehicle belonging to Robert and Lori Melton, but also returned a hit for a "sound-alike" vehicle — a white Honda Civic with the license number 281-PZG that had been reported stolen. (Gottschalk Dep. 14:15-16:24 (Dkt. No. 15 at 11); Wilson Dep. 26 (Dkt. No. 15 at 33).) The confusion was not cleared up until shortly after Plaintiff had been arrested.
The relevant phone and radio communications leading to Plaintiff's arrest are preserved as audio recordings, establishing a record and a timeline of the incident. Below, are excerpts from the phone conversation between Halterman (the "reporting party") and Burris (the "call taker"), as well as the radio communications between Gottschalk (the "dispatcher") and the officers. These two different audio recordings are spliced together to create a narrative of the timeline of the events. The officers did not communicate directly with the reporting party, and the only information available to them regarding the description and location of the suspect vehicle was relayed by Gottschalk, the Skagit 911 dispatcher. ( See Wilson Dep. 17:21-18:8 (Dkt. No. 15 at 30-31).) Accordingly, their decision to stop the vehicle and arrest Plaintiff was based exclusively on that information, which is emphasized in bold below. 6:37:48 p.m. Recovered vehicle. SR 20 westbound into the city limits. Reporting party is following a black 1992 Honda Civic, license 281-PFG. Reporting is calling a friend to confirm that it is a stolen vehicle. 6:39:12 p.m. I'll be en-route to stolen, update on position. Vehicle now passing Seventh Day Church. Reporting party is following in a green Honda Civic two-door. Description of stolen and have you been able to confirm it? I believe the call taker is confirming that it was stolen out of Wenatchee. Running the plate now. It's 281-PFG. 6:41:19 p.m. The vehicle is now turning onto Fairhaven. I've run the plate on the vehicle, it comes back to a Robert and Lori Melton. Unsure if that is the correct plate, it could be 281-PZG. Received. We are out on Fairhaven. Suspect vehicle description? Suspect vehicle is a black 1992 Honda Civic. Check and advise of exact location now. 6:42:49 p.m. The vehicle is now at the Skagit Skate Park. The skate park or the skating rink? That would be the skating rink and license 281-PZG does return stolen out of PD Seattle. I will be behind that vehicle northbound on Spruce near the fire station. Copy, northbound on Spruce near fire station. I'm Fairhaven and Spruce, where do you want to stop it? 6:44:15 p.m. If you could come — we are ordering him out right now. . . . If there is a way you can stop traffic coming southbound. Received. 6:45:33 p.m. Right, we are out with the vehicle, felony stop Spruce between Sharon and Cedar. 6:48:27 p.m. One in custody, status 4. One in custody. One to run. Last of Melton. First of Robert, S., 9/4/59. 6:49:09 p.m. Where is the reporting now? Reporting party is a Tessa Halterman. I have a cell phone. Received. Confirming that the registration that is stolen is 281- PFG? Negative, 281-PZG. Received. Go ahead and run PFG and give me a read back. PFG returns to a black 1996 Honda Civic to a Robert Melton and Lori Melton of Brickyard Blvd., Sedro Woolley. 6:51:50 p.m. Drivers' on Melton. Go ahead. Returns clear and current. Also, the license plate 281-PZG is confirmed stolen out of Seattle. Which one's confirmed? License 281-PZG, on a white 1992 Honda Civic is confirmed stolen out of Seattle.
Some of the less pertinent dialogue has been omitted.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint in Skagit County Superior Court, alleging several state-law based causes of action. (Removal 1 (Dkt. No. 1).) After a number of hearings, the Superior Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's state law claims, but granted leave to amend his complaint. ( Id. at 1-2.) The Second Amended Complaint asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiff's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-19 (Dkt. No. 1 at 11-12).) In February 2009, Defendants removed the action to this Court, and have now moved for summary judgment.
II. APPLICABLE STANDARD
III. ANALYSIS
56Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242 248-50 Id. Id. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett477 U.S. 317322Anderson 477 U.S. at 250 Celotex477 U.S. at 323-24 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jackson v. City of Bremerton 268 F.3d 646650Fourth Amendment Id.
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint appears to attempt to assert a state-law negligence claim as well. ( See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-13 (Dkt. No. 1 at 10-11).) However, because all of Plaintiff's state-law claims were dismissed in state court, (Resp. 2 (Dkt. No. 17)), the only surviving claim removed to federal court is his § 1983 claim.
A. Probable Cause
A warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where it is supported by probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164, 175 (1949). Thus, the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim based on an alleged unlawful arrest. Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1966) ("[W]here probable cause does exist civil rights are not violated by an arrest even though innocence may subsequently be established."). Under federal law, "[p]robable cause exists where `the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76 ( quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). Stated differently, probable cause exists when "under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the arrestee] had committed a crime." United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986). Probable cause is an objective standard based upon the "totality of the circumstances" known to the officers at the time of arrest. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
Based on the facts and circumstances presented here, Officers Wilson and Youngquist had probable cause to initially arrest Plaintiff. The officers' decision to stop and briefly detain Plaintiff was based upon the information provided to them by Gottschalk, the dispatcher. Gottschalk specifically told the officers that the suspect vehicle was a "black Honda Civic, license 281-PFG." (911 Audio (Dkt. No. 16).) After receiving updates on the vehicle's location, Youngquist asked the dispatcher to confirm the vehicle's description and its status. ( Id.) Gottschalk replied that the "call taker is confirming the vehicle is stolen" and its license plate is 281-PFG. ( Id.) After running the plate, the dispatcher told the officers that the plate was licensed to Robert and Lori Melton, but she was " unsure if that is the correct plate, it could be 281-PZG." ( Id.) (emphasis added). Once the officers got close to the vehicle's reported location, Youngquist asked again, "Suspect vehicle description?" ( Id.) Gottschalk again confirmed, "Suspect vehicle is a black 1992 Honda Civic." ( Id.) Then, when the officers were just about to stop the vehicle, the dispatcher informed them that "license 281-PZG does return as stolen." ( Id.) (emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, the officers stopped the black Honda Civic. ( Id.) Given that the dispatcher repeatedly and consistently described the suspect vehicle as a black Honda Civic whose license was 281-PFG but "could" be 281-PZG — which was confirmed as stolen, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe the vehicle they located was stolen. Moreover, the officers' knowledge that the reporting party was following the suspect vehicle, providing details about its specific location, and confirming its stolen status, further supported their belief that the vehicle was stolen.
The confusion that led to the officers' mistaken belief that the vehicle was stolen was caused by a lack of communication by the dispatcher. When Gottschalk initially ran the 281-P F G license plate through the computer system, no stolen vehicle report returned for that plate; instead, she received a "sound-alike stolen" report for a license 281-P Z G. (Gottschalk Dep. 14:15-19, 15:17-22 (Dkt. No. 15 at 12).) But Gottschalk never told the officers that license 281-PFG came back as not stolen. ( Id. at 18:15-19:1.) Nor did she tell them that the confirmed stolen vehicle, license 281-PZG, was a white Honda Civic. ( See 911 Audio (Dkt. No. 16).) Instead, when asked for a description of the suspected stolen vehicle, Gottschalk again confirmed that it was a black Honda Civic. ( Id.) The revelation that the dispatcher had been relaying information regarding two different vehicles with different license plates, one reported as stolen and the other not stolen, did not occur until after Plaintiff had been stopped and arrested. ( See id.) Based on the information relayed by the dispatcher prior to the arrest, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the black Honda Civic they located was stolen. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (defining probable cause as "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt" that is "particularized" to the person seized). In short, the deficiency in this case was one of communication, not probable cause.
After carefully reviewing the audio recordings, the Court is convinced that the information communicated to the officers provided probable cause to justify Plaintiff's initial arrest. "In some instances there may initially be probable cause justifying an arrest, but additional information obtained at the scene may indicate that there is less than a fair probability that the defendant has committed or is committing a crime." United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007). This is such a case. The information communicated by the dispatcher to the officers, during the six minutes they spent locating the vehicle, established a reasonable basis to conclude that the vehicle Plaintiff was driving was stolen. As soon as additional information revealed that the vehicle was not stolen, the officers immediately released Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff's brief arrest was supported by probable cause, it was reasonable and permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law.
Because Plaintiff has not suffered a constitutional deprivation, his § 1983 claim against Defendant City of Burlington also fails as a matter of law. The Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to allege any basis whatsoever for establishing municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
B. Qualified Immunity
Even if the officers somehow lacked probable cause, Plaintiff's § 1983 against them cannot succeed because they would be entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields officers from a suit for damages if "a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). "Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law"). For example, in Hunter, the Supreme Court found that two secret service agents possessed probable cause to arrest a suspect. 502 U.S. at 228. The Court further found that, even assuming the agents erred in concluding that probable cause existed, they were nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because their decision was reasonable. Id. at 228-29.
Here, at the time the officers arrested Plaintiff, they possessed reasonable grounds to believe that the black Honda Civic was stolen. They had received confirmation of the specific description and location of the vehicle, as well as information indicating that the reporting party had confirmed the stolen status of the vehicle. Even assuming that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, they would be entitled to qualified immunity because their decision was reasonable, albeit mistaken. See id. 227-29.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14) is hereby GRANTED. Because Plaintiff's sole claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law, this case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED